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Introduction 
“Reality is merely an illusion, albeit a very persistent one.” — Albert Einstein 
 
When I started this project in 2007, I thought of it as a natural extension of the work of the 
Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. It was intended to be a comprehensive description 
on the nature and limits of language primarily based on Wittgenstein’s ideas presented in his 
first book, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.1 A modernized and simplified version of his ideas 
would be presented, restructured in a manner that seemed reasonable to me if Wittgenstein had 
had the capacity and predilection to do so. 
With the benefit of new research and the passage of time, some details of Wittgenstein’s 
analysis dissolved into generalizations, but the core concepts remained and took on a much 
greater extended life, well beyond what I imagine Wittgenstein could have envisioned, although 
at one time he did think that he had solved all the problems of philosophy. If I had to take a 
single core concept from Wittgenstein which encapsulates what I have come to understand 
about the human condition, it is: Language creates its own reality. The questions which arise 
about this statement leave so much to be answered. Is it the case in fact that language does 
create its own reality, and if so, how does this happen? And what do we mean by reality 
anyway? 
How can it be that we can go through life thinking we know the world when we cannot 
understand why we believe the things we do, or why the next person will believe something 
completely different given the same set of facts? How did the acquisition of language change the 
human mind? And how much can be said about the mind when consciousness is a near total 
mystery?  The Australian philosopher David Chalmers gives an excellent summary of the 
various positions and arguments concerning consciousness in his paper Consciousness and its 
Place in Nature (Chalmers, 2003). In the end, we simply cannot reconcile the material world 
described by science and the phenomenon of what it feels like to have a conscious experience.  
When I began this book I had not intended to cover the topic of consciousness, but after a period 
of time of putting words on pages, it seemed to flow naturally from the work on language. Once 
the meaning of language was clarified, it segued into some novel ideas about the 
phenomenological experience of consciousness. My own views on the subject are fairly close to 
those Chalmers classifies as type-F monism, or neutral monism. In this view, the 
phenomenological and the physical are intrinsically related. I believe the reader will find in the 
chapters that follow the development of a cohesive theory that reconciles the physical world 
with the phenomenological subjective experience.  
This book touches on a broad range of contemporary issues in science and philosophy, and in 
this world of specialization, I would expect few readers to have a deep familiarity with all of 
                                                             
1 Abbreviated as both Tractatus and TLP in this book. 
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them. Many topics not often discussed in the public arena, such as mathematical logic and 
quantum mechanics, are necessarily examined as they are germane to the central thesis. I have 
framed this book as a narrative in a style which is perhaps more in keeping with philosophy 
than science, although the boundaries are very much blurred, as most of the subject matter can 
be found in both disciplines.. Some of the ideas will be challenging enough without additional 
burdens. I have tried to be as inclusive as possible without sacrificing the essence of what the 
theory dictates. Many of the newer concepts presented are repeated throughout the book to 
afford the reader several variations on the general theme.  
If I were to advise the reader by offering one helpful suggestion, it is to be open-minded about 
one’s conception of reality. When we awake and open our eyes, it is that conscious experience 
that we typically label reality, and everything else must fall into place to account for that reality. 
But it is reality that should be the end product of our examination of the world; not something to 
be taken axiomatically. And when I say that language creates its own reality, I am putting reality 
in a contingent state until we examine all the elements that comprise that statement to a level of 
satisfaction whereby we are comfortable with our definition of reality. Therefore, the statement 
is both relativistic and unsettled all at once. It is best to throw away any concept of reality that 
might reside in one’s mind and start afresh. Only at the very end of our analysis of the evidence 
can we perhaps say: This is what we shall call Reality.  
When philosophers speak of ontology, or theories concerning existence, there is some 
preconceived notion of what we mean by the term existence, in that we have some idea of what 
it means to exist. Generally speaking, we have never fully recovered from the Cartesian ‘cogito 
ergo sum’ view of the world, as if thinking necessarily had something to do with existence. I 
would like to impress upon the reader that when we are not conscious there is nothing we can 
say about the existence of the world. We only surmise that it must go on without us. It is not an 
unreasonable assumption at all, but it leaves open the very problems that Chalmers outlines, in 
that this whole relationship of the physical and the phenomenological is unclear, to say the least. 
Furthermore, a word like existence represents a concept within language and is not necessarily 
related to anything outside of language. As will be shown, words have more to do with logic 
than existence. From a philosophical perspective, if we cover this ground thoroughly, the 
ontological should consequently emerge from this enquiry. 
We begin our journey without any ontological assumptions. Descartes is for the most part left 
behind, except for the quite important necessity of explaining dualism, i.e. why it seems that the 
mental and the physical are separate things. We will take a look at dualism, but without doubt, 
Cartesian concepts must be abandoned; they only need to be accounted for. The Cartesian idea 
of thinking is not ontological at all, but rather epistemological. Descartes might well have agreed 
with this, but turned thought into a starting point for epistemic certainty, and goes on from 
there. If I were to devise my own Cartesianesque monologue, it might begin like this: I think! 
Well, isn’t that strange; I wonder how that came about. Descartes however jumps to an 
ontological conclusion, when there remain deeper questions which are fundamentally 
epistemic. We should remember that Cartesian thinking originated in a pre-Darwinian world, 
when god was the creator of the god-like human, so it was not so fanciful to think that humans 
would be created so they could eventually come to know everything about the world and could 
entertain questions on the nature of existence, for god had taken sufficient care not to delude 
our thoughts.  
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It was not my intension to write a book about a conceptual reframing of how we view the 
universe, but it evolved in that direction during the course of its writing. Nevertheless, the core 
of the book remains about the nature and limits of language. Although some may find otherwise, 
I do not think the ideas about language presented here are speculative. They are more so a 
reformulation and expansion on Wittgenstein’s ideas from the Tractatus, and a new 
conceptualization of the universe came about through the insights gained from this initial line of 
inquiry. As with any theory not residing in the mainstream it is to some degree speculative, but 
not necessarily novel. Much support can be found in the writings of some of the most respected 
scientists and philosophers of our era. If I have done anything in this, it is putting a new twist on 
things so that a different, yet unified, picture of the world emerges.  
I loathe using the term Theory of Everything, because it has generally meant a unification of the 
theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, which customarily means formulating a theory of 
quantum gravity; and it seems a phrase that is a bit over the top as well. Although this book does 
not propose such a unification of gravity with the other forces of nature per se, it does cover a 
large swathe of theoretical territory regarding the workings of nature. There was a time when I 
would have thought it absurd to have language playing any significant role in the 
comprehension of the world, but now I am proposing that it is the sine qua non of making 
progress to understanding the universe from inception to the present. 
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Perspectives 
“The doctrine that the world is made up of objects whose existence is independent of 
human consciousness turns out to be in conflict with quantum mechanics and with facts 
established by experiment.” ― Bernard d'Espagnat 
 
Underlying the immense complexity that we see around us may well be a rather simple world at 
its core; perhaps the kind of world that some physicists believe might be as simple as a formula 
that can fit on the back of a tee shirt. It is just difficult to see this simplicity through the miasma 
of language and anthropocentrism. We go about our lives giving hardly a thought to how words 
come into our heads and how we can make sufficient sense of it all so that we usually 
understand each other with relative ease. Yet we have not come to grips with the mechanism 
which mediates our understanding of the world, the comprehension of which is perhaps even 
more challenging than the comprehension of the world itself. This mechanism of how things 
come to be understood by humans, as beneficial as it may be, nonetheless forms a barrier to a 
deeper understanding of the world in all of its many manifestations. 
Trying to make sense of the world has been the essential quest of philosophy and science 
through the ages. When we take stock of where we are in achieving this understanding of 
nature, it seems that three great perplexing questions stand out for which we have few answers. 
More than just questions, they represent gaps in our comprehension of what makes the 
universe tick. 
 What is the nature of belief? 
 What is consciousness? 
 What is the relationship between mathematics and the physical world? 
 
The answers to these three questions encompass the principal means by which we come to have 
knowledge of the world and will form the focus of this enquiry. When these questions are 
examined closely, we find that we actually know very little about any of them. So perhaps we 
should take one step back by first asking a single generic question: How do we come to know the 
world? 
The first, and most common way, is through our senses. This is how humans and other living 
things obtain knowledge about the environment, an obligatory knowledge that permits an 
organism to behave in a manner appropriate for the occasion. Let us focus first on how human 
beings come to know the world, just to avoid a discussion on what other forms of life may or 
may not know about the world. Through the generally acknowledged five senses (although if we 
look at neural pathways, there are many more), we receive information from the physical world, 
filter it through some mechanism, and interpret that information through the sensations of 
vision, audition, olfaction, etc.   
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This leads naturally into the second feature of how we come to know the world, consciousness, 
which seems to form a backdrop, or stage, on which the sensations of the world play out. 
Cognitive scientists like to describe this as what it is like to be something.2  Mental states 
supposedly have this phenomenological feature that differentiates them from physical states. I 
have classified this as a second feature of our knowledge, since we generally believe that the 
physical world goes on even if we are unconscious. We may be in a coma, and in due course we 
will die, yet we assume that the physical world will continue for others who remain conscious. 
At least this is the broad consensus of belief. The intriguing thing about consciousness is that 
this feature of nature, for which our understanding of the world totally depends, is for all intents 
and purposes a complete mystery. The so called hard problem of consciousness (perhaps best put 
why does it feel this way?) remains as far from resolution as ever. I would think that even if the 
most convincing arguments about consciousness were presented, and I was totally persuaded 
that an explanation for consciousness had been found, the question of why does it feel this way 
would remain. For the scientific community there seems little choice but to forget about this 
problem, brush it aside, and just move on to other things; but in a larger sense, we really cannot 
understand the world without making some headway in this area. The study of consciousness is 
not only a valid area for scientific enquiry, but perhaps the most important. The more I have 
thought about consciousness, the more I have come to believe that it is the lynchpin to which do 
much of scientific progress depends. 
The third way that we come to know the world, mathematics, is made possible only because 
humans acquired language. The relationship between language and mathematics, or more 
precisely logic, for logic forms the foundation for both language and mathematics alike, was 
explored by the aforementioned Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, who will feature 
prominently in this discourse. 
Not only do I hope to explore each of these areas separately, but also tie them together in a 
unified theory of nature. 
… 
When the question arises in a public forum of why people believe the things they do, as it had in 
the 2006 Australian Science Festival Debate, the usual answer is: We do not know (RN, 2006).3 
Incredibly, even scientists argue the case supporting their point view from their own 
perspective on quite a superficial level, as if it should be self-evident that one’s arguments 
should be self-evident and totally convincing. Upon reflection, one would have to wonder how 
we can have any confidence in our understanding of anything. If we admit that we have no idea 
how we come to believe something, what can we really say about anything which is not mere 
opinion and without foundation. Are we to think that faith alone is sufficient to make something 
true? This cannot be passed over lightly. It is difficult to move on to the next topic when we 
cannot offer any explanation for how it comes about, for example, that the words on this page 
                                                             
2 Terminology used in the philosophical debate on consciousness is discussed at length in the chapter on 
consciousness (page 58). 
3 For a good backgrounder on the subject of belief, see the ABC (Australia) Radio National broadcast on 
the subject. Much of what this book tries to resolve is discussed in this radio broadcast.  
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can be understood by readers, some of whom will agree with its arguments and some that will 
not. Furthermore, I may not be able to offer any proof or substantiation as to how, in any detail, 
I came upon these beliefs, nor how it will come about that the reader will interpret these ideas 
and to what degree it will influence the reader’s belief systems in turn. And I do not mean this in 
a superficial sense. I am referring to the brain function which receives, processes and evaluates 
sensory and linguistic inputs which lead to one having particular beliefs. I am not suggesting 
that this explanation includes a neuron by neuron firing report, but something more at the 
system level. In a computer analogy, I would not be hoping to report on the activity of every 
logic gate on a silicon chip, but would at least wish to be able to provide a system flow diagram, 
with a goal of presenting the computer program that runs the analogous brain function as well. 
The paucity of science community dialogue about belief is symptomatic of a taboo subject, 
which it effectively is, since it has been portrayed as an intrusion of science into areas 
traditionally covered by religion. It is a politically and socially sensitive area which most 
scientists tend to avoid. Only the likes of a Richard Dawkins or a Daniel Dennett, representative 
of the few who can rightly feel secure in their status as public intellectuals, have the confidence 
to make any foray into this magisteria  (as it has been so labeled). Their approach originates 
from a scientific perspective which examines other perspectives from within its own, arguing 
the authority of one supposed truth value over another coming from a different perspective. A 
more dispassionate and objective style is rarely seen, but will be the approach that is taken 
here. 
Religion tends to take center stage when addressing matters of belief, but it is by no means the 
only area covered by the term. Beliefs include such things as political leanings, racial 
perceptions, future success of a football team, and the physical appearance or intelligence of 
others as well as oneself. It is just the ubiquity of religion in human culture and the centrality of 
its role in so many lives that brings it to the forefront. The conflict between religious beliefs and 
scientific theory is often the focus of debate when the topic does arise, but the underlying 
mechanism for all types of belief is the same, only the specific neuronal details will differ. So at 
some physiological level the differences between beliefs should be represented by respective 
differences in neurological mappings, even if such mappings are beyond the realm of analysis at 
present. We should suppose that in the broadest interpretation of things that there is some 
configuration in spacetime which represents one’s particular belief; otherwise we might have to 
deduce that it comes about by some kind of magic.  
The fact that around 85% of the world’s population say they have religious beliefs, and around 
30% are covered by the most numerous group, Christianity, would imply on statistical grounds 
alone, that at least 70% of people are mistaken about the veracity of their belief system. 
Accordingly, we must ask how it is that so many humans could be so deceived in such an 
important part of their lives; many would say in the guiding force of life. I find it very odd indeed 
that the majority of individuals in any animal population could be so self-deceived about the 
context of their environment. It would not bode well for an animal to be so mistaken about its 
world, as if a wildebeest mistook a lion for a lamb. Self-deception seems so antithetical to the 
Darwinian process, in that it would seem to make the possessor of such beliefs less adaptive to 
its environment; one might be initially inclined to think that it must be a deleterious byproduct 
of natural selection. Deception of others is a common theme in the animal and plant kingdoms, 
but not self-deception. The fact that we do not observe other species with distorted views of 
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their world is suggestive that belief systems require deeper examination, and the fact that these 
other species do not have language and humans do is a good indication of where this is leading.  
It would seem a good point to pause here and state what I mean by perspective. By the very 
nature of this thesis, a certain degree of formality and structure is required. The reasons for this 
will become clearer in due course. Every hypothesis I make will be made within a system of 
understanding that will have within it some assumptions that cannot be proven (or more 
strictly, will have undecidable propositions).4 I hope to limit the number of these assumptions 
as much as possible (which is one of the points of this exercise), but it should be understood 
that every system of understanding or belief has some assumptions that cannot be proven. My 
approach to this subject about belief, and everything else in this treatise, assumes that all 
characteristics of living things come about via a Darwinian process. And in general, the 
assumptions underlying my perspective of the world will not venture too far from what would 
be considered mainstream science. It is the very nature of this treatise that it may challenge 
some interpretations of science, but the evidence based approach provided by the scientific 
method forms the foundation of my world view. It is quite clear that this will differ from 
perspectives that do not have the same assumptions, such as those of most religions. It is not my 
intention to condemn or deride these other perspectives, but rather to understand how they 
come about. I would assume that at least the 85% of the population that say they believe in god 
could not agree with my point of view without changing their underlying belief system, since my 
world view does not include deities. And it is probably far greater than that. This is of little 
concern, as I hope to describe a world within my belief system and say that this is how the world 
works given these assumptions, i.e., within this system. I make no judgment about other systems, 
except to state that they are different from mine. It is not a question of truth, but rather 
conformity with the system. If a fundamental Christian perspective was being advanced, and I 
wanted to check the standing of a proposition such as ‘the world was created in six days’, I would 
say that the proposition is true if I checked the Bible for conformity with that proposition, not 
any scientific body of evidence. It is unlikely that one would come to the same conclusion if the 
supporting structure for another belief system were used instead. What interests me here is not 
that one method of understanding the world might be right and another wrong, but rather why 
there are different perspectives at all, and how they come about. I hope to show that my 
particular perspective is in keeping with the spirit of the scientific method, in that it can only be 
said that a proposition generated from a system not conforming to the principles of the 
scientific method may not be true when viewed from within a system conforming to such 
principles. It is (unfortunately in some respects) necessary that such a strict interpretation need 
be adhered to, since things would flow so much more freely if not tied down by such formalities, 
but we need to be so careful about language, for it can very easily lead us off course. It should 
start to become evident that the workings of language and its limitations are central to one’s 
understanding of the world and what can be known about the world. This is the first taste of the 
difficulties of venturing into the recursive process of using language to examine language.  
Before we enter into a deeper examination of language, it is necessary to put ourselves into the 
most objective position possible, for the attempt of stepping out of language in order to examine 
it is like stepping out of one’s skin. It is not going to be easy. The extent of this bewitchment that 
                                                             
4 See Glossary: Formal Systems.  
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Wittgenstein refers to cannot be underestimated. It is, in fact, the core of the problem of making 
sense of the world.  
The task before us is to lose some of our anthropocentric disposition. But how is it possible to 
view the world in a non-human way while being human? And what does it mean to have a non-
human perspective anyway? For one, it will require a non-linguistic view of the world, while 
describing that view linguistically, since that is the only mechanism for making such a 
description. 
Another thing to keep in mind is that we tend to view the world from within our senses. For 
how else could it be viewed? Yet this view originates from a complex organism that has gone 
through 14 billion years of evolution from the event of the big bang. One should ask how the 
world might be viewed before there were humans, before there were animals, or even before 
there was life. The world was still going about its business, one would assume, without any 
human sensation to interpret it. Why should the world view of pre-human organisms have any 
less interpretive validity than the human one? How is the world to be regarded before the era of 
the human experience? It would seem that we need to go beyond a solely anthropocentric 
perspective if we are to resolve these issues. 
Often associated with anthropocentrism is a top down approach to how the world operates. This 
approach states that it is us, our will, our actions that make things happen in the world, and 
whatever we precisely mean by ‘our’, it is something that we believe is happening at a very high 
level; something we often call a conscious level. But then we must ask how do our conscious 
actions affect the molecules that supposedly bring our conscious actions into being, or the 
atoms within those molecules, or the protons, neutrons, quarks or whatever quantum building 
blocks that must change from one state to another to be in accord with our conscious actions. It 
is like a house deciding how the bricks are laid down to construct it. It would seem more 
sensible to have an approach where the bricks are building the house, rather than the other way 
around. The common belief of how things come about does not seem to hold up very well under 
just a modicum of scrutiny. This ‘god makes man, and man makes the rest’ viewpoint has swept 
through nearly all cultures and even into the scientific community.  
There are several things that support the view that the world is indeed a simple place. In the 
quantum mechanical depiction of the physical world, particles can seemingly be completely 
described at a point in time by their energy state, electric charge and spin (angular momentum). 
With the relatively small number of particles in the current standard model of particle physics 
(see Figure 1), this is not such a great amount of building blocks for such a large and diverse 
universe. Energy may take on many different forms and can be expressed in different ways, but 
the laws of physics state that we are dealing with a quantity which is conserved throughout time 
and space. That is, the amount of energy that we presently have in the universe is the same 
today as it was at the beginning of spacetime. Whether energy is expressed as heat or a 
vibrational frequency or motion or mass (rest energy) or momentum (a combination of mass 
and motion), whatever we started with is presumably still here today. So this thing we call 
energy is merely going through a transformation in time. And this transformation is said to be 
mediated by the four forces: Gravity, Electromagnetism, the Weak Force (radioactive decay) and 
the Strong Force that binds quarks in the nuclei of atoms. 
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Figure 1: The Standard Model of Particle Physics 
 
Electric charge and spin take on discrete limited quantities, which can be resolved as binary 
pieces of information. An electric charge is either positive or negative. Spin is either up or down, 
and takes on either whole or half integer values. When viewed from this perspective, there are 
not that many identifiers that define a particle (or should we say a point in spacetime). A 
description of the universe, from the quantum mechanical perspective at least, may well be 
presented as discrete transformations in space, in discrete units along the arrow of time. 
The binary process, where something can be categorized by having either one of two possible 
values, but no other values, e.g. true or false, on or off, 0 or 1, seems pervasive in all descriptions 
of the world. It is the simplicity of the binary process which makes the world a simple place, and 
this is what I mean when I say the world is a simple place. I hope to show in this treatise how 
the binary process, and its operation as described by mathematical logic, is essential to making 
sense of the world.  
The world can be viewed from many angles. Each perspective can tell a different story. How are 
we to decide which one, or combination of narratives, presents the most accurate depiction of 
the world? 5 
 
The Big Picture 
My personal perspective of the world is not the common sense viewpoint that most of us share. 
It may have been so some years back, but I became increasingly troubled by the lack of 
conformity in the various perspectives offered in contemporary times. In recent years, my 
                                                             
5 Many of the ideas discussed in this book are thoughtfully addressed in two papers by Dan Bruiger and  
present a comprehensive review of the mind-body problem and related issues (Bruiger, 2008, 2011).  
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picture of how the world is put together has migrated considerably from the consensus 
orthodoxy, so it would not be easy for the reader to delve right into the issues to be presented 
without offering some framework as guidance.  As such, it will be helpful to most readers if I 
break the suspense of how this book will end, so to speak, by presenting at the outset my broad 
vision of how the universe works.  
It may seem strange to begin this presentation with the relationship of language and logic, but I 
believe this will become clear in due course. For those who venture down that long tunnel that 
is Wittgenstein and manage to come out the other end intact, life is changed forever. There is no 
going back. The world is simply a different place. One sees meaning in the world as defined by 
language and the words objective and truth can never again sit comfortably side by side.   
A belief is a set of related true propositions. It should be obvious that it is linguistic, personal 
and subjective. A world view is a belief system; it hardly differs from a belief except that it is 
likely to be an aggregation of a number of beliefs which may not be clearly related until 
organized into a larger coherent unit. I use the terms organized and coherent to mean in the 
mind of the believer, and not in any objective sense.  
What can be said to be objective or subjective is an important theme in this thesis. And since 
this book contains words that are part of a language, hence, by my own definition it cannot be 
objective. Our respective individual world views are among the strongest beliefs that we have 
and are not readily changed. If a person is not predisposed to a world view which is similar to 
one’s own, there is a strong likelihood that this individual will not be receptive to a conflicting 
world view. If this sounds a lot like the preface to the Tractatus, it is because I have a shared 
understanding with Wittgenstein about how language works and recognize that it is not the 
mainstream view on this subject by a long shot. 
The relationship of language, our conscious experience of the world, the physical world itself 
and its information content, are all fundamental to the formation of a world view. However, 
these concepts are usually just considered part of the commonsense landscape and are seen to 
be just notions about how the world is, and needn’t be examined in any great depth. For in fact, 
most of science can continue unimpeded without any consideration of such matters, usually left 
to philosophers to hash out. 
At this point I would like to put together a few thoughts and thematic impressions which were 
influential in the formation of my world view. The meaning of ‘theme’ in this case is something 
that seems pervasive throughout the universe, in that it just seems to pop up wherever you look.  
At the top of the list is examining the limit of what is comprehensible by a human being. There is 
a strong foundational belief, particularly in Western theistic tradition, that Man, as God’s 
creation, has the capacity to completely comprehend the world, or at least come quite close; and 
furthermore, the world is presented to Man in a manner such that it is ostensibly and 
presumptively comprehensible, this being the notion that the physical world is the one and only 
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reality.6 This perspective is made to the exclusion of the notion that the world may be some 
filtered or transformative version of a more fundamental form of reality, which is presented to 
humanity through the interpretive mechanism of the conscious experience. Without a 
comprehensive understanding of what consciousness is, we should not accept, a priori, the 
experience it portrays of a physical world as something fundamental or objective. So for the 
moment, let us hold in abeyance our thoughts on the matter until a more convincing argument 
can be made one way or the other. 
Language is a recursive process, that is, we use words to describe other words and we use 
language to analyze what language is; sentences can be constructed with an unlimited number 
of embedded clauses in a nested series of self-reference. When we have a problem 
understanding something it is often because the words used in the description become spread 
out over an ever larger expanse of meaning, so much so that one might say that the meaning 
tends to become meaningless. If the definition or common usage of a term is sufficiently vague, 
it is hard to say what it means; the speaker, the listener, the writer and the reader all may have a 
different idea of the meaning to be conveyed. The word ‘consciousness’ is one example of this 
dilemma, where the term is used in common parlance, although there is barely an inkling of 
agreement of what it is supposed to mean. There are many points of view and positions on the 
matter, with not much accord to be found. I will therefore be as careful as possible when using a 
number of common usage terms which may have somewhat different nuances in practice. 
⋯ 
I came to read Jacque Monod’s Chance and Necessity (Monod, 1971) well before I first 
encountered Wittgenstein. I was very much a materialist at the time and thinking a great deal 
about natural selection, primarily due to the book The Selfish Gene (Richard Dawkins, 1976), 
which stirred my interest in the mechanism of evolution. Over the years the title words of 
Monod’s book have become thematic fixtures in my understanding of the universe; it just might 
convey more about the workings of nature than any book title I have ever come across. It is the 
ubiquity of the interplay of these two concepts, chance and necessity, which makes it 
conceptually so powerful. Although the book was ostensibly about biology, I see in the title a 
generalization of what is transpiring in a Darwinian process which extends beyond biology and 
the evolution of living things. So let’s take a look at the ideas encompassing these two 
pervasively important words.  
Necessity has a broad meaning in common parlance as well as in philosophy, particularly in 
reference to causality and determinism. We can think of the term to mean how one thing leads to 
another in a predictable way, in a sense that if this were not the case the world would fall apart, 
so to speak. For example, we expect that children will inherit some combination of genes from 
each of their parents and this will be portrayed in their phenotype, in accordance with the high 
                                                             
6 A spiritual reality would also be part of theistic tradition, but a spiritual perspective is not considered as 
a reasonable alternative here, even though it is recognized that historically mainstream perspectives with 
theistic origins dominate many common sense notions of reality. There is just no way to deal with this 
except from a historical perspective, lest we thrust ourselves into the commonplace science verses religion 
debate, which is something removed from this presentation. 
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fidelity of genetic replication. The rate of human genome mutation per nucleotide base pair per 
generation is estimated at around 1 in 4,000,000 (Nachman & Crowell, 2000). The large scale 
activities of the inanimate world also behave in calculable ways, even if our calculations must be 
approximations due to the complexity of interactions. The gravitational interplay amongst 
several celestial bodies is nearly impossible to calculate to a high degree of precision, yet is good 
enough to send satellites into the far reaches of space. The subatomic world also behaves in a 
quite predictable manner and is well defined by quantum mechanics, which also has its limits as 
to what can be precisely determined. Aside from these constraints, the universe is a fairly 
predictable place, and we can usually account for why things change over the course of time by 
applying some mathematical method to our observations. We may not be able to predict the 
weather as reliably as we would like, but we have a general idea about the contributing factors 
which cause it to change and evolve over time. These types of observations have led to the 
causal determinism which embodies the physical sciences.  
Yet for all this predictability in nature, some things happen by chance alone, which itself is a 
necessity of nature; for without chance, the evolution of the universe would be totally 
deterministic from beginning to end. The deeper philosophical question is whether the 
randomness we observe is truly random and not some feature of determinism at a level beyond 
our ability to calculate. From what we are able to measure, it would seem that randomness, 
ranging from genetic mutation to radioactive decay is truly random, in that there is not enough 
information in the universe to make these events predictable.  
Necessity brings stability to the world and chance makes evolution by natural selection possible. 
Deism, theism and atheism all leave room for this interaction of chance and necessity, despite 
the wide variations in these belief systems. But it should be seen that without true randomness, 
an omnipotent god of some sort would have to be the creator of the universe, for if nothing were 
left to chance, the evolution of the universe would be known at the outset or would be part of an 
experiment or simulation for which prior knowledge existed. We can only conjecture about this 
as it clearly extends beyond the limitations of our knowledge, in that it is a dialogue about 
something outside the time and space of our universe. 
My own opinion is skewed by another theme of the universe, conservation. Given the various 
laws of conservation, from energy to angular momentum, it would seem to require a lot more 
information to create a universe which is completely deterministic than one which could evolve 
by some heuristic process brought about by innate randomness. It is easier to argue the case for 
a simpler process explainable within the universe than having to resort to extra-universal 
causation. Of course, those with a more religious bent would disagree with this position, but I 
think it is more in keeping with the principles of Ockham’s razor, in that the universe can evolve 
a near infinite number of outcomes with roughly the same information, while a fully 
deterministic universe can produce just one. More on this later, but first I would like to return 
briefly to the discussion on causality, but taken from a somewhat different angle. 
The manner in which causality fits with one’s conceptualization of the world is critical to one’s 
theoretical construction of that world. It can be said that this notion of causality is an 
epistemological necessity in understanding the world, for we can only make sense of the world 
from the passage of one state of affairs to another. And by extension, it can be said that this 
notion is a linguistic necessity as well, for the rules of language also, at least tacitly, assume 
some form of Kantian causality. Without this causal necessity the ability for linguistic 
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representation breaks down, for the idea of predication is meaningless if one state of affairs 
cannot be distinguished from another. The notion of causality wells up from the necessity of 
distinguishing objects in spacetime.  The circularity in reasoning that arises in the discussion of 
causality points to the interdependence of these concepts, such that, if we refer to our 
understanding of the world through language, then a Kantian form of causality is taken 
axiomatically, including the perception of objectivity. It cannot be otherwise. If some other 
notion of physical relationship, such as non-local quantum causality is entertained, then that 
relationship cannot be rationally constructed with the tools available to the human mind. This is 
the reason why many concepts from quantum theory are so difficult to grasp, and why quantum 
entanglement causes such a conceptual problem. Anything that attempts to deconstruct the 
presumption of causality in our thinking is doomed to fail. In the end, causal constructions are 
very much subjective even though we all seem to share, more or less, the same notion of 
causality. Notions of causal objectivity are inferred by induction, which is fair enough, but not 
necessarily the case.7 The limitations of language and rationality will have something to say 
about that, and we use the term objective at our peril. 
It is nonsense to describe the world outside of these precepts. So how are we to make sense of 
the world? To speak of objectivity or ontology in a philosophy of the world is useless, as it falls 
outside the boundaries of what is possible to construct within the apparatus of our rational 
mind, i.e., the apparatus of language. Any rational construction of the world is thus an epistemic 
endeavor.  
So the first notion of the world that needs to depart is that of ontic reality. It is a presupposition 
about the world which may be convenient, but is hardly supported by the evidence. A starting 
point of ontic reality is certainly not a philosophical position with any sort of neutrality, as it is 
supported by an unfounded a priori bias. Yet it is very difficult indeed to let go of both the word 
and notion of ‘reality’. Why is this so? It’s simple! We open our eyes, we see the world and there 
it is; so we naturally assume that must be reality. And we are led to believe that any true 
statement that we make about the world must conform to this notion of reality, a physical 
reality as revealed by our senses. To drop this notion of a fundamental physical reality would 
call for a total reconstruction of how the world works. And indeed this is the case.  
So what is it that makes the physical world that we call reality so untenable? First there is the 
presupposition that our senses are fully capable of presenting the underlying reality of the 
world. That is, our senses give a true picture of the world as it might be understood by a 
hypothetical being sitting outside of the world. The arguments relating to this conception of the 
world are well discussed in the philosophical position called Representationalism, and there are 
many books and papers written on the subject. The general idea about Representationalism is 
that our mind in a conscious state produces a representation, or picture of the world, but that 
the world may not necessarily be that way in some more fundamental understanding of reality. 
Our sensory experience mediates between an objective reality and its representation in our 
mind. There are many variations on this theory of mind, most of which focus on notions of 
consciousness and the popular philosophical term of intentionality. Although I find myself in this 
broad philosophical group, I tend to differ with most of the more popular positions, particularly 
                                                             
7 Induction will take the definition in logic here and not the one in mathematical proof. 
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those with a focus on intentionality, something I find not only unnecessary, but a hindrance to 
the understanding of consciousness. 
If we take this one step further, it is the presupposition about the physical world which is at the 
heart of the problem. Under most theories of Representationalism, the physical world is still the 
real world; it is more a question of how this real world is represented in our minds. I would 
suggest that this label of reality that we tag onto the physical world is the part that is 
contentious.  
If we take the representational point that what appears as our conscious experience is not 
actually how the physical world is, but only a mental image, then we should ask what makes up 
the physical world. To this we must turn to physics. Mainstream physics would propose that a 
complete description of the physical world is given by the Schrödinger wave equation. This is a 
quantum mechanical description of the world, where classical notions of having full knowledge 
of where something is and where it is heading are thrown out the window. It is a description of 
probabilities, not of actualities. Surely the representational view of our mental image of the 
world is not referring to this quantum mechanical picture but rather a more classical 
representation. The philosophical interpretation underpinning the quantum mechanical 
impression of reality has been at the center of debate since the onset of quantum theory and 
remains so today. In a nutshell, quantum theory defies our commonsense ideas about the 
physical world. Most would simply pass this off as a curiosity to be left to physicists to sort out, 
never to be given a further thought. However, the triumph of quantum mechanics as the most 
successful physical theory of all time cannot be denied, and what quantum mechanics tells us 
about the world cannot be ignored.  
… 
This is the first problem underlying an ontology of the physical world is that the deep science 
behind explaining the characteristics of the physical world cannot tell us what it is about, except 
in terms of waves of probabilities, which more than hints of a problem in applying the term 
reality to the physical world. It doesn’t quite sound right if you say this is reality, but don’t ask 
what it is, because we can’t tell you. 
Having covered a bit of ground on both the mind and the physical world, we can return to the 
mind-body problem of relating what goes on in our minds to what goes on in the world per se. 
There have been many interesting terms introduced along the way which try to account for the 
relationship: qualia, intentionality and representata to name a few, let alone more common 
terms, such a self-awareness and self-consciousness, all of which seem to defy a tangible 
comprehension of what they are. There is a struggle to find the right word to describe the 
mental experience, because nothing quite fills the glass completely. This is where the link to the 
workings of language enters center stage.  As a brief interlude of sorts, I would ask: Why is it 
that language is insufficient to describe the world? 
There is much to say about what physics can and cannot tell us about the physical world. But at 
this point let it be said that the terms existence and reality should be used cautiously, as we will 
find that they hardly refer to anything tangible at all. 
The second problem is that of consciousness itself.  It would be pointless to give a definition of 
consciousness, because a hundred other definitions could be found that would be different. So if 
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we restate the problem about what we call the representational view of the real world, it would 
be the conscious representation of a quantum mechanical reality. So the second weakness in 
this quasi-orthodox notion of reality is that even at the representational level we have this term 
consciousness, a thing that remains a mystery despite the myriad theories and musings about it. 
We can use terms like awareness, self-awareness (or perhaps even self-self-awareness in an 
infinite recursive process of self-reflection), without really saying anything of what 
consciousness actually is. Do dogs have it? Most would say yes. How about ants? And what 
about plants? One’s definition of consciousness seems to depend on what stage in the 
evolutionary process this attribute is deemed to have been acquired, although exactly what it is 
and how it is acquired is left a mystery.  
There is much to discuss about consciousness. But at this stage I just want to say enough to 
show how our understanding of consciousness underpins our notion of reality, and if we delve 
just a little bit into this matter we actually cannot say very much at all about it. This is why I 
make the point that we must dispense with the ontological notion of a physical reality. It is  
based on a conscious mental representation of a physical world. Both sides of this relationship 
are for all intents and purposes unknown, or at the very least clouded in mystery. As difficult as 
it may be to hold in abeyance notions of an objective reality of a physical world, there really is 
no basis to take it as a given. To accept an objective physical reality a priori would first require a 
foundational understanding of both the world of quantum mechanics and consciousness. I 
would say that what we know about these two things is very meager indeed. 
To this we can add the vagaries of language. We should not forget that all of this knowledge that 
we have about the world is built on the scaffolding of language, yet another thing that we tend to 
take for granted. We only have to look at the numerous religious belief systems to realize how 
deceptive the results of language-based reasoning can be. We should not forget that the worlds 
of science and philosophy are built on the edifice of language.  
⋯ 
Most theories of reality are based on a comprehension of a combination of these three mysteries: 
the physical world, consciousness and language. We will never have an understanding of how 
the world works without addressing the nature of how the world that we see when we open our 
eyes comes about. The ingredients that make up that understanding of the world are 
mathematics, consciousness and language (mathematics being the language of description for 
the physical world). It should be more than just coincidence that both the mystery and the tools 
we have to solve the mystery are nearly identical.  
It is not necessary to have a world of stuff if we have a mental representation of a world of stuff; 
the mental representation should suffice. A physical reality of hard things is quite superfluous. 
But we are still left with the task of explaining how that mental representation got there in the 
first place. The easy part is defining the problem. The solution may require a bit more 
imaginative alacrity. 
And this brings us back to the subject matter of this treatise. 
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A World View 
The initial point of departure on the road to my world view begins with a dismissal of all notions 
and preconceptions of reality. I take nothing for granted. When I open my eyes I have a 
conscious experience, but I can say nothing about what it is. Not the world. Not the mental 
experience.  It is the term in language that we call real which must be dispensed with, as this is 
predicated on the several presuppositions described above, none of which am I at all 
comfortable in presupposing. There is nothing wrong with having ontology as a branch of 
philosophy so long as it is limited to categorizing speculative theories about existence. Reality is 
a goal, not a reality. In its common usage, reality is a tautology wrapped in a single word. 
Let us begin with Wittgenstein’s statement: The limits of my language mean the limits of my 
world.8 This sets the foundation upon which my world view is assembled, which acknowledges 
that my knowledge of the world is limited by my senses and what I can say about the world 
within a linguistic framework. Without the use of language our sensory memories would fade 
into oblivion and we would have no way to organize them into a coherent aggregation of ideas 
upon which a belief system could be built. There would be no arguments, discussions, treatises, 
or even ideas for that matter. This is not to pass judgment on whether a world without language 
would be richer or poorer, better or worse, than the one we experience with language, only that 
it would be different. Science, philosophy and religion would simply not be possible; it is so 
obvious that it seems hardly worth the mention. But if science, philosophy and religion present 
to us certain truths about the world, and these truths are presented within a linguistic 
framework, we should ask how truth is extracted from language. If a certain proposition is 
presented as true, what does that actually mean? How did that truth value get attached to that 
proposition and what are we to make of it? 
Wittgenstein would say that language gives us logical truths, to which I would agree. But he 
would further assert that we can check the veracity of such propositions by comparing them 
with facts in the physical world. To this I would differ, in that Wittgenstein accepts the objective 
reality of the material world, and as stated above, I do not, and certainly not a priori. For 
Wittgenstein, if a proposition in language represents a true picture (a fact) of a state of affairs in 
the world, (I would say a conscious sensory experience of the physical world), then that 
proposition is true. For the same representation, I would say that the conscious experience is an 
isomorphism of a proposition which is logically true. 
I agree with Wittgenstein’s presentation (in TLP) of language as a (formal) system of 
propositional logic. However, the attendant truth values (theorems of the system) should 
remain within their own logical space. They can say nothing about the external world. What we 
get from the mechanism of language presented in the must be evaluated in its own right. It 
should not influence what we can say about the experiential world of consciousness for which 
language is the tool that is used to express ideas about this world. This linkage of language and 
                                                             
8 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 5.6. 
It should be noted that it is said that Wittgenstein came to disagree with this statement later in his life. I 
too would not agree with this as some all-encompassing philosophical position, but rather to set the tone 
for how language establishes a boundary to what can be said about the world.  
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the conscious experience of the external world must be deconstructed, examined separately, 
and perhaps brought together at a later stage once we are confident that we have understood 
the profound implications underlying these concepts. Thus, everything that can be said about 
the world is accordingly stripped away. All the handles are gone. The only thing that remains is 
logic. And logic exists in its own space. It does not require a physical world to support it. Logic is 
not the world, but rather an elementary part of the world that modern human beings require to 
make sense of the world with their idiosyncratic biology of utilizing language as their principal 
tool for rational thinking.  
From this new beginning a fresh pathway to comprehending the world can start without the 
burden of the dead-end roads where much of science and philosophy has taken us. We need to 
come to terms with the limits of our understanding. We are a product of Darwinian evolution 
with cognitive limitations; we are not the omniscient demigods that we are often portrayed to 
be. We experience the world in causal relationships and represent the world logically via the 
apparatus of language. This does not preclude the theoretical possibility of some deeper 
understanding of the world, only that our accessibility to that deeper understanding may be far 
afield in our present incarnation. It is important both to recognize and accept these limitations, 
and work with the tools that we have, lest we find ourselves lost on a road to nowhere. 
Science is a methodology that uses language and mathematics to describe our conscious 
experiences, usually within the prescribed structure called the scientific method. It is at its core 
an experimental methodology which uses our sensory perception, and extensions thereof via 
the usage of clever instruments, to make generalizations about the physical world. It can tell us 
a great deal about the world, but must be used judiciously, recognizing our lack of 
understanding of the conscious experience and how it may relate to some non-subjective 
description of the world. As we delve into a quantum mechanical description we find clear 
indications of these limitations. Our senses will only take us so far, then the isomorphism of the 
physical world breaks down, and some other description must be found if we are to proceed; 
and we should not be surprised by this. Why should our senses be able to reach the limits of the 
universe? Quantum theory makes a great contribution to our understanding of the world, not 
only from what it tells us about the universe, but also from the conundrums it presents. Both 
should be utilized to find the best way to continue. 
Once these cognitive boundary conditions are established the most reasonable way to proceed 
is to hold on to the things we know we can work with and try to move on from there. First we 
should reexamine the hierarchy of how our universe is structured. The three main variations on 
this theme can be found in many writings on the subject. I have taken the following three from a 
paper by the physicist Paul Davies that was included in a book by mathematician Gregory 
Chaitin (Davies, 2007): 
1. Laws of physics → matter → information. 
2. Laws of physics → information → matter. 
3. Information → laws of physics → matter. 
I would like to propose yet another way of looking at the hierarchy: 
 Information → Laws of nature → Consciousness 
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In this scenario, the universe starts out as a singularity of information all of the same type. It has 
been estimated by Seth Lloyd and others that the total information content of the universe is 
between 10120 and 10122 bits (Funkhouser, 2006).  In the usual 0 and 1 notation, let’s say all the 
bits are initially set to 1 and go through a process whereby some bits are converted to 0, so that 
the universe evolves into a network of 1s and 0s. Whether we call the driver of this process the 
laws of physics, the laws of nature, the algorithm or the computer program that runs the 
universe, we are saying essentially the same thing. It is perhaps preferable to call it an 
algorithm, as this most closely conforms to the concept of information. Planck Time (the 
theoretically smallest interval of measurable time) would be equivalent to the clock speed of a 
computer, and each instant of Planck Time would execute another iteration of the algorithm in 
some variation of a Hilbert Space, or perhaps best left to an even less defined Information Space. 
We should hold open the possibility of doing some type of reverse engineering of the physical 
universe from what we can discern from quantum mechanics and string theory; perhaps there 
are enough clues to begin deciphering the nature of this algorithm. But we are still at the early 
stages of this journey and for now it must suffice to simply outline the structure of a newly 
defined reality in the making.9 
I would like to modify the definition of the term ‘evolution’ so that it encompasses the Laws of 
Nature as stated above. The general use of the term has largely referred to how biology evolves, 
but I see biology as just a special case, involving more complex entities, of the general case of the 
universe as a whole. Additionally, natural selection is construed as a special-case term as 
applied to the evolution of biological entities, where the general case would be the evolution of 
the information content of the universe as dictated by the algorithm we call the Laws of Nature. 
But make no mistake; the laws that apply to the evolution of mammals are the same that apply 
to quantum mechanical objects or strings, assuming they are good representations of the 
subatomic world. It may not seem that apparent since the algorithm that we are looking at in 
biological evolution disguises the subroutines taking place at quantum scales and even Planck 
scales below that. When we examine the evolution of highly complex entities, such as biological 
entities, we are looking at the outer layers (or higher levels) of nested loops of computation, 
without examining the computation taking place lower down in the nested hierarchy. Upper 
level procedure execution cannot take place without the more fundamental procedures residing 
deeper in the nest. I will leave the details to a later chapter and return now to the next part of 
the picture. 
One might wonder what happened to matter, and why it found itself replaced by consciousness 
in my hierarchal model. The reason is that they are in fact one in the same. The conscious 
experience of the physical world is no different than what we actually call the physical world. 
There is no objective physical world per se, only the experience of the physical world. There is 
no objective physical reality, but only a subjective experience of a physical reality. Where did all 
the stuff go!? Well, it was never really there in the first place. Not an illusion; just a 
transformation. Not Idealism, but rather elevating information and consciousness to a more 
prominent position in the scheme of things. When we are not conscious, whether it be in a deep 
                                                             
9 My view on the primacy of information is a variation on the general theme of what has come to be 
known as Digital Physics or Digital Philosophy. A paper on the field by one its leading proponents, 
Edward Fredkin, can be read for a more detailed background on the subject (Fredkin, 2003).  
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sleep, anaesthetized, or no longer amongst the living, we cannot and do not experience the 
physical world. We just assume that the physical world will still be out there, but we are not in a 
position to experience it. I contend that this is a misconception, mostly due to a bit of linguistic 
trickery and is perhaps the greatest deception that language plays on us. The reason we cannot 
come to terms with the nature of consciousness is because we accept the reality of the material 
world axiomatically. If one’s description of the universe is that of an algorithm that leads to the 
evolution of information into aggregations of complex relationships, and consciousness is some 
expression of a subset of the state of affairs of the universe from the perspective of a particular 
entity, then everything in the universe has some form of consciousness which will vary based on 
the complexity and nature of the respective entity. Consciousness by its very nature is 
subjective. It doesn’t matter if you are referring to a human being, a bat, a tree, a hydrogen atom 
or a cell in the liver of a chimpanzee. Each respective entity, however defined, needs to 
determine the state of affairs in its environment in order to know what to do next. That is, how 
the algorithm will arrange the bits of information in the universe in the next instant of Planck 
Time. At the level of the human organism, consciousness just happens to take the form that 
presents a movie type experience of tactile substances in a three dimensional space. If an oak 
tree had language, I am sure it would describe a completely different conscious experience. 
Wittgenstein might call this a different form of life, and perhaps expressed the same idea in his 
statement: If a lion could speak, we could not understand him.10 
Many years had passed before Albert Einstein took the experimental evidence for the constancy 
of the speed of light at face value and changed the course of physics. In the same way, we should 
accept that where our consciousness ends, so does the physical world, just the way it seems.   
⋯ 
I thought this summary would be constructive before going into the detail of how the various 
pieces of the puzzle fit together. It may take some convincing to let go of the physical world as 
an objective reality, but I hope to show how language presents a prejudicial view of the world 
which, when examined closely, is not justified.  
There are a few anecdotal points worth noting about the philosophical position presented here: 
 There is a simplicity about it that conforms quite well to Ockham’s razor. 
 The laws of nature are consistent at every level of size and time.  
 Emergent properties can be explained by transactions at lower levels, not by the 
introduction of something new into the universe. 
 There is a great economy of just about everything, in conformity with the conservation 
laws that are observed in nature. 
 The world is analogous to a manufacturing process with very simple machinery. There 
are lots of repetitive processes. The output is something more refined than the input 
materials (complexity), and there are waste products at the other end of the process 
(entropy).   
                                                             
10 Philosophical Investigations, p.223 
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 In the spirit of Jacques Monod’s Chance and Necessity, we find a ubiquitous fidelity of 
replication, spiced with the odd random occurrence, which allows the overall system 
(the universe) to maintain its basic structure yet evolve with the passage of time. And if 
time is equated to the ticking of the Planck Time clock, then there is plenty of time for 
randomness to do its work. 
 Everything is accounted for in a single theory. If the present explanation is not totally 
convincing, there is at least a pathway to future progress. 
Something to take out of this big picture view is that the world presented by the conscious 
experience is an isomorphic representation of a mathematical (or logical) construct. We needn’t 
have language to access the representational part of this duality, which we call the physical 
world, but it adds to the picture. With language, we can tap into the underlying logic which 
creates that picture. As such, language becomes a link between the two, as it resides in both 
worlds: the world of logic and the world of perception. Both can be used together to construct a 
more meaningful picture of the world. 
⋯ 
The chapters that follow will present in greater detail how this picture of the world came about. 
It should be apparent by now that the cornerstone will be a theory of language with a 
foundation in the original work of Wittgenstein. It is on one hand surprising how little influence 
Wittgenstein has had on modern science, despite the broad recognition of his genius; yet on the 
other hand, an acknowledgment of how difficult it is to extract the essence of his philosophy 
from his writings.  
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Language 
“Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.”   
— Ludwig Wittgenstein  
 
A central theme of this treatise is the nature and limits of language. It is my contention that the 
world cannot be understood, that is, one cannot make sense of the world, without first coming 
to terms with how language functions. Making sense of something is a term in philosophy often 
associated with Wittgenstein, but is just another phrasing for a way of determining the meaning 
of something.  
The basis for this contention is that the apparatus used in all rational thought, including the 
current argument that you are now reading, as well as every other set of arguments which 
purports to describe anything, is actualized within a linguistic construction. As obvious as this 
may be, it nonetheless needs to be emphasized that without the use of language there could be 
no discussion of anything at all. In respect to rational thought and communicating a sense of 
how the world operates, if not for language, humans would find themselves, more or less, in a 
position similar to that of chimpanzees. Language fosters the development of deductive 
reasoning, something which is seldom observed in the animal kingdom, and when it does arise, 
it is quite limited. I would conjecture that the pre-linguistic development of deductive reasoning 
as a precursor was the evolutionary driver behind the emergence of language. It is through 
language and the attendant deductive reasoning that humans make rational sense of the world. 
And further to this, the understanding of the world gained from the empiricism of science has 
become the orthodoxy by which knowledge is measured. All of this is due to the fact that Homo 
sapiens acquired a very handy tool for dealing with these matters; the tool which we call 
language. 
So, how well suited is language as a mechanism for making sense of the world? Language is 
scrutinized herein to find the answer to this question.  
Very little is known about the specifics of how humans acquired language, and perhaps for this 
reason it does not enter into most theories of mind to any significant degree. Although the exact 
details of language acquisition may not be known, there is enough evidence to piece together 
the evolutionary trajectory of language in order to see how it may fit into a theory about how we 
came to have a conscious experience largely dominated by words. 
In summary, this is what can be said about the emergence of language: 
Whatever language is, it certainly came about via a Darwinian process. The oldest human fossils 
have been dated to round 200,000 years ago, with some anthropologists estimating 250,000 
years as a likely upper transition point to what can be said to be anatomically modern humans. 
Since speciation is not an overnight process, pinpointing an exact date is as much definitional as 
biological, and having to pick a number like 150,000, 200,000 or 300,000 would not change 
much as to how we view the nature of the human condition. Much of taxonomy, although 
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systematic, is about classification and subject to change, as is most of science for that matter, as 
when new theories cause a shift in the paradigmatic thinking of the day. 
Language is believed to have arisen around 75,000 years ago, with estimates ranging up to 
100,000 (Bickerton, 2007; Widgen, 2004).11 Some anthropologists estimate that the all African 
human population may have been as low as 2,000 to 10,000 individuals at the time of language 
emergence. Around this time humans are believed to have begun their continuous colonization 
of the world, taking language with them as they journeyed to settle the other continents. There 
seems to be a growing consensus around this theory, all of which seems quite reasonable. 
Written language is dated to between 5,000 and 6,000 years ago, and may have arisen more 
than once. But most peoples had written language introduced by invaders. Many tribes still do 
not have a written form of language. 
Some aboriginal tribes, such as the Pirahã of the Amazon rainforest, are thought to have very 
small languages of perhaps no more than hundreds of words (and quite likely fewer than 1000), 
and a distinct lack of numeracy (Everett, 2005; Nevins, Pesetsky, & Rodrigues, 2009). These 
tribes do not exhibit the worship of deities and have few if any stories. They would lack what 
more technological humans would call culture. But it would not be seriously suggested that they 
are not human nor do they lack the intellectual capacity of humans with larger languages.  
⋯ 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, an analysis of the nature of language by Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
was published in 1921(Wittgenstein, 1922). It was promptly recognized as a work of great 
importance by Bertrand Russell and other prominent philosophers and mathematicians of the 
time. This treatise identifies the relationship between language and logic and defines the limits 
of philosophy by articulating the conditions for a logically perfect language. In one of the most 
extraordinary and distinctive of written expositions, Wittgenstein shows how language can be 
understood as a formal system of propositional logic (see Glossary item). It is this great insight 
that sets the stage for understanding how language works in the mind.  
 
Widely acknowledged as the 20th century’s most important philosopher, Wittgenstein’s life and 
work has been examined and debated in academic circles from the time of his early days at 
Cambridge University.  It is not my intent to enter this debate in any significant way, but rather 
start with the central thesis of his work, particularly that found in the Tractatus, expanding 
upon that thesis to show how indeed natural language, and not just idealized language, is a 
formal system of propositional logic, and precisely what that means. To say that the Tractatus is 
a difficult work to understand, especially for those uninitiated in logic, would be an 
understatement. Wittgenstein makes little effort to help the reader comprehend where he is 
heading; many of the terms and phrases used can be interpreted in a number of ways. To have a 
reasonable chance of understanding the deep meaning of Wittgenstein’s work, the Tractatus 
may need to be read several times. But once its meaning filters through, it can become quite 
poetic and almost lyrical. Whatever may be derived from the Tractatus, there can be little doubt 
that it is unique in the annals of philosophical literature. 
                                                             
11 These date ranges are very sketchy, which even the authors admit, but 50,000 to 100,000 years ago 
seems to fall within the general consensus. 
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The last 2 sections of TLP are regularly quoted and are often used to illustrate Wittgenstein’s 
ideas and philosophical style:  
6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes 
them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so 
to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)  
7 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. 
It is interesting to note that perhaps the most critical examination of TLP comes from 
Wittgenstein himself, principally in his Philosophical Investigations (PI), first published after his 
death in 1953(Wittgenstein, 1958). The PI expounds upon the bare bones logic of the Tractatus 
into a more general examination of human language, and is much more approachable than the 
Tractatus. But PI has generated much debate amongst Wittgenstein scholars as well. In any case, 
his elusiveness has guaranteed that his writings will long remain both interesting and 
challenging. 
Although the Tractatus fails to resolve all philosophical matters as Wittgenstein had initially 
suggested, it succeeds in expounding the fundamental relationship between language and logic. 
This permits us to rethink some of the assumptions that we make about the world, including 
those concerning causality and epistemic considerations regarding the physical world, or what 
most call physical reality or simply reality.  
The terms propositional logic and propositional calculus are often used in the logical analysis of 
language; rule-following, a terminology sounding a bit less technical, can just as well be used in 
its stead.  The game of chess, which will often be used metaphorically in this book, can equally 
be described as a rule-following system or formal system of logic; for all intents and purposes 
the terms can be used synonymously. What is being described is a system of a specific set of 
rules, that when followed, will unambiguously produce a legitimate result within that system. In 
the case of the game of chess, there is never a doubt as to what constitutes a legal move and 
what does not, as all such questions can easily be resolved by reference to the rules of the game. 
Nothing is left to chance. 
When we explore natural language as a rule-following system, it need not be so restrictively 
conceived in the way it is generally applied to formal systems of number theory, as might be 
found in applications of mathematics or in computer programs, with a set of axioms and well 
defined rules for the generation of theorems. Although language is a rule-following system, 
these rules seem to be loosely constructed and ill-defined. This is acceptable under the 
circumstances; there is nothing to say that amongst the rules there will be rules that permit 
some fuzziness or misstatements in both their execution and interpretation. At some level the 
rules of binary logic will conflate with rules of fuzzy logic. It is this imprecision that defies the 
discovery of a definitive language algorithm. It is in our conception of what a formal language 
system must be that can be problematic in understanding Wittgenstein’s general idea. If some 
form of randomness is part of the natural world, and there is every indication that it is, then we 
should not expect that formal systems conforming to the natural world would be strictly 
deterministic, in a classical sense, at every level of examination. If randomness is intrinsic to the 
construction of the world at a basal level, when we look at language, which operates at a very 
high level of complexity, the actual nature of the randomness and indeterminate complex 
decision-making relationships is buried so deep in the algorithmic hierarchy that it simply not 
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observable. As such, the connection goes undetected and without consideration by those 
working in the fields of linguistics and cognitive science. One cannot examine a state of affairs 
solely at a top-level and expect to comprehend what is going on at lower levels. An entirely new 
picture of this process must be constructed.  
The outcomes of binary decisions at high levels of operation can be probabilistically 
deterministic in a manner similar to what is found in quantum mechanics, where the observed 
determinism is probabilistically distributed in accordance with the wave function. At the 
macroscopic level, we can take the example of a person coming to a fork in a road for which the 
person has no previous references. How does the person decide whether to go left or right? 
There will likely be many determining factors, including road appearance, position of the sun, 
general notions of the direction of the correct path, historical preferences for either left or right 
and similar determinants. These will go into some value weighting system. Let’s say that on a 
scale of 0 to 100, a value of less than 50 means turn left and over 50 means turn right. A value of 
50 may result in a random ‘coin toss.’ But a mechanism whereby calculated values between 48 
and 52 result in a coin toss may be operative as well, so that close calls will be randomized as 
part of the rule-following system. Anecdotally, we often have this feeling of not quite knowing 
what to do when our internal valuation system seems finely balanced around the 50-50 mark, 
with each consideration and re-evaluation of the circumstances swaying the decision to one side 
and then the other. This is suggestive of the probabilistic determinism of the natural language 
decision process in action (although recognizing that there is more than just rational linguistic 
inputs that enter the valuation system). We cannot directly examine the quantitative value 
weightings of this process, but when weighing up important decisions, we may at times 
experience them in a mind-consuming process of long duration.  
This process, as noted, is not of a purely linguistic origin. In humans there are combinations of 
sensory, emotional and rational (language-based) inputs. Furthermore, we may observe how a 
startled animal freezes when confronted with a potential danger, such as a cat spotting an 
unfamiliar dog or human, waiting to see how the situation evolves before making the next move. 
There is experimental data in controlled environments supporting this view (Montague, Hyman, 
& Cohen, 2004). It has been proposed that the value weighting system is moderated by 
neuromodulators, such as dopamine, and randomness is also integrated into the system. One 
should expect that decision processes which can take a range of potentialities would be 
normally distributed, as it would be a notable exception for nature to perform otherwise.  
 …  
As Wittgenstein credits Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) for 
stimulating his ideas, I in turn credit Wittgenstein for the motivation of my own contemplations 
on these matters; but now must leave Wittgenstein (not completely, but to some extent) and 
start afresh while maintaining the kernel of Wittgenstein’s conception of language and logic.12 
From here on, I will offer my own interpretation of Wittgenstein’s ideas. There are many areas 
where I may not be in agreement with Wittgenstein’s philosophy, but do not see the point of 
                                                             
12 In the 1918 dated Preface to TLP, Wittgenstein writes: ….. I am indebted to Frege's great works and of 
the writings of my friend Mr Bertrand Russell for much of the stimulation of my thoughts. 
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examining those differences in any great depth. For example, in my own view of the world, I 
would not know what to make of TLP 4.01 ‘A proposition is a picture of reality’. The word reality 
is such a loaded word that I would strongly argue against its usage in such a headline statement. 
I understand what Wittgenstein means by the statement, but my own position has moved far 
enough from Wittgenstein’s where I would not pursue this line of reasoning. There is no need to 
go further into such matters, for in the end, it is the importance of the relationship between 
language and logic which is the essential part, to which Wittgenstein and I are in accord. 
⋯ 
There is a vital thread linking language, axiomatic systems and the perceived physical universe 
which unifies them together into one neat composition. We know there is something about 
mathematics that is at the core of what the universe is all about. The foundation of mathematics 
is based on the axiomatic set theory and first-order logic. An axiomatic theory stipulates within 
its construction its own limitations about what it can say, effectively establishing its own 
boundary conditions. Although the construction of a good axiomatic system may be difficult 
when the system being represented is complex, the structure itself is rather simple. We start by 
defining the symbols and grammar of the system, which is a common understanding of how the 
system operates, whether it be a game or a language. To this we add a set of assumptions, called 
axioms; these assumptions will be taken as givens, which generally speaking cannot or will not 
be proven. Further to this, we will have a set of rules that will generate true statements, or 
theorems within the system having aforesaid axioms, which once derived can in turn become 
axioms as well.  
Even if one feels comfortable with mathematics, some of the concepts concerning logic and the 
foundation of mathematics can be daunting. It is a subject matter which rarely ventures beyond 
a small circle of academics, although computer scientist Douglas Hofstadter managed to reach a 
much wider audience with his remarkable book on incompleteness (discussed below) titled 
Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (Hofstadter, 1979). To natural language within this 
framework only adds to the remoteness of this topic from ordinary discourse. Except for those 
conversant with the subject, it is not easily seen how language would fit into a formal 
mathematical system. Yet, all this said, a grasp of these concepts remains critical to 
understanding the principal themes found in this book. I have employed the metaphoric use of 
games, particularly chess, to help scale this crucial barrier.   
A vital addendum to formal systems are Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems (Gödel, 1931), 
which states, in part, that: All consistent axiomatic formulations of number theory include 
undecidable propositions.13 This problem of undecidability has troubled mathematicians since 
the theorem’s publication. Further to the difficulties it poses to the foundations of mathematics, 
                                                             
13  More precisely, Gödel’s theorem states: Any effectively generated theory capable of expressing 
elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete. In particular, for any consistent, effectively 
generated formal theory that proves certain basic arithmetic truths, there is an arithmetical statement that 
is true, but not provable in the theory.  
 
There has also been considerable contention as to whether Wittgenstein understood or agreed with Gödel 
on this matter, a debate which continues into the 21st century.  
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it implies that scientific theories, which are based on mathematics, cannot be proven at some 
scrutinized level of examination. The importance of Gödel’s Theorem cannot be understated and 
requires an in-depth discussion in its own right, for it sets the very boundaries to knowledge 
and affects every aspect of investigation within the universe and how the universe itself must be 
viewed. And akin to the concept of chance and necessity, it should be regarded as a universal 
thematic.  
The reason for this undecidability is recursion, or self-referencing, and the fact that formal 
systems are defined by their axioms, which are unproven autonomous declarations. The axioms 
of a formal system are said to be recursively enumerable, which means, by example, that a 
computer program can generate all the axioms of a recursively enumerable system without 
generating something that is not an axiom. So a formal system is a self-contained, self-defined, 
self-referential system. A formal system lives within its own logical space. So it should be noted 
that if natural language is a formal system it too would live within its own self-referential logical 
space.  
The complications presented by Gödel’s Theorem are exemplified by the following set of 
statements about how we come to know the world: 
1. The most reliable source of knowledge about the world is obtained from science. 
2. Scientific theories use mathematics as the basis for their proof and veracity. 
3. Mathematics is based on logic. 
4. Logic is an axiomatic formal system. 
5. Gödel’s Theorem states that formal systems of logic, therefore mathematics, therefore 
science, therefore knowledge will have statements which are deemed to be true within 
its own set of rules, but cannot be proven. 
6. The above 5 statements are true within this recursive system, but cannot be proven 
since the first statement is an axiom of the system that was the trigger for producing the 
other statements. 
7. All sets of propositions in any language will be generated within an axiomatic system 
and subject to the same constraints. 
Since language produces the kind of knowledge that we are concerned with here, whether it be 
systems of scientific truths, other fact-based truths or revealed truths, its axioms must be 
carefully scrutinized. Furthermore, as there is a wide acceptance of belief system relativism, we 
have a socio-political pragmatism which allows for the flourishing of under-scrutinized truth-
generating systems. Within this perspective mathematics can be viewed as a subset of language, 
having a more strictly defined set of rules of operation and a more rigorous scrutiny of the 
production of truth values. There are not any socio-political considerations to be concerned 
with in mathematics to muddy the waters. We would not permit an incorrect mathematical 
proof simply because it was deemed to be politically correct. It would seem that natural 
language is often placed outside the rigors of formalism mainly because it is just too hard to lock 
down all the rules and definitions necessary to deal with it effectively under such a system. But 
the real determining factor concerning whether natural language does or does not function as a 
formal system should be in its actual biological execution, regardless of its complexity.  
The critical point regarding incompleteness as it pertains to belief systems using natural 
language is that perfect knowledge cannot be obtained from within a formal system, only from 
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outside the system (meta-system) looking back into the system under scrutiny. Since we cannot 
step outside our universe, or even outside our language, we have to live with this limitation. 
Rather than eschew these findings, they need to be embraced if we are to come to terms with 
how the universe operates. It is just the way things are. Language is the starting point of this re-
examination of the basis of knowledge. It needs to be picked apart, warts and all, and handled 
with a full understanding of its limitations. So when I asked the question: How well suited is 
language as a mechanism for making sense of the world? We might reply that it has its 
limitations; and we will need to dig deeper to see just how far these limitations go. 
 
Figure 2: What Can I Say About My World? 
Gödel’s Theorem can be put another way that might add a bit more clarity: Anything you can 
draw a circle around cannot explain itself without referring to something outside the circle – 
something you have to assume but cannot prove. If you have lived your whole life inside a sealed 
box, shut off from the outside world, you can have no knowledge of your standing in the 
universe. Wittgenstein states: The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world 
everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists— and if it did 
exist, it would have no value (TLP 6.41). So if we start with an examination of language as a 
formal system of propositional logic, then a circle must be drawn around language and 
examined in self-referential terms. That is to say, that language is used to examine language.  
Once we come to terms with how language functions as a formal system, we can see how it is 
just one idiosyncratic case representative of everything else that is going on in the universe. The 
same algorithm that produces language creates life in all its variations, as well as the planets, 
the stars, atoms and the state of consciousness that allows us to perceive the world in those 
terms. Language can also be seen, by dint of example, as a window to how these other things 
come into being. The challenge for science is to get itself in a frame of mind that allows it to find 
the kind of algorithm that can account for all the processes we observe in the universe and see if 
it can be put into a tidy package. 
… 
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Although Wittgenstein wandered off on a somewhat different track after the Tractatus, it would 
seem to me that all that has been written in this chapter leads naturally from this work. Having 
contemporaries such as Kurt Gödel and Alan Turing would suggest that it would have been a 
good time to incorporate Wittgenstein’s theory of language into the world of computing and 
computability. Perhaps it is because Wittgenstein went a bit off course from the central theme of 
the Tractatus that this never quite happened.  
 
Inductive and Deductive Reasoning 
Let us take a look at how an animal with true language differs from one without. Induction and 
deduction are the two principal classifications of how animals predict the future and decide 
what action to take in a given situation. I believe that the balance between these two ways of 
reasoning played a critical role in the development of language and will approach the subject 
with this in mind.  
It is not by coincidence that we once again find an important duality in nature. There is an 
analogue here to the chance and necessity duality which is not immediately evident. The laws of 
nature are about how we go from one state of affairs to the next in respect to time. Induction 
corresponds to the necessity part of the equation; we take what was ascertained from one state 
of affairs and apply it to an analogous future situation, the assumption being that what has 
worked in the past will apply in the future. Decision making of this sort brings both stability and 
predictability to the world in that the past dictates the future. All animals that can learn from 
experience with some reasonable level of sophistication use induction as their primary driver in 
the decision making mechanism, with the possible exception of humans, where the balance is 
not so clearly resolved. Induction acts as a fine tuning mechanism for the instinctive behavior 
that animals are born with. Generally speaking, the more complex the animal, the more room is 
left for learned behavior, particularly for animals capable of adapting to diverse environmental 
conditions. 
Deductive reasoning is another kettle of fish. With the exception of humans, it is not often 
observed in nature, and when it is, only to a limited degree. Some parrots and corvids have 
shown remarkable problem solving ability, both in the wild and under controlled conditions. 
Many primates along with dolphins and a number of other mammals exhibit generalized 
problem solving behavior that is suggestive of the process of deduction. Deductive reasoning 
can be viewed as bringing chance into decisions about how an animal might behave in a 
particular situation, in that, the animal must first form a hypothesis about how the world works 
and then test the hypothesis in a situation which seems an appropriate application of the 
general principle. This is what tool making is about. The relationship of the principle to the 
applicability is deduced, not taken from a like past experience, so there is a far greater chance of 
error due to misapplication of the principle.  
In the context of our understanding of language development, it is important to recognize that 
deductive reasoning mirrors a formally logical construction. There is the formation of a set of 
premises about the world, and on this basis some rules will be formulated on how to proceed in 
the accomplishment of a task. For example, if one has used a stone to craft a piece of flint into a 
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sharp point, a generalization may be made about how stones can be used to shape objects. This 
understanding about the relationship of the use of stones in the shaping of other objects in the 
environment can be applied to flint in the construction of spear tips, large arrowheads and small 
arrowheads, arrowheads made from materials other than flint and on and on. If the premise is 
that stones can be used to form arrowheads from any material, one would eventually discover 
that the premise is not completely correct and would need some refinement, as when the rule is 
applied to things such as diamonds or butter the premise will be found out to have failed in 
these instances, as the relative hardness or softness of the material to be formed will play a role 
in the ability to complete the task. Hence, such is the case with deduction, language and other 
formal systems; the results are only as good as the premises. It can nonetheless be seen that 
once a good set of premises is established, this type of reasoning is very powerful in its potential 
application across a broad array of conditions.  
The use of tools and the control of fire by ancestral humans are fairly well documented and 
were refined throughout the period of encephalization. It would seem reasonable to conclude 
that this is evidence of deductive reasoning due to the broad application and variations of 
behavior, as well as encephalization itself. If we imagine how a non-linguistic primate would 
construct the logic necessary for deductive reasoning, it would almost certainly be by 
visualization. The construction of a logical picture would require a significant amount of 
neuronal power, analogous to the storage of images on a computer, thus the finding of hominid 
encephalization corresponding with this pre-linguistic period of early technological 
development. This is why humans already had large brains before the acquisition of language. 
We needed to store all those visualizations requisite for crude deductive reasoning prior to the 
acquisition of the symbolic substitution for these visualizations. When I speak of symbolic 
substitution, I am of course referring to language. This would seem to be the evolutionary driver 
for language development consistent with the evidence. Symbols replace visual imagery in the 
deductive reasoning process. The formal system of logic is already in place and so is the 
computational powerhouse to deal to with it. Visual logic is replaced by propositional logic, and 
as they say, the rest is history. 
 
Language as a Sense Organ 
It should be clear by now that when I refer to language I attach to the definition that of a formal 
symbolic system. I am not referring to a variety of other aspects of human language which are 
shared with many other animals; these can be categorized mostly as communications 
represented by one-to-one relationships between the sign (usually a vocalization) and its 
meaning. Communication is an important aspect in the life of most animals and the word 
language is frequently used in a generic reference to this behavior. Researchers have estimated 
that chickens have between 20 and 30 unique vocal signs with associated meanings, including 
references to food, danger from above, danger from below, egg laying, brooding and imperatives 
(like get away from me!). Human language appears to be unique in its breadth of syntactic 
features and neural pathways. As such, it shares much with what we normally associate with 
traditional human senses of sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch. It is generally understood that 
we perceive the world through these five senses. It is not important to this discussion that the 
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number of senses is higher if we count neurological pathways whereby we might include pain, 
balance, temperature and a number of others; our common historical understanding of a sense 
will suffice here.  
Broadly speaking, a sense organ is simply a faculty or mechanism for perceiving external 
stimuli. It receives input from the environment (or the world perceived to be exogenous to the 
mind) and processes it into something we interpret as meaningful. The eye receives 
electromagnetic radiation (EMR) as input, sends the signal to the brain to process into what we 
consciously experience as vision. The ear accepts waves of air pressure which are interpreted as 
sound. In effect, the input itself cannot be directly experienced; it is processed by the respective 
sense organ and corresponding parts of the brain. It is then stored in memory to be interpreted, 
directly or through recall, as a conscious experience or for subconscious processing. If one is not 
conscious then sound waves will not be interpreted as anything, since part of the apparatus for 
processing this input is not functioning, notwithstanding that there may be other neural 
pathways to register stimuli even if the primary organ for interpreting such stimuli is not 
operative (blindsight for example). Vision and hearing, as with all the senses, are something 
interpretive of the world external to the mind. They do not show what the outside world 
actually is, only an interpretation of the input. This has been previously discussed as the 
representational view of the world.  
I would propose that the language organ, as ill-defined as it might be, is itself a type of sensory 
organ. What the sensory part of language does is receive a proposition as an input, and assigns a 
truth value to that proposition as its output. In this way language operates very much like any 
other sense organ, as it receives information from the external world and processes it into a 
representation in the internal world of the mind. For most people the input will be in the form 
of sound waves, but hand signs used mainly by the deaf work quite satisfactorily and 
accomplish the same task. These signals are then parsed into words and interpreted using the 
rule-following system of grammar to form structures such as sentences, some of which can be 
classified as propositions. Structures, such as imperatives, can be simple or complex 
constructions of one-to-one symbol-semantic relationships. But the ones we are concerned 
about here are the propositions, for these are the ones which allow language to grow into the 
combinatorial assemblies that we find in modern language. There are many neurological 
processes that have been skimmed over to get to the stage where we are discussing 
propositions. Linguistics is a broad field with numerous specializations and it is not my intent to 
review them in any depth, but rather jump to the part that relates to the question at hand, which 
is the rule-following aspect of language.  
It may not be customary to include language as part of the usual panoply of senses regardless of 
the definition one chooses, but upon close examination, language incorporates many of the 
typical features of other senses. Broca's area and Wernicke's area of the brain are two regions 
often identified with the production of language, so a neurological basis for categorizing 
language as a sense is fairly well established. There is evidence that the inferior parietal lobule 
near Wernicke’s area may be the key region used in linguistic syntactic and numeric processing 
(Jackendoff, 2002).  
Since language utilizes hearing as its primary input mechanism, one could say that it piggybacks 
on another sensory system rather than being a sensory system in its own right. But the fact that 
language can also piggyback on vision and touch shows that these senses are merely vehicles for 
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the primary pathway for linguistic inputs to get to the cellular mechanism that processes it. 
Although the exact mechanism of language evolution is not clear, most would agree that it 
evolved from a more rudimentary form of verbal communication; it should be noted that 
gestural origins for language have also been posited (Christiansen & Kirby, 2003; Jackendoff, 
2002; Masataka, 2008). A most convincing argument for placing language among the other 
senses is that we don’t need any other sensory vehicle to use language when thinking. We 
effectively talk to ourselves without vocalizing, although sounds will come into our minds if we 
have normal hearing function and the related visual context will take part if one is a user of a 
signing system such as American Sign Language. But there is nothing entering from the external 
world per se. All the inputs and outputs are within one’s own brain. Language takes external 
sensory inputs, adds to this its own stored memories and creates a logic-based perception of the 
matter in question. Therefore, further to the usual perception that a non-linguistic animal might 
have, a linguistic human can have a rational take on a particular state of affairs. 
Whether one feels comfortable with conjoining language with the usual senses is not all that 
significant, but perhaps reinforces that language is an important means for humans to make 
sense of the world. Language can give a blind person a very rich experience of the world despite 
the loss of his or her most vital traditional sense. It is this idea that I wish to impart by labeling 
language a sense. 
 
What was it like before we spoke? 
To gain an understanding of how language operates, it would seem helpful to cover some 
territory concerning its evolution. There is not much to go on in this regard, since language is 
not the sort of thing that leaves behind footprints; so from the period in which language was 
presumed to have been acquired we have to rely mostly on skeletal remains and prehistoric 
tools to piece together something which is not directly related to either. Some useful inferences 
can be made if one accepts that language is a formal system, and I will explore this path in 
developing my personal take on the theory of language evolution. 
In the briefest of summaries, one could state that with the evolution from Homo erectus to Homo 
sapiens came the mastery of fire and simple tools. Perhaps this is a rather crude synopsis of one 
and a half million years of human history encapsulated in a single sentence, but there is not 
much point in dwelling on this period for which so little is known concerning language, except 
that it is a near certainty no animal had it. During this period the brain enlarged to modern 
proportions, growing by roughly 30%. What is noteworthy is that brain size increases during 
this epoch and it transpires before language is acquired, not after. The gross physical capacity to 
process linguistic information is in place first, although it is not clear that this physical capacity 
is actually necessary for true language production. It is however an interesting point which 
provides a framework for examining the development of language in the human species. The 
brain is a great energy-consuming organ, so it is unlikely that an animal would evolve to 
increase its size without having developed an important countervailing benefit. I have already 
offered a theory that encephalization occurred to accommodate the storage of visualizations 
required for deductive reasoning, and will take that as an opening point.  
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There are several areas of examination that can come under consideration for modeling 
language development in a pre-linguistic human: 
 The fossil record of the period prior to human language acquisition. 
 Behavior in other animals, particularly our social primate cousins. 
 Non-linguistic behavior in adult humans. 
 Behavior in pre-linguistic human juveniles. 
We need to place ourselves into a setting a few hundred thousand years ago to imagine what 
might have occurred to drive one particular species to make the jump to a syntactic system of 
communication. It might seem to many that this is such a great leap that it takes on leap of faith 
proportions; so much so that it even led the great intellectual and father of modern linguistic 
theory, Noam Chomsky, to conjecture that something other than a Darwinian process may have 
been responsible (Chomsky, 2005, p. 104).14 But this, of course, cannot be so. Everything 
evolves because of some Darwinian process; it is just that some are a bit more obscure than 
others. And if one does not already have a very broad view about what a Darwinian process is, 
this would be a good time to broaden one’s view. I offer this as some inducement: If it’s not 
evolution by natural selection, then what is it? There is nothing else science offers as an 
alternative, and that’s because there simply is nothing else. What needs to ensue is an expansion 
of what comes under the ambit of Evolution and to appreciate how it works as a multi-level 
process. 
It is a challenge of imagination to be taken out of our present state of being and picture 
ourselves back in a world before humans had language. More often than not our minds are 
flooded with words, at times overwhelming our consciousness to the exclusion of other sensory 
information. But occasionally language takes a back seat to our more primeval senses, such as 
when responding to a crisis situation (what we might describe as an instinctive response). Some 
other situations might refer to activities like surfing, walking through rainforest or observing 
wildlife, particularly when unaccompanied by another person to share communication. The 
appreciation of these situations would seemingly be reduced if language were interjected in a 
manner that dominates the other senses. A natural human hunter is quiet, as you might expect 
for any predator that uses stealth as a means of achieving a successful hunt. Native peoples 
often have these experiences, while those in advanced technological societies may attain this 
through sport and nature travel. Sexual activity is another example where language is often 
suppressed, ostensibly to maximize the sensory experience; listening to instrumental music is 
yet another. The modern world requires ever increasing processing of linguistic information, 
such that traditional sensory information is pushed to the background in favor of the more 
efficient linguistic processing. For example, it is not much help if one is trying to understand a 
written contract by simply staring at it without reading it. But linguistic processing is made at 
the expense of a dampening of our acuity in the other senses. It should start to become evident 
that the traditional sensory and the linguistic sensory are two semi-integrated systems, with 
language evolving in humans to occupy an ever greater amount of mental processes as required. 
                                                             
14 In fairness to Chomsky, he has modified his earlier views and has challenged those who have 
interpreted him as suggesting a non-Darwinian alternative to the evolution of language. 
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Momentary mental processes can manage a wide combinatorial spectrum of both traditional 
sensory and linguistic information. 
A final example of a human lacking language is the pre-linguistic infant. Much has been written 
about the innate ability of humans to acquire language (Pinker, 1994). There is nothing 
abnormal for a human not to have language if one is young enough. Suffice to say that a baby 
experiences the world and absorbs more information than arguably at any other time in life, but 
none of it is syntactically linguistic until the programmed time for this process to kick in.  
⋯ 
We will continue on this theme with a little thought experiment: Imagine a time machine is 
invented that will allow someone to be transported back in time. An anthropologist with access 
to the time machine is interested in the origins of human language, so she devises an 
experiment where she transports the (ubiquitous) linguist Noam Chomsky back to the year 
80,000 BCE to a village in Africa where she believes that language originated. When Professor 
Chomsky returns to the present, the experimenter inquires: Professor Chomsky, “do humans 
have language yet? And by the way, how did the people treat you?” Professor Chomsky replies: 
“No they don’t have language yet, but I think we are getting close. Although they seemed surprised 
to see me at first, they treated me very kindly indeed; everyone smiled to show that I was a 
welcomed guest. One man pointed to a simple hut and made it clear to me with gestures and 
grunting sounds to enter the hut and sit down. Then a woman, perhaps his wife, brought me a cup 
of water. I pointed to myself and said ‘my name is Noam Chomsky’.” So the experimenter sends the 
good professor back to the same village one generation later, i.e., the year 79,980 BCE, and the 
process is repeated. Again Prof. Chomsky returns with the same reply. This continues covering a 
period of many centuries, with roughly the same result. Chomsky reports that with each 
visitation it seems that the older people remember him, but the younger ones that were not 
around during his previous visit  were surprised by his visitation and seemed to have no 
expectation that such a thing might occur. As we slowly grind our way ever closer to the present 
Chomsky becomes increasingly more encouraged. Finally in the year 76,540 BCE Professor 
Chomsky returns and says: “Eureka! We’ve got language. It’s pretty simple, but I definitely 
detected a few rules of grammar, and if I’m not mistaken, maybe even a hint of recursion. When I 
arrived, a smiling young man greeted me and said: ‘Noam Chomsky, glick euk hok’; I wasn’t sure 
what he meant by that, but he pointed to his hut when he made those utterances, quite like on 
previous occasions. And this time, even the teenagers seemed to be waiting for my arrival, as if they 
were expecting me.” It then comes to the mind of the experimenter to ask Professor Chomsky 
another question: “By the way Professor, did you notice if the people became conscious once they 
learned to speak?” And Professor Chomsky replies, “What do you mean? Everyone seemed exactly 
the same in that regard. They appeared to me to be just as conscious in the year 80,000 BCE as 
they did on this last visit. The only difference was that before this time they could only grunt, but 
now they could speak.” The experimenter is overjoyed. She goes on to publish a paper where she 
claims that humans acquired language between the years 76,560 and 76,540 BCE. 
This little parable is useful for highlighting several important points: 
1. Although language certainly evolved via a Darwinian process, it is difficult to imagine a 
scenario that easily fits this evolution. In the parable, humans evolve from a species 
without language to a species with language in a single generation, yet we feel 
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uncomfortable about the specifics of that evolutionary process, particularly in the 
generational time it would take to accomplish the task. In the end, it takes an expert, 
Noam Chomsky in the parable, to declare what constitutes true language. Although we 
will never have this opportunity, if it were possible, it would probably come down to 
something like this; some expert would declare such and such as the moment of 
transition. And this of course would be disputed by other so-called experts. 
2. Without language the concept of history is dramatically deflated. Language preserves 
events of the past and is immensely powerful in the growth of knowledge. Language 
permits the passage of knowledge beyond the generational experiential boundary. An 
individual does not have to personally experience an event to attest to its veracity. In 
fact, the whole concept of truth comes about in the emergence of language. In the 
parable, those too young to have witnessed a prior visit from Chomsky, nonetheless 
have a belief in his existence and likely (pseudo-messianic) return, due to the linguistic 
passage of knowledge to the next generation. If Chomsky never did go back in time to 
the year 76,540 BCE, for how many generations would the belief in the stories of the 
elders persist in the society? Who can say, but in modern society some seem to persist 
for quite a long time. 
3. What was consciousness like during this transitional period of language acquisition? 
Would we be prepared to deny pre-linguistic Homo sapiens consciousness? How would 
we apply our concept of thoughts and thinking to these humans? Surely humans were 
thinking prior to language acquisition, but they had to be thinking without words and 
grammar. And during the transitional period from grunting to speaking there would 
certainly have been a transitional form of conscious experience from non-linguistic 
sensory to the mixed form we have today, but with a balance very much skewed toward 
a non-linguistic form of conscious experience. For this purpose the term qualia is quite 
useful as it can be said that the qualia of our consciousness would have changed.  
4. The conscious experience of the grunting human of the year 80,000 BCE would have a 
lot more in common with the sensory-type consciousness of a dog or chimpanzee than 
that of a modern linguistic human. We need to be very cautious about where we draw 
the line about consciousness and recognize that the modern human conscious 
experience is in a long transitional period. One of the features of consciousness is that it 
does not lend itself to quantification; but qualitatively, it would be fair to say that 
language confers a far greater change in the conscious experience than does a change in 
speciation for late evolution mammals, to which I would include both dogs and 
chimpanzees. The conscious mind of a pre-linguistic hominin was probably much closer 
to that of a chimpanzee than to that of the modern linguistic hominin, or in the parlance 
of Thomas Nagel or David Chalmers, the mental experience of what it is like to be a pre-
linguistic human is probably closer to what it is like to be a chimpanzee than what it is 
like to be a linguistic human. (The contributions of the philosophers of cognition Nagel 
and Chalmers are discussed in the chapter on consciousness). 
… 
I would like to bring together several pieces of mostly anecdotal evidence to suggest a theory of 
how language came about. 
Since there is nothing in the fossil record that could indicate the transition from a non-linguistic 
animal to the current variety of human, we can only conjecture some reasonable accounts for 
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what may have transpired. The fact that all humans have some language, regardless of their 
technological development, is supportive of the view that an African tribe developed language 
around 75,000 years ago, and took this new characteristic with it as tribal members migrated 
far and wide. They either brought the linguistic culture with them; integrating language into the 
culture of tribes they mixed with, or replaced non-linguistic humans completely. If the oft used 
75,000 years ago mark is assumed, then a scenario whereby a relatively small population of 
humans spread language to all the habitable continents within the succeeding 50,000 years, or 
thereabouts, seems quite likely. There is some evidence that several isolated tribes remained 
with small languages until encounters with more technologically advanced humans; this 
suggests that language, at least in some cases, remained simple prior to civilization. By simple 
language, I mean that language was contained to representations of everyday events and not 
many abstractions. 
Darwin noted in his account of the Voyage of the Beagle the simplicity of language amongst the 
natives of Tierra del Fuego (Darwin, 1839).  The size and complexity of Yaghan (Fuegian) 
language is probably much greater than Darwin had supposed. It is not at all clear what 
development may have occurred after the Beagle expedition, and once missionaries entered the 
area. Unfortunately, there are few remaining native speakers, as the Fuegian tribes are now all 
but extinct. 
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Darwin looked upon these people with considerable contempt, calling them wretched, 
practicing cannibalism, naked in subzero temperatures and living the most basic of subsistence 
lives. But he remarked that they were quick to learn foreign languages and seemed in most 
respects to be as intelligent as civilized people.15 Darwin also noted their superiority of vision 
over that of his own countrymen.16 Another point Darwin makes is that they did not seem to 
have a concept of god or spiritual matters. This is not surprising, as it takes a language of 
sufficient breadth to form the concepts required by religious belief systems.  
In regards to linguistic characteristics, the Fuegians may be representative of how most humans 
were round 20,000 years ago. One may build a picture whereby in the not so distant past 
humans were very much like other primates, but with better communication skills and more 
advanced tool making ability. No small matter, but behaviorally a far cry from the modern 
variety of our species. One might say that an elephant is a large herbivore with an excellent 
memory and a marvelous prehensile snout. By making this comparison I am highlighting that 
humans and elephants are two animals with some very handy adaptively evolved traits. 20,000 
years ago it may have been objectively difficult to say which would be more utilitarian, but as it 
will turn out, it is language that is indeed the extraordinary evolutionary leap forward.  
In a world where there are ever decreasing numbers of speakers of aboriginal languages, it 
becomes difficult to imagine what conditions were like at the advent of language. Darwin’s 
observations are useful in constructing this picture, mainly due to the fact that, notwithstanding 
his 19th century prejudicial views of native peoples, his observational faculty was second to 
none. I believe the picture that Darwin portrays of the Fuegian people is a fair representation of 
early linguistic humans. The main points to be taken are that early humans have a greater 
traditional sensory acuity and their consciousness is less skewed toward the language 
dominance found in modern technological humans. The balance of sensory utilization is, of 
course, strongly adaptive; so in a world where audiovisual acuity is most useful, one would not 
want to have it suppressed by the imposition of too many words clogging up one’s thought 
processes.  
                                                             
15 Charles Darwin, Voyage of the Beagle, Chapter X, excerpt: They are excellent mimics: as often as we 
coughed or yawned, or made any odd motion, they immediately imitated us. Some of our party began to 
squint and look awry; but one of the young Fuegians (whose whole face was painted black, excepting a white 
band across his eyes) succeeded in making far more hideous grimaces. They could repeat with perfect 
correctness each word in any sentence we addressed them, and they remembered such words for some time. 
Yet we Europeans all know how difficult it is to distinguish apart the sounds in a foreign language. Which of 
us, for instance, could follow an American Indian through a sentence of more than three words? All savages 
appear to possess, to an uncommon degree, this power of mimicry. I was told, almost in the same words, of 
the same ludicrous habit among the Caffres; the Australians, likewise, have long been notorious for being 
able to imitate and describe the gait of any man, so that he may be recognized. How can this faculty be 
explained? Is it a consequence of the more practised habits of perception and keener senses, common to all 
men in a savage state, as compared with those long civilized?  
 
16 Charles Darwin, Voyage of the Beagle, Chapter X, excerpt: Their sight was remarkably acute; it is well 
known that sailors, from long practice, can make out a distant object much better than a landsman; but both 
York and Jemmy were much superior to any sailor on board: several times they have declared what some 
distant object has been, and though doubted by everyone, they have proved right, when it has been examined 
through a telescope. They were quite conscious of this power; and Jemmy, when he had any little quarrel 
with the officer on watch, would say, "Me see ship, me no tell." 
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Language must have gone through a long rough period to finally take hold when it did, but once 
its advantages became clear, natural selection took its course, and those humans lacking a 
language faculty would have been considerably disadvantaged and aptly replaced by those with 
the linguistic adaptation. This selection continues today as our brain must apportion ever 
greater capacity to language processing. Darwin’s account of the Fuegians, as well as other 
similar accounts, is testimony that some brainpower previously allocated to other senses is 
being redirected to language handling. 
⋯ 
I have found the experiences described by the autistic animal behaviorist Temple Grandin 
particularly enlightening. She has brought her manner of visual thinking into prominence, 
making the point that she does not convert words into visual generalizations the way that 
neurotypical (her term for normal or non-autistic) people do, but rather into specific visual 
representations from memorized experiences; so her memories are visual memories, not verbal. 
She strongly believes that many other animals are visual thinkers as well and likens her 
thoughts to that of animals that she has worked closely with, particularly cattle. She is arguably 
the world’s most successful designer of cattle handling systems, applying her visual thinking 
abilities to the task (Grandin, 1995).  
Some of Grandin’s remarks pertaining to visual thinking correspond well with Charles Darwin’s 
observations about the three Fuegians on board the Beagle.  Other primates, particularly 
chimpanzees, due to their close genetic and behavioral relationship to humans, form good 
examples for what human behavior might be like without language. What happens thereafter is 
the interesting part of the story.  
The facility which humans possessed for increasing their communication skill had exceptional 
selective advantages, which was evidenced by the rapid expansion of the human population in 
both numbers and habitats. In addition to the advantages inherent in superior communication 
abilities, language permits the symbolic storage of information. This method is far more 
economical than other representations, although ostensibly less precise. While most would 
agree that this change in the kind of information stored in memory represents a concomitant 
increase in knowledge, it may have more to do with how we define knowledge than what may 
be the case in fact. It would be fair to say that the kind of knowledge gained through language 
leads to the expansion of culture. Richard Dawkins coined the term ‘meme’ to represent a unit of 
cultural inheritance; it is a useful term when compared to ‘gene’, since both have information at 
their core. One could say that culture is the phenotype of memes. 
This seems a good place to break on the history of human linguistic development to discuss the 
linguistic conveyance of information and how that information is used by our brain. We will 
need to start from a rudimentary level, since much of my terminology is novel and not part of 
the accepted parlance of linguistics. 
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Words 
The meaning of a word is determined by social agreement or declaration. This is my 
definition and the one that I use throughout this book; it is a self-referential definition made by 
declaration in conformity with the previous sentence. Or as Wittgenstein put it in Philosophical 
Investigations (§43): The meaning of a word is its use in language. 
Although this may seem a rather gross oversimplification of semantics, it is often stated that 
there is nothing inherent in any word that need convey any particular meaning. If I am speaking 
English, I may use the word house to represent my place of abode. If I am speaking Spanish, I am 
likely to use the word casa. A word is simply a sign that represents an object or a descriptive or 
an action in the mind of the speaker. The generally accepted meaning applied to most words is 
usually not contentious, since they tend to have a commonly shared meaning by the nature of 
their facilitation in communication. A group speaking a common language (English in this case) 
will find that there is no point in debating whether a four-legged animal that barks is a dog or 
should be labeled with another moniker. The common definition is the essential thing, since it is 
a social agreement about the sign and what it represents which makes communication possible; 
this applies to non-syntactic communication as well, and is perhaps even more critical in one-to-
one sign-semantic expressions. Agreement on the meaning of signs may not be the case for 
words that describe a state of affairs which is unclear in a particular social context. An example 
of contentious meaning might involve the use of terms like fair and just or other words related 
to the concept of fairness or justness. Is it a crime for a mother to steal food in order to feed her 
starving children if she has no other means of obtaining food? There may well be a law that 
clearly defines stealing as a crime that should be punished without exception. But many would 
argue that the act of stealing in this particular case is justified. Should the act of stealing in this 
case represent a punishable crime or should it not? If a poll were taken, there would surely be 
fair representation on both sides of the issue. Thus, the meaning of a word can be situational or 
contextual, or as Wittgenstein might say, can vary with its use in language. 
The following will define some of the terminology used in this section. In cases where we are 
simply naming a definitional non-contentious sign, I will be call the word or phrase a fact. In a 
case where agreement is not that clear as to whether a word or phrase can rightfully be applied 
to a particular state of affairs, I will call such a case an opinion. An opinion can be made into a 
fact by declaration. I can declare that a mother who steals food in order to save her children 
from starvation is not committing a crime, but is acting in a fair and just manner. A fact is thus 
something which, in the case of a proposition, is deemed to be true because it is true in relation 
to a defined system of logic with a particular set of axioms. In the example above, it is the 
declarer who decides what system will dictate the truth or facthood of the proposition. 
My point here is that there is nothing absolute in the nature or meaning of any word or 
assemblage of words. Meanings come from agreed definitions or declaratives, in essence, by 
social arrangement. The emperor that declares that the first-born child of every mother be 
sacrificed to the gods may find cause, for whatever reason, to have such declaration written into 
the law of the land and declared to be both proper and just, although, as one might expect, it is 
unlikely to be agreed to by most mothers. In the social context of the empire, such declarations 
are valid in determining the usage of a word in its representation of a state of affairs. That a 
particular definition appears in a particular dictionary next to a particular word does not make 
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that stated definition the meaning of that word; it is more that members of a social group have 
at least tacitly agreed on a particular definition, or that an authority has declared it to be the 
meaning. Whether something is a fact or a matter of opinion will depend on the social context. If 
there are ten people in a room with a four-legged animal and everyone agrees that the animal is 
a dog, then the animal is a dog, even if a larger group of people not in the room may say the 
animal is a cat. If those participating in the state of affairs are all in agreement, then it can be 
said to be a fact. Thus, facthood is a mental attribution, or more precisely, a linguistic 
attribution, rather than one determined by a state of affairs in the external world. On the other 
hand, returning to the room of 10 people, if 6 declare with certainty that it’s a dog and 4 say it’s 
a cat, then we would have to surmise that whether the animal is a dog or a cat is a matter of 
opinion. In the respective minds of 6 participants, it will be a fact that the animal is a dog, and it 
will be a fact that it is a cat in the respective minds of the other 4 participants.  
A great deal of modern life is devoted to coming to a social agreement about the definition of 
words. Much of this may be fought out in courts of law or by other modes of arbitration. 
According to the Geneva Conventions, torture is a criminal act. Whether a specific act 
constitutes torture is something which is the subject of much debate. Where the word and 
definition fit a particular state of affairs is of great social significance, worthy of considerable 
time and attention. Whether the word marriage should have the meaning of a man and a woman 
joined in a civil union for the purpose of procreation and no other type of union, or be extended 
to include civil or religious unions of other types, is in dispute in many nations, and will almost 
certainly be resolved by authoritative declaration or by some method which leads to social 
consensus. 
… 
Language approximates states of affairs. Since the number of states of affairs is for all intents 
and purposes infinite, language would be useless if it were not a shorthand methodology 
covering groupings of similar states of affairs. We may utilize the words human genome to 
generically signify the DNA in a human being, knowing full well that no two genomes are 
identical, with perhaps the exception of identical twins. The words that describe an event, or a 
state of affairs, can never fully describe the event. If one were to look upon an expanse of beach, 
would there be a point in detailing the position of every grain of sand (in normal 
circumstances)? In that language categorizes and simplifies similar types of objects and states of 
affairs, some detail must necessarily be lost in the process. Language can never provide an exact 
description of the world. Generally speaking, our senses approximate the world with the goal 
that it be sufficient for survival, at least long enough to reproduce. Language is yet a further 
approximation of these perceptions, but comes with the added benefit of some analytic capacity.  
Let us examine a few interesting words which most often express matters of opinion by the way 
they are used in typical circumstances. I will acknowledge beforehand that there will be some 
Wittgensteinian type problems in the very definitions that I had hoped would clarify these 
problems, and in the same regard I shall say they should be considered elucidatory. The usage of 
these common words as well as the underlying assumptions we make about their usage in 
everyday conversation should be reconsidered, for it can color the way we think about the 
world. 
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 Reality: This is the thing that we are seeking to know at the end, not the beginning or 
middle, of our philosophical enquiry into Nature. At some future time we might be able 
to make a statement about what this thing is that we call reality. Currently, it is just a 
word that at best can be said to be some version of objectivity, itself being a term that we 
are grappling with to define. To say something is real, as it is used in common parlance, 
is to say that there is certainty in our knowledge about the thing in question. It is best to 
leave reality as a term used to denote findings in a philosophical culmination, not a word 
to be posited as a resolved characteristic or property of some entity. The related word 
existence can be similarly classified. We are a long way from saying what reality is, and 
this will be explored in greater detail in later chapters.  
 Intelligence: A word often assigned to humans when being compared to other animals, 
or to particular types of humans when making intra-species comparisons. I may offer 
‘computing power of the brain’ as a definition, but I think this is rather arbitrary. It 
seems to be an attribution of mental power in the way that strength is an attribution of 
physical power. But it will always be a word with a definition in dispute, particularly as 
it is applied in specific cases. Since there are not many people that would separate 
language from the whole of mental processes, there is more than a subtle inference that 
intelligence refers mainly to linguistic intelligence. It is an ability to manipulate data that 
makes humans intelligent and the greater the ability for a human to manipulate data the 
more intelligent we are likely to believe a particular human is. We have gone so far as to 
distinguish other types of intelligence, such as emotional intelligence and common sense 
as being different kinds of intelligence, apart from the principal measurement of this 
characteristic. Another animal, a dog for instance, may be considered intelligent, but not 
in a way to be compared to humans, but rather to other dogs or perhaps other animals 
in general. 
 Progress: This word seems to imply that something has improved by going from one 
state of affairs to another. But who is to decide? What do we mean by improve? Is the 
building of a dam to be considered progress if it brings electricity to millions of people 
that once had none, or should we consider the opinions of those people, animals and 
plants that have been killed or displaced because of the dam’s construction?  
 Better: Very much like progress. Swatting a fly may be better for the human, but worse 
for the fly. Much of what goes on in life is a zero sum game, substantially about energy 
transfers when considered at a thermodynamic level. Whether something is better or 
worse than before is clearly a matter of one’s perspective. A gain in energy will usually 
be considered better than a loss of energy. The consumer is usually better off than the 
consumed. 
 Good or evil: Again, this is an appeal to an absolute authority. How often these words are 
used as if they signify something that should be obvious to all. But it is usually an error 
on the part of the speaker concerning the authority that deems something to be good or 
evil that is the semantic villain. The speaker has become self-deluded into believing that 
there is an undisputed absolute authority, a law-giver, so to speak, that passes judgment 
over a range of states of affairs, labeling them accordingly on some putative scale of 
goodness. This is at the heart of the nature of belief. 
 Morality: Utterly a matter of opinion, although rarely presented as such. It is simply a 
word used to signify a standard by which actions are to be judged, but the standard is 
completely arbitrary, although apparently not in the mind of the moralist. Ethics is a 
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debate about the generalities of what should be considered fair and just in a given 
society. Whatever the society agrees upon as moral is moral by declaration or social 
agreement, and thus the standard of measurement.  
 Meaning: Whatever word, entity or state of affairs which is the matter at hand has 
meaning only relative to the subject in the relationship. Similar to the definition of a 
word, the meaning of anything is by dint of social agreement or declaration, even if that 
declaration is a self-made declaration. Meaning is both relative and internalized.  
 Should: A word used to state a matter of opinion, as it is just the way the speaker advises 
in a particular situation. 
It may seem that, at least in my opinion, just about everything is a matter of opinion. And that is 
in fact my opinion. The words that I have listed for clarification are but a few examples of those 
for which social agreement is not easily found. We can continue through a large portion of a 
dictionary and find many like examples, but I think the point has been made. The combination of 
the wide variety of social contexts and belief systems make many of the propositions of 
language both contentious and arbitrary. When ordinary language is understood in terms of a 
system of propositional logic, then this must be the case. What we call beliefs in a language 
system are equivalent to the axioms that form the foundation of any formal system of logic. If 
you change the axioms, then the theorems, or statements of truth, will change as well. So facts 
are obtained only when in a given social context of the respective belief systems of the 
participants are the same, and opinions will attain when the belief systems differ. 
The relativism surrounding a wide variety of states of affairs is what we actually observe in the 
world. Understanding why this is the case will be shown by how language, as a formal system of 
logic, generates its statements of truth. 
 
Are we alone in the universe? 
I will not attempt to answer this question, or should I say, offer an opinion, but rather analyse 
the question itself from the perspective of the discussion on the nature of language. The 
question can take on several nuances, depending on how one interprets the meaning of its 
constituent words.  
If an astronaut found something similar to an earthling spider on another planet, would this 
satisfy the word we in the question? Do we mean a creature that shares many of the animal 
characteristics of a human being? Or would this eight-legged creature not be close enough? 
Certainly finding something on another planet as remarkable as a spider would be headline 
news around the world, and it would likely make the SETI17 people exuberantly confident that a 
more human-like ’We’ would not be far off. But these seekers of life out there are looking for 
what they call intelligent life, for they are hopeful of finding something that is advanced enough 
                                                             
17 The Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence is the collective name for a number of activities undertaken 
to search for intelligent extraterrestrial life. 
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to transmit radio signals. So even some creature close enough to humanity as a gibbon or a 
Neanderthal would not suffice for this purpose, nor would a 19th century human meet this last 
criterion.  
In order to satisfy the term intelligent it would seem that we need to have something a bit more 
like a 21st century human. What is being sought by SETI is a creature, regardless of physical 
appearance, that can do science, and that means having language. So as much as might be said 
for the intelligence of dogs, pigs, parrots and dolphins, when we use the word ‘intelligence’ in 
this manner we usually require a modicum of linguistic ability. So I will take the liberty of 
rephrasing this subchapter title to read: Are human beings the only creatures with language in 
the universe? Not everyone will agree that this rephrasing is what is meant by the original, 
which is part of the point, in that all propositions have some degree of scope in their meaning. I 
have tried to be as objective as possible in attempting to find the midpoint of the normal 
distribution of interpretations of the question ‘Are we alone in the universe?’ all the while 
realizing that one can never be completely objective.  
This brief examination of a single interrogative sentence highlights several features of language. 
Foremost perhaps is to make the point yet again that language is a social activity. We regularly 
come across statements that are open to interpretation and usually find a way to impart the 
proper meaning in the context of the situation. For example, if an atheist attends a wedding in a 
church, she is likely to hear lots of references to god, but it is very unlikely that she will stop the 
ceremony to correct the minister about what she believes are the facts of the matter. We tacitly 
understand that others have different opinions and the expression of opinions different from 
one’s own may not be socially acceptable in certain situations. In fact, our own opinions may be 
unacceptable in quite a large number of circumstances during the normal course of life. This 
reinforces the notion of the subjectivity of the meaning of propositions and how the system by 
which meaning is extracted from propositions must be examined to comprehend the nature of 
the process. Acknowledging that the world contains a wide range of differing opinions, it is 
bewildering that so little attention has been paid to how this comes about.  
Another point is how we ascribe the term intelligence within the requisite linguistic 
construction, recognizing that other animals can be intelligent, but not in the same way that 
humans are intelligent. As previously noted, the subjectivity of language is critical when 
assigning definitions to words like intelligence, thought and consciousness; there is nothing 
objective about the process. Words cover a broad conceptual range, but usually we do not need 
to be explicit about it in the normal course of social life. Nonetheless, there are occasions when 
we do find it necessary to be more specific and might add an adjective, such as ‘higher’, before 
the noun, making a distinction like ‘higher intelligence’ attributable to humans and other 
creatures with language having the faculty to comprehend the world scientifically, wherever in 
the universe they might reside. 
Although in the discourse of world events some 
debate may be focused on the meaning of words, 
most times we go through life without stopping for 
any analysis whatsoever. In the course of evolution, 
living things have not given much thought, linguistic 
or otherwise, to how they happened to have evolved 
a particular trait; and language, being very much a 
Figure 3: Drawing Hands, M C Escher, 1948 
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part of the Darwinian process is no different. An examination into the workings of language, as 
Wittgenstein recognized, is a self-referential process, which is what makes it so difficult to do, as 
is depicted by the M C Escher lithograph Drawing Hands (Figure 3). This, in part, is what 
Wittgenstein is saying in the last few sections of the Tractatus. We are trying to be as objective 
as possible, but cannot be completely so by the very nature of how language operates. As a 
formal system of propositional logic it is firmly in the grasp of Formalism, Incompleteness and 
Undecidability. 
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Truth and Logic 
“Nothing is so difficult as not deceiving oneself.”  — Ludwig Wittgenstein 
 
What truth is and is not in a nutshell: 
 Truth is a function of language, not of the physical world.  
 Truth is about logic, not semantics. 
 Truth falls within the domain of logical space, not a materialistic spacetime.  
This may arguably be amongst the most minimalist of all deflationary theories of truth. Truth is 
totally detached from the external world, which is, in this case, the world outside of language. It 
is not relevant that linguistic truth, more specifically that which exists in the mind of a linguistic 
human, agrees with some notion of reality or a particular perception of a so-called real world. 
The correspondence of a fact, i.e. a true proposition, with the perceived state of affairs in the 
physical world is a different process and a separate issue very much related to consciousness. 
Although this is in conflict with Alfred Tarski’s conception of truth (Tarski, 1944), it is only so 
due to Tarski’s presupposition about the reality of the physical world, which at this point in this 
thesis is yet to be established. For the most part I would find little difference between my 
conception of truth and that of Tarski, except for this notion of reality that Tarski shares with 
Wittgenstein and their questionable distinction between the logic governing natural and 
idealized languages.  A perceived isomorphic relationship of a proposition to a state of affairs in 
the physical world is significant only in relation to a similar or dissimilar isomorphism 
perceived by another person, which would determine whether that person would agree or 
disagree with the proposition made by the first person.18 One’s own world view, or any subset 
of propositions relating to that world view, is rightfully open to challenge by someone with a 
conflicting perspective, since the only guarantee for agreement between two sets of 
propositions is if they are generated from a system with the same axioms; of course, this is 
highly unlikely in real life situations. It is this very point that explicates why people presented 
with the same set of facts, or information, may disagree on the truth of a particular proposition 
relating to those facts, and accounts for why people believe what they do, as well as why some 
beliefs seem so far-fetched having little correspondence with general notions of reality, or in 
many cases, one’s personal notion of reality.  
These points are meant to be both definitional and something beyond definitional. At the root of 
the dilemma that I find with semantic notions of truth is how natural language is viewed. There 
is a long history, starting with Wittgenstein himself, that there is a difference between idealized 
or formalized languages and natural language. I would say that natural language falls within the 
                                                             
18 Under this system all truths are tautological truths, as there are no semantic considerations, only 
syntactic ones represented by the rules of truth generation of the system of logic applicable to the set of 
propositions under examination. 
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ambit of formalized language, but is too complex to axiomatize, so there is the predictable 
tendency to exclude natural language from the formal language classification. At the level which 
ordinary language is examined, it is impossible to access the underlying structure that leads to 
language output (or speech, if you like). But this belies the neuronal level of formalization which 
simply runs too deep to be examined. To exclude natural language from formalization is the 
same as for someone who does not understand the game of chess saying that chess does not 
have rules, simply because that person cannot figure out what the rules are. One only need 
examine the mechanism of cellular biology to marvel at the complexity of its operations. The 
intricate array of agonists and antagonists in the multitude of cellular interactions could never 
have been foreseen before the efforts of tens of thousands of microbiologists deciphered the 
wonders of the cell; and there is so much yet to be discovered. Natural language, involving 
cellular as well as intracellular interactions, poses the same daunting task for unraveling its 
intricacies as do other biological processes.  
Furthermore, if the universe is to follow laws falling within the purview of information theory, 
natural language would be just one of the myriad processes to do so. One would need to find a 
compelling reason to exclude natural language from axiomatization, rather than include it 
within the ambit of formal systems. Theories of truth tend to put natural language to the side for 
fear of the challenge posed by explaining its operation via enumeration of the axioms of its 
formalized system It is much easier just to deal with idealized languages and wait for a solution 
to arise in the future, as if some novel physical law will one day be discovered governing 
ordinary linguistic practices. 
The concept of truth presented here resolves one of the great puzzles of philosophy: Why do 
people believe the things they do? And as such, significantly bears upon how the world is to be 
understood. To show that truth is, in fact, only a function of language and not one of 
correspondence will require further elucidation as to how language works in the contemporary 
human mind. 
Let us start with a review of the way things were for pre-linguistic humans. If we turn the clock 
back around 100,000 years, we find an animal with a large brain, like those of modern humans, 
but with vocalizations sounding roughly similar to that of chimpanzees, in that both animals 
would lack a grammar in their communications, but I would suspect that the vocalizations of 
humans would be more extensive and complex. I could also imagine that with the passage of 
time there being a gradual increase in ostensive, non-syntactic vocalizations. This would 
constitute a form of communication, but would not qualify as a true language in that there 
would be a lack of methodology for generating additional constructions from those already 
known. But at some point in time, and exactly how this happened no one is ever likely to know, 
language with some form of grammar took hold in humans and flourished. The details of this 
development can only be a matter of speculation, so it would be rather pointless to elaborate 
further.19 It may be possible one day, through work in the field of genomics, to become more 
                                                             
19 As a simple thought experiment, one could begin with 7 words (vocalizations or gestures in the context 
of the time) that one could easily imagine being part of a non-syntactic communication: me, you, baby, dog, 
eat, sleep and kill. It is not difficult to make a number of 2 word sentences and then a few 3 word 
sentences. As vocabulary increases, it may have come to the realization of some tribe that there was far 
more scope in communication than originally thought.  
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precise about this critical transition. But for the analysis herein, we must accept that the 
evolution from an animal without true language to an animal with true language occurred 
sometime around 75,000 years ago or thereabouts. 
It is reasonable to assume that the first human users of true language did not go to sleep one 
night and awake the next morning chatting away with a full-blown grammatical language. 
Vocabularies must have started small and simple, grown slowly, and almost certainly lacked 
recursion. Nevertheless, this proto-language would have followed a system of predicate logic. At 
this early stage of development there would be no difference between a syntactically correct 
simple natural language and an idealized one. As language grows, grammatical errors creep in, 
precise syntactic correctness is not required for comprehension, words are dropped because 
they are understood without speaking them outright and a sort of fuzziness enters what was 
once a clean formal arrangement. But in fact, the rules are still in place; they have just become 
more convoluted and difficult to enumerate. At the basal level, natural language is indeed 
formal; but as the language matures the axioms of the system swell to an incomprehensible 
level.  
So what was this acquisition of language about? An animal that sensed its environment in a 
manner similar to its close primate relatives, i.e. by way of vision, hearing, smell, etc., acquires a 
new sense, language. If we take vision as representative of our senses, then the function of 
vision is to receive electromagnetic radiation as an input and process it into a mental 
representation. The neuronal connections that result from this process can be interpreted as the 
output side of this sensory experience. If a neural network is a type of digital system (although it 
need not be one that functions like a digital computer), then one could say that vision digitizes 
the analogue electromagnetic (EM) signal so that a mental representation of the physical is 
made. 20 There is a close relationship between the physical and the informational in this type of 
input-output process. Other senses act in a similar way.  
Language acquisition effectively places a kind of computing machine in the brain which gives it 
the capacity to process propositions. I will now call this recently acquired human sense the 
language module. The language module is a sensory representation of a formal system of 
propositional calculus and can thus be analyzed by the rules of such formal systems. This is my 
physiological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s ideas presented in the Tractatus.  
The language module has two key functions. First, it determines the truth value of an input 
proposition. Second, it stores the proposition, along with its truth value, in the memory system 
of the brain. It can be easily extrapolated that the language module integrates with the brain ’s 
memory system in the storage of true propositions. What is not a direct part of the module is 
verification with the outside world, i.e. the world as interpreted by our other senses. Simple 
propositions, such as ‘there is a cow in the pasture’, may be easily verified visually. This creates a 
                                                             
20 A neural network is a computer program for a learning system that tries to mimic a biological neural 
network. It would be too great a digression to get into further detail about the subject of neural networks. 
This topic has been explored enough, that at least to my satisfaction, there is an equivalency between the 
biological and the programmed neural network. It is yet one more example of the relationship between 
logical and physical spaces, or the informational and the physical world. This example, by the way, does 
not represent my position on how this function actually works, which is described in later chapters on 
consciousness.  
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correspondence between the proposition and the processed visual input which validates the 
truth of the proposition. The sound of the cow mooing and the smell of the cow could further 
validate the truth value of the proposition and reinforce one’s certainty concerning its truth. In 
the case just mentioned, the truth of the proposition is isomorphically represented by the other 
processed sensory inputs. If, for example, I am in a room with a window which looks upon a 
familiar pasture, and there are several people in the room that have been truthful with me in the 
past, and they all state that ‘there is a cow in the pasture’, I would very likely interpret their 
statements as true even without peering out the window to verify the assertion with my own 
eyes. Regardless of physical world state of affairs about this particular cow I would likely store 
in my memory as true the proposition ‘there is a cow in the pasture’, even though in fact there 
may not be a cow in the pasture, thereby making the statement about this particular state of 
affairs false in the physical world, or its associated correspondence-theoretical formulation. 
Nonetheless, this does not invalidate the truth value of the proposition, as the physical-world 
state of affairs concerning the cow and the pasture is irrelevant to the truth value stored in the 
mental machinery of the person not seeing the cow, which was arrived at by believing the 
statements of trusted friends. One is limited to proclaiming that an isomorphism, or 
correspondence, between the proposition and state of affairs in the physical world would not be 
the case in this particular instance.  
This disjunction of linguistic truths from their isomorphic representations explains why people 
have belief systems that do not seem to have correspondence in the physical world. When the 
physical world’s isomorphic representations of a particular belief do not exist, then the truth 
value of this belief can be said to be justified by faith. So faith can be defined as a belief ensuing 
from theorems of a particular formal system of language when a justification from an 
isomorphism of those theorems in the physical world does not exist. This definition will require 
some revision when we examine in more detail what is meant by the ‘physical world’ and 
‘reality.’ 
So, how can it be that we have been so deceived for so long that truth had something to do with 
physical reality. There are two general misconceptions about the world which are responsible 
for this anomalous situation: 
1. There is something called truth that actually has some meaning in the physical world. 
2. That our conception of reality is reasonably accurate, even though there is no basis for 
this belief other than our conscious experiences, something of which we have little 
understanding (although I will offer an explanation of consciousness in a later chapter). 
To show that our concept of truth does not have meaning outside of language, we should 
examine how the world is perceived by non-linguistic beings. For all intents and purposes, this 
would include all known organisms including humans that lived prior to 75,000 years ago. 
Let us examine how a dog might conceive of the world. A dog does not have formal language, 
and operates with two-color vision and an exceptional sense of smell. When the dog perceives 
an odor, it categorizes and stores in memory an olfactory representation of some molecules that 
its nose has inhaled. There is no mechanism by which the dog’s olfactory system can interrogate 
the particular smell as to whether it is in fact a true representation of the molecules it purports 
to represent, but is instead some bogus odor only disguising as the authentic set of molecules 
entering the olfactory system. For example, the dog would not question the veracity of its senses 
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if it thought it smelled a fresh sirloin steak. The dog would not query whether this was some 
trick and it was not in fact the smell of a sirloin steak and may in fact be the smell of a 
decomposing dead rat. There simply is no apparatus that the dog has to pose such a question. 
The odor carries its own truth value. It could never be conceived of as not being true. It could 
never register ‘this is a bogus smell of a sirloin steak’. It may in fact not be a sirloin steak that the 
dog has sniffed, but this is of no consequence, as we are not examining the functionality of the 
dog’s olfactory system at this time. If the dog is mistaken, then it is likely to be due to a less than 
fully functioning olfactory system or the dog has perhaps been purposely tricked into acquiring 
that false belief in a manner similar to how a Venus Fly Trap plant deceives a fly. In the same 
way, a human can be thrown off by a mirage and be mistaken by some distorted visual input. 
This is just the limitation of the sensory system. No one would suggest that we should be able to 
see everything that exists in the physical world. Some things are too far away to be seen, some 
too small, others outside the range of detectible EMR wavelengths. It would be rather 
extravagant for natural selection to have evolved a mechanism like a non-linguistic truth 
checking system for sensory information, since there would be no way of attributing a proper 
truth value. How would one know if some visual input was or was not a mirage? There may be 
some question as to the certainty of the observation, but this is merely what happens when 
processing insufficient information to make a definitive determination. This is quite different 
than receiving deficient sensory information for determining if the input was what it is seemed 
to be or was just a hoax or a mirage. For example, if we believe that we can clearly see a cow in 
the pasture, but conclude, without any further input, this to be a false visual representation and 
the thing in the pasture is actually a horse, or perhaps a dog or maybe it’s a tree. It is easy to see 
how ridiculous this would be, and also how excruciating it would be for an animal to go about its 
business if it questioned the validity of its sensory input, even if it had the capability to do so; 
small wonder that natural selection did not see fit to find this sort of adaptation beneficial. 
At some rudimentary level, all information is ultimately binary and can be interpreted as having 
a truth-like value, but for living things, the matter usually at hand is one of how a particular kind 
of input is interpreted by a particular organism. There are countless binary triggers, such as 
quorum sensing in bacteria to give but one example, which are responses to environmental 
stimuli that have threshold triggering mechanisms (Cámara, 2006; Waters & Bassler, 2005). 
When sensory inputs are complex, as is the case with our own primary senses, access to binary 
resolution is buried deep in the underlying detail. For example, even though at some basal level 
vision may have binary correlates to individual photons entering the eye, our visual mechanism 
is built to ultimately interpret and respond at the level of the visual image, not to that of 
individual photons. These senses require interpretations that carry a default truth value for 
these types of inputs, with a course handling mechanism to deal with degrees of uncertainty due 
to limitations on information in both reception and interpretation. Simple organisms, as well as 
components of more complex organisms, such as cell membranes in mammals, have 
mechanisms ostensibly operating at the binary level for molecular transactions; an example 
being the binary lock and key mechanisms that are ubiquitous at the cellular level. Complex 
organisms have their binary decision processes executing at a subconscious level, effectively 
letting all the ‘dirty work’ take place a lower levels of resolution. This permits the organism to 
handle a multitude of lower level functions in the background, simplifying as such, the complex 
requirements of real-time high level decision processes, and is how natural selection has 
handled the building of organisms with trillions of cells working in coordination. 
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What is special about language is that it is a high level sensory apparatus that uses symbols, 
mainly words, for its simple structural componentry, which can produce infinite arrays of 
sentences. Many of these can be resolved as binary operations, which are the propositions. 
Other senses lack this property. Having language is like being given access to a kind of biological 
Turing Machine (TM) at a conscious level of experience, effectively, a theorem creating machine. 
This is why truth is a function of language, for it produces true statements from its axiomatic 
rule-following system. The capacity of an organism on our planet to resolve something 
consciously as either being true or false only exists by virtue of this mechanism. These truths 
exist in their own self-contained world, within one’s own personal respective world of language. 
It’s like being in a box with its own set of rules. What goes on outside the box is in a certain 
sense irrelevant to what goes on inside the box, in that truths can exist within the box regardless 
of evidence to the contrary outside the box. A well-functioning human being will be helped (and 
well-advised) by coordinating the truths of the language system with states of affairs as 
reported by other senses. The truths, or theorems, that are generated in the rule-following 
system of language are recursively defined. Whatever comes out of it is just following logic. As 
Wittgenstein states (TLP 2.012): In logic nothing is accidental. 
A truth concept is plainly not part of the usual sensory world. Correspondence theories of truth 
are inconsistent with the picture presented here, in that they intend to compare an 
independently obtained linguistic truth value with a representation constructed by a limited 
system of interpretation about a physical world that is itself problematic. So, if truth is not a part 
of the physical world, then what is it? Truth is a condition that arises as a consequence of the 
binary process. The result of a binary process operation can take on one of two values. What 
these values are called is irrelevant. It can be this or that, but nothing else. Some of the usual 
suspects are: true and false, yes and no, 1 and 0, -1 and 0, up and down, left and right, on and off, 
open and closed. The physical world of our experience is not presented as a binary process. We 
comprehend the binary nature of physical processes due to the science that has come about 
from language-based knowledge. The binary process underlying the physical world exists at 
more fundamental levels of structure. The physical world as consciously interpreted by non-
linguistic mammals is an analog world.  
On the other hand, language, being a system of propositional logic, indubitably produces binary 
process values. Propositions take on either one of two values that we label true and false. Saying 
that truth can only be attributed to language (regarding the human interpretation of things) 
becomes self-evident when one realizes that the remainder of how we come to know the world 
appears analog at conscious levels. All cellular responses are ultimately binary, even if one 
needs to descend a level or two to reach the causative mechanism. Many are quite easy to 
interpret. The neuron either fires or it does not, the muscle either contracts or it does not, the 
protein either fits into a receptor molecule on the cell membrane or it does not. The ubiquitous 
lock and key configuration of cellular processes is representative of so much of biology that it is 
hard to find a process where an underlying binary operation is not at the root of a more 
complex process.  
⋯ 
The truth value of a proposition or set of propositions is determined by comparing the input 
proposition to similar ones that exist in the memory of the person. There is no difficulty in 
adding a strength magnitude to the truth value of a proposition, effectively giving a proposition 
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any value between a generic extremely false to extremely true. Remember that we are talking 
about beliefs, which is something not usually enumerated, although the underlying mechanism 
must in fact be digitized. It is the beauty of the binary process that underlies logic that such 
complexity can grow out of such simplicity. It must be quite rare to have a belief supported by a 
single axiom corresponding to a single supportive enumerated memory; however that might 
come about biologically.  
Let us see how this happens in everyday experience by examining this simple proposition: John 
is an honest man. Let us suppose that a friend has just made this statement to you. And let us 
further suppose that you are considering going into a business with John, so it is important to 
know whether John is a trustworthy person. This is analogous to a pre-linguistic human 
determining whether or not it is safe to walk past a pride of lions. Just like it is important for any 
animal to know what situations are safe and which are not, it is likewise important for modern 
humans to do the same, and we usually do this linguistically, although almost all of us rely on 
some form of intuition (or non-linguistic factors) to varying extents. Linguistically, this is done 
by assigning a truth value to the aforementioned proposition.  
So how will your rational mind determine what truth value to assign to the proposition ‘John is 
an honest man?’ Clearly, there will be a great number of factors which may go into this 
determination. If you have no knowledge of John whatsoever, you are likely to rely on the word 
of your friend who made the supportive statement. Alternatively, you may not necessarily 
consider your friend an honest person, which would be something to be taken into account. You 
may be a person that is generally suspicious of people that you don’t know well, or to the 
contrary, be very trusting of others. Your mother may have said to you once: “Don’t trust John, 
he is not an honest man.” You may have suspected that John took a pen that you left on the table 
the last time you met. You may know that John has been convicted of robbery in the past. Or you 
may have heard a story how John spent two days looking for a person whose wallet he found, 
just so he could return it. Any number of factors may be considered in making a truth 
determination. Suppose there are only two pieces of information and both come from trusted 
sources. Your friend says that John is honest, but your mother has brought John’s honesty into 
question. Hence, residing in your memory may well be two evenly valued truth assignments, say 
on some arbitrary scale, a +5 for your friend’s opinion and a -5 for your mother’s opinion; so the 
net value comes to zero. This is what happens in the oft experienced weighing up of a decision 
where pros and cons are evenly balanced. Perhaps it will be your general proclivity to be 
trusting, which will finally be the deciding factor, this in itself a weighing up of myriad past 
experiences which brought you to this particular proclivity. Exactly how the brain is wired to 
accomplish this task and which neurons are firing is not yet known, but I imagine one day it may 
well be. For our purposes here, it is not critical. It will suffice to know that there is a 
neurological underpinning to the process. On a systems level, the proposition to be assigned a 
truth value is compared to a variety of possible propositional theorems residing in memory that 
could influence the determination of the current input proposition and a truth value of 
particular strength could be assigned to the current proposition. We may characterize this 
process as a deliberation or a consideration of the facts. 
Human beings are extremely complex creatures. We cannot begin to compute the multitude of 
low level binary operations that go into making us such well-functioning biological machines. 
But we can nonetheless surmise the methodologies that must be in place to produce that 
functionality. Of the myriad binary operations continually being executed at every imaginable 
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level, the binary truth values assigned to linguistic propositions is a very distinctive case 
seemingly reserved just for humans.  
 
Comments on TLP Section 6 
Section 6 of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is informative on a number of important matters 
concerning propositions and logic. As much as I would wish to refrain from direct analysis of 
TLP, there are several points that call for some elucidation regarding assertions made in this 
book which differ from the Wittgensteinian concept of truth. 
To address some of the issues presented in the Tractatus I can supplement my definition of 
truth by adding the following elucidations to my earlier postulates: 
 All propositions of language are propositions of logic. 
 All true propositions of language are tautologies. 
Let us examine the following paragraphs from TLP: 
6.1 The propositions of logic are tautologies.  
6.11 Therefore the propositions of logic say nothing. (They are the analytic propositions.)  
6.111 All theories that make a proposition of logic appear to have content are false. One 
might think, for example, that the words 'true' and 'false' signified two properties among 
other properties, and then it would seem to be a remarkable fact that every proposition 
possessed one of these properties. On this theory it seems to be anything but obvious, just 
as, for instance, the proposition, 'All roses are either yellow or red', would not sound 
obvious even if it were true. Indeed, the logical proposition acquires all the characteristics 
of a proposition of natural science and this is the sure sign that it has been construed 
wrongly.  
Section 6.1 is the same as my own.  
Section 6.11 is another way of stating one of my opening postulates of this chapter: Truth is 
about logic, not semantics.  
Section 6.111 brings to a head the main point of contention, which is whether or not 
propositions of natural language are logical propositions. If they are not, then a correspondence 
theory of truth, like that of Tarski, would attain.  
So the question may rest on how pervasive logical processes are in the world. Do they extend to 
natural language, as I have argued? Determining the relationship of language, truth and logic is 
one of the most critical tasks in philosophy; so much depends of the outcome. One can sort 
through Wittgenstein’s own words to build a case for linking the three together, despite 
conclusions that one might reach from Wittgenstein’s philosophy in its totality (Wittgenstein’s 
statements, in italics, are followed by my comments): 
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 The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world (TLP 3.01). One might ask what a 
false thought would be. Are the thoughts derived from language part of the picture of the 
world? It would seem so, for if not, what kind of thoughts are they? 
 Logical pictures can depict the world (TLP 2.19). It would seem that Wittgenstein is 
referring to sensory perceptions here. Whether language belongs in this category can be 
argued from the point of language being a sensory perception. It would certainly be 
classified as such if using the neural pathway argument. Wittgenstein states that every 
picture is a logical one (TLP 2.182), so the link is being made between reality, pictures 
and logic. 
 The picture represents a possible state of affairs in logical space (TLP 2.202).  One could 
infer that propositions of language must create a pictorial representation, for if a 
proposition of language is true it would represent a state of affairs in logical space, and if 
false it would not; that is the possibility. One could surmise that pictures derived from 
common sensory experiences would come up against a comparison test with physical 
reality to determine the appropriate status in logical space; one could imagine that 
mirage-like pictures would not represent a state of affairs in logical space according to 
Wittgenstein. 
 If a thought were correct a priori, it would be a thought whose possibility ensured its truth 
(TLP 3.04). If a thought, regardless of how it is categorized, is a theorem of the thinker’s 
internal system of logic, and one might wonder how it could be otherwise, then its 
internal logical truth is assured. All thoughts as such are correct a priori, if they are not 
subjected to the test of what the inquisitor believes is the truth in an objective reality. 
We have seen that there can never be a consensus on objective reality if there are 
differences in beliefs within the population. One might defer to objective reality as 
scientific truth, but we know that science depicts itself as a system of contingent truth 
without universal consensus.  
 In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning (Wittgenstein, 1974, PG 
468). Why would this be the case? Cannot one argue that mathematics presents a 
picture of reality? What are we to make of the laws of physics, which are stated as 
mathematical equations? Or can we simply conclude that the world itself is 
meaningless? But in the end I would agree with Wittgenstein here, for meaning is not 
the sort of word that one should apply to mathematics. So, of course Wittgenstein is 
correct; logic and meaning fall into different camps.  
Wittgenstein continues in Section 6 of the Tractatus to confirm the relationships between logic 
and experience that have been expounded in this book. So it is only how one considers ordinary 
language which is in contention, at least if one is to take Wittgenstein at his word. In a sense, one 
has to make a determination of how the world comes about to resolve these matters. I have 
made the argument that natural language must fit into the domain of predicate logic along with 
recognized formal languages, as it conforms with a consistent interpretation of the world across 
many fields and levels of examination. One can also argue in the negative, in that, if we are to 
exclude natural language, then where would an explanatory theory come from? And then how 
are we to explain why people believe the things they do? 
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A Wittgensteinian State of Mind 
As a way of summation of the chapters concerning language and truth, I will offer some 
impressions about what it is like to be in what I call a ‘Wittgensteinian state of mind’. Perhaps I 
have used this term for lack of a better one, even though it probably encompasses a somewhat 
different state of mind than Wittgenstein may have had himself, for as we are all too aware, one 
can never really get into the mind of another living person, let alone someone who has passed 
on. I am inclined to attach Wittgenstein’s name to a way of looking at the world, a mindset, or 
perhaps the popular vernacular term headspace is the best one of all.  
The very first line in the Preface to the Tractatus reads: Perhaps this book will be understood only 
by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it, or at least similar 
thoughts. Wittgenstein knows that he is in his own special headspace and others may well 
struggle with his Tractatus because they do not share that same state of mind or perspective of 
how things operate in the world. While my own interpretation of the physical world differs from 
that of Wittgenstein’s, I also recognize that my views fall into a very small minority indeed, and 
would not expect contemporaries to share these ideas, let alone someone from Wittgenstein’s 
era. Although I have extirpated the physical world from the process of verifying the truth value 
of facts, this does not lessen my own feelings about being in a Wittgensteinian headspace.21 
What follows are the first few lines from the Tractatus: 
1 The world is all that is the case. 
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things. 
1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts. 
1.12 For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also whatever is not 
the case. 
1.13 The facts in logical space are the world. 
It is here at the outset that Wittgenstein puts logic at the heart of the world; and this is what I 
mean by a Wittgensteinian state of mind. The conception of our respective worlds emerges from 
the words that are running through our heads at this very moment and how they will be 
attributed meaning from what was already in our consciousness before the current stream of 
words took the place of the previous stream.  That is a bit of a mouthful, but sums up what we 
might call a linguistic stream of consciousness. 
Getting into a Wittgensteinian headspace is, at first, the act of becoming highly aware of what 
language is about, particularly the variety floating about in our own respective minds. It is not to 
simply take for granted that we have language and everything else that emerges from our 
thoughts is somehow a precise picture of an objective reality. Language is a powerful piece of 
software that is constantly being tuned and retuned. It has many limitations and can easily go 
off the rails. If we want to understand why linguistic output is the way it is, we need to go 
                                                             
21 It would be mistaken to classify my philosophy as Idealism due to my position regarding the physical 
world, since my position is not metaphysically based, nor do I approach the classical mind-body problem 
from the point of view of traditional Idealists.  
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through a process similar to that of a computer programmer when the program is not executing 
the way intended. For example, if we have a program that gives an answer of 5 when adding the 
numbers 3 and 7, we would be alerted that something is fundamentally wrong with the program 
and the source code will need some review and modification (debugging). Likewise, we each 
have our own respective linguistic source code that determines how we evaluate propositions 
and how these are put together to form belief systems. To understand how a propositional 
evaluation program is working, whether it be our own or that of someone else, we need to get 
into the source code, so to speak: the axioms of the language system in question. 
Wittgenstein recognizes that this is not an easy task. At first inspection, there does not seem to 
be anything particularly mistaken about how we evaluate propositions or come to have the 
beliefs that we do, when taken from one’s own personal perspective, of course; all of this 
presuming that we have given at least the slightest bit of thought that language may have some 
influence on why we believe the things we do. We realize that our beliefs may be different than 
those of others, but we trust, that if called upon, we can support why we have the one’s we do, 
regardless that they might differ from the beliefs of others. And if we are not too dogmatic about 
such things, we can be comfortable with a state of affairs where we have our respective 
positions on matters and other people have theirs. But if Wittgenstein or I have managed to 
convince you that there is indeed something quite profound in the workings of language, then 
you might be inclined to take the next step in your contemplation of such matters.  
This next step is a big one. It must first be acknowledged that we will be using the logic of 
language to evaluate the logic of language. So we will be working against ourselves in some 
sense. There is no way to step out of this subjective self-referential state; we can only swim 
toward the boundaries of this autonomous language box. A significant part of the work in 
Psychology and Psychiatry is aimed at getting into to the source code of our linguistic minds; 
and therapeutically, seeing if the code can be tweaked to improve the mental health of those 
being treated. 
There is much fuss made about the ambiguity of meanings which arises in a wide variety of 
trivial situations, such as whether true statements can be made about non-existent things or 
fictional characters. For example, is it a true statement that unicorns have one horn given that 
unicorns are fictional entities? There is considerable philosophical debate about such 
encounters at the intersection of logic and reality, as it is typically defined as a fact of existence 
in the physical world. I find this to be a sideshow to the central issues of philosophy and more of 
a distraction than having anything substantive to add to the discussion.  I have found 
Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘language games’ (PI) instructive and insightful, yet at the same 
time, often moot. It is not for me to criticize the mental meanderings of a genius and I am rather 
pleased that he has covered so much ground concerning these nuances of language. In the end, a 
formal system of propositional logic can theoretically be constructed to account for all these 
nuances and trivialities, each system being slightly different in its respective construction.  
… 
There are several variations of the game of chess played in Southeast Asia. In Thailand the game 
is called Makruk, and is quite recognizable as a chess-like game, but with a number of rule 
changes. When I first witnessed it being played, it seemed to me that it was the regular familiar 
chess game, but being played by people who were not conversant with the proper rules and had 
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made some up. So many of the moves seemed legal, yet others were clearly not. Eventually I 
came to understand that Makruk was a variation of chess with a proper set of rules of its own 
that just happened to be very similar to chess. The variety of chess played in Cambodia is called 
Ouk-Chatrang and is virtually identical to Makruk, with only a couple of minor differences. On 
the king's first move, players have the option of moving the king like a knight, but only if not in 
check and only if no pieces have been captured. On the queen's first move, the player has the 
option of moving the queen two squares forward instead of just one, again only if no pieces have 
been captured. 
Language games are a bit like Chess, Makruk and Ouk-Chatrang. There can be much discussion 
about the variations and merits of each game, but ultimately each game lives in its own logical 
space and creates its own world of truth and dare I say reality. Analogies can (and do) get made 
between games like chess and warfare or politics, as all are seen a strategic enterprises, but we 
would be mistaken to take these analogies too far. Usually no one dies playing chess. Each game 
has its own self-referential reality, and at some point it becomes rather meaningless to judge 
one game using the rules of a different game. It would be like a Christian saying that Hinduism 
was wrong because it didn’t follow the doctrines of Christianity.   
Language creates its own reality. And each variation, or language game, creates its own variation 
of that reality. This can be seen as a rewording of Wittgenstein’s: The facts in logical space are 
the world. 
The goal of a philosopher, I believe, is to make sense of the world. Put in another way, it is to 
define what reality is. In order to make any progress in this regard, one must put oneself in a 
Wittgensteinian headspace. The first step in that process is to recognize how everything will be 
framed in language, and our language must be scrutinized to an extent that we can feel 
reasonably assured that we are not carrying around axioms liable to lead us astray. We don’t 
want to be playing Makruk if nature is playing Ouk-Chatrang.  
We have a jigsaw puzzle before us. Let’s call it Nature. Not all of the pieces are on the table; a 
few pieces seem to fit together nicely; a number of others look as if they might go together, but it 
is taking some forceful manipulation to get the fit just right, so maybe it really doesn’t belong 
where we put it. We have had lots of experience in the past where pieces that seemingly fit well 
together were in fact not quite in the right place. So let’s take out the joins that are a bit dubious 
and see if a different approach may hold the key to a more fitting and consistent arrangement. 
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What is Consciousness? 
“Human consciousness is just about the last surviving mystery. A mystery is a phenomenon 
that people don't know how to think about - yet.”   
― Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained 
 
Consciousness surely must be the most intractable of all mysteries of life and of the world. It 
does not readily lend itself to any avenue for comprehension. It has no edges. It has no handles. 
It evades definition. It avoids analysis. We want to examine it scientifically, but it refuses to 
submit.  
Now armed with the recognition that everything we understand must be understood within the 
framework of language, we can attack the problem of consciousness from a new angle. There 
are many questions to be asked about consciousness, but the very first should be: Why is the 
logic of our language unable to come to terms with the subject of consciousness?  It seems as 
though any theory of consciousness is destined to end up in the undecidable basket. So what is it 
about consciousness and some axioms that are common to all language systems that make 
consciousness so resistant to rational analysis? If we are to seriously address the many 
conundrums of consciousness, we first need to make the subject matter more compliant to 
rational thought.  
Before we embark on unraveling this second of three focus points of this book, a review of how 
things stand would seem fitting and necessary.  
 
Historical Context 
The establishment of consciousness as one of the central issues of Western philosophy is usually 
attributed the methodical attention to the mind-body problem by the 17th century philosopher 
and polymath René Descartes (1596-1650). To concisely summarize, Descartes concluded that 
god had created two separate things in the world: physical things and mental things; and thus 
the term Cartesian dualism found its way into a central role in philosophical debate.  
Despite several hundred years of mental heavy lifting, the mind-body dichotomy still remains 
one of the most perplexing unresolved problems in philosophy and cognitive science.  No matter 
how many new words, definitions and philosophical positions are introduced to shed light on 
the matter, there seems no way to reconcile the subjective phenomenological nature of 
consciousness with the objective materialism that is the foundation of science. The discourse in 
academic circles mirrors the common sense view of the mind-body problem. Even if we can 
attribute our thoughts and sensations to neurological states, there still seems to be a 
non-physical nature to the phenomenological experience. Pre-Cartesian philosophies often 
identified the conscious experience with the soul or some analogous life force that transcended 
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the physical world; this view pertains to the present amongst the vast majority of the world’s 
population. For a relatively small number of scholars concerned with jettisoning unwieldy 
dualism from philosophy, two main branches of monism have ascended: physicalism, which 
attempts to fit mental states into the physical world, and idealism, which states that the world is 
essentially a mental construction. Most of the scientific community would broadly support the 
former view, for denial of the material world would seem to undercut the essence of what 
science is about.  
In 1974 Thomas Nagel published a paper titled: What is it like to be a bat? (Nagel, 1974).This set 
off both a rethinking and a reframing of questions about consciousness. Nagel states that an 
organism has conscious mental states "if and only if there is something that it is like to be that 
organism—something it is like for the organism." Some 20 years later Nagel’s idea evolved into 
what was to become the common philosophical terminology: The Hard Problem of 
Consciousness, first used by David Chalmers (Chalmers, 1995), who does a superb job in 
succinctly formulating the central issues. I quote here two paragraphs from his paper: 
Consciousness poses the most baffling problems in the science of the mind. There is nothing 
that we know more intimately than conscious experience, but there is nothing that is 
harder to explain. All sorts of mental phenomena have yielded to scientific investigation in 
recent years, but consciousness has stubbornly resisted. Many have tried to explain it, but 
the explanations always seem to fall short of the target. Some have been led to suppose 
that the problem is intractable, and that no good explanation can be given.  
The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and 
perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As 
Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This 
subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: 
the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual 
field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a 
clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; 
mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the 
experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is 
something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience. 
 
It is this hard problem of consciousness that I will be addressing in what follows. 
 
Principal Discussion Points 
One of the more interesting aspects of the consciousness dialogue is just how many unresolved 
issues there are and how little agreement there is. There seems to be a lack of scientific focus on 
the matter, except that a materialist based explanation is where most want to go. Even with a 
sort of general agreement about the identification of the hard problem as the central issue, a 
definition of consciousness, what it is, who or what has it and how it came about, is anything but 
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settled. Perhaps there is a consensus that humans definitely have it, but beyond this point of 
accord there is plentiful debate, opinion and disagreement. The proliferation of terminology 
doesn’t help either. Additional terms, definitions and categories circumvent the problem and 
tend to promote a discussion whereby participants talk over, under and around each other. I 
will try to address the main issues and be as clear as possible about my own definitions. 
The first point to be addressed is by manner of elimination, that is, how consciousness does not 
come about. Any suggestion that consciousness is not a result of an evolutionary process is off 
the mark. What is meant by an evolutionary process is the conceptual extension of the Darwinian 
process, as it is applied to biology, to encompass all natural events so that the definition can 
become synonymous with the laws of nature. Natural law, whatever it may be in its detail, 
should apply to living organisms and inanimate objects alike. There is no indication that for the 
only venue for life that we know of in the universe, i.e. our planet Earth, there should be some 
laws of nature not available elsewhere. If the laws of nature that existed just prior to the first 
living substance were somehow enhanced to produce life at the time of this creation, we would 
have a situation suggestive of some supernatural intervention. It is far more consistent with 
scientific principles to think of the laws of nature having applicability to an extensive range of 
complexities, essentially, all things simple and complex as we find them in our universe. It is fair 
to ask how the same laws that apply to hydrogen also apply to viruses, fungi, clay and swans. It 
is a challenge for science to find a solution to explain how apparently unchanging laws of nature 
can account for all entities in the universe during its entire 13.8 billion year history, and for the 
most part science has done quite a good job. Although there are theories that hypothesize 
irregularities of the laws of physics in different spacetime references, current orthodox science 
is based on a consistent set of laws from the beginning of time, with the possible exception of 
the proposed inflationary period that took place in the first fraction of a second after the big 
bang. Whatever theory one might propose for consciousness, it should be explicable within the 
framework of a consistent set of natural laws. 
It would be helpful if the generic use of the term consciousness would suffice to unambiguously 
describe what is meant by that term. We intuitively know what it is, and the likes of Nagel and 
Chalmers have nailed it down well enough where adding additional terminology is not going to 
enhance our understanding. I tend to use the word awareness as a more general non-
philosophical term for perceptions derived while in a state of consciousness. But in the end, 
there really isn’t much difference between them, and I would not say they represent two 
different states of affairs, nor consider it to represent something additional to consciousness, 
but rather a feature within its general definition. Likewise, the terms self-conscious and self-
aware do not increase our understanding of the state of consciousness. Effectively, any 
organism that can react to its environment has some level of awareness, and if it can 
differentiate its own self from non-self, one can say it is self-aware as well. By this description 
every living thing would be aware and self-aware, conscious and self-conscious, since all 
organisms are behaving in response to perceptions of their environment. As Nagel points out, 
the respective states of experience for bats and humans are quite different. We can refer to 
human consciousness as being what it feels like to be a human and to bat consciousness as what 
it feels like to be a bat, without either having the ability to experience what it feels like to the be 
the other organism. We recognize that consciousness is a subjective experience that can only be 
known to that subject. Even within one’s own species, it is somewhat different to be like another 
individual than to be like oneself. We reasonably surmise that one’s own (human) subjective 
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experience is more like that of another human than it would be to be like a chimpanzee, but 
nonetheless, not identical. 
The terms mental states and physical states are purposely being eschewed, for the whole of the 
dualist leitmotif forces the discussion into the same Cartesian Theatre that has historically 
restricted our thinking about the subject, often confining it to a choice between some version of 
idealism or physicalism. From the point of view of constructing a world that makes sense, to this 
point in our discussion, we have only sought to establish various manifestations of the binary 
process, of which language is one, and all existing within the subjective phenomenon of 
consciousness. There is no point in positing mental or physical states if they cannot be explained 
within the context of this aforementioned constrained architecture. This discourse will proceed 
in a different direction and not rely on many of the more popular pathways that have been 
taken by cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind. There will be little dialogue about the 
often used terms qualia and intentionality nor anything to do with a soul or élan vital. What is 
the point of introducing an entity such as qualia to describe what it is like to experience 
something, other than to lump a wide variety of these things inside a single nomenclature? I 
have no problem with the use of the word to categorize the various types of experiences that 
one has that cannot be expressed in terms of the physical world; in fact, this is exactly what 
qualia are. The term encapsulates the hard problem of consciousness, but to talk of qualia as a 
type of mental entity is just adding as bit of clutter to the room, especially since qualia as such 
have never been detected, nor could they be by its own definition. So it becomes just some 
hypothetical additive to support those building a theory of consciousness around the concept of 
mental states. The term intentionality is yet another attribution of mentality that adds nothing 
to our understanding of consciousness. What does it mean to say that an intrinsic part of 
consciousness is that it is about something? The starting point for intentional states is already a 
fully conscious human, without any discussion of what led up to the human having 
consciousness, or furthermore, a consciousness with intentional states. If someone makes a 
statement that a human being has consciousness and then a second statement that a human 
being has consciousness with intentional states, I find that I have no greater understanding of 
consciousness after the second statement than I had after the first. This is one of the generic 
problems of building a theory of consciousness around the characteristic of mental states. 
Adding terminology, attributions, properties and new entities fails to get to the core of how 
mental states come about without the usual allusion to some aspect of physicalism, which it had 
hoped to sidestep in the first place. It is dealing with a level of complexity far too elevated to 
develop a basal conceptual comprehension of how consciousness comes into being and what it 
does.  
If we return to the formalist model of analysis, we see that the discussions of mentalism and 
physicalism both rely on too many presuppositions. We cannot examine something as crucial as 
consciousness without initially starting at a much more fundamental level of operation.  
 
Physicalism: Back to Basics 
It is time to let go of the physical world. It will hurt to give up the most cherished of things that 
science has given us. As counterintuitive as it may seem, it simply cannot be supported by the 
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evidence when scrutinized within a Wittgensteinian framework. To be clear, the physical world 
is not an illusion, but rather a delusion, something whose objectivity we have talked ourselves 
into by the logic-based nature of language. Like the moving images that appear on a television 
screen, the physical world cannot be denied, but is rather the result of an underlying 
transformative process that is hidden from discernment. It is only through the knowledge of the 
process, as in the case of the television images, that reveals what would otherwise be a beguiling 
mystery. Forsaking physicalism does not mean doing the same for physics. On the contrary, 
physics takes on a different and important significance. We must not look upon physics as 
describing a physical reality, but rather as a pathway to understanding how information and the 
laws describing its evolution in time, create the consciousness that animates the physical world. 
The findings of physics that describe the physical world are clues to how this comes about. 
The discipline in science that we call physics is not physicalism; the material world along with 
its ontology should be seen as a language-dependent belief system. When we go from an 
unconscious state to a conscious state, such as when we awaken from sleep, we come to 
perceive the physical world. From our completely subjective viewpoint the physical world 
appears to come into existence. When we return to an unconscious state, the physical world 
disappears. Wake up again, and the world reappears. On the evidence of our conscious 
experience alone, the physical world is turned off and on by that phase of our state of 
consciousness; just like a light switch turns the state of the light bulb from on to off and back 
again. By all experiential accounts, it would seem that consciousness causes the physical world 
to come into being. When there is a 100% correlation between two events separated in time, we 
usually induce that there is a causative relationship between the events. Or if they are deemed 
to occur simultaneously, they would almost certainly be part of the same process, either in 
transformation or perception. And from the first person perspective, which is the only one we 
know, it would seem most natural to assume that our consciousness is the causative agent. So 
the question is: Why do most of us think otherwise? Why do we think the lights stay on after our 
switch is put into the off position?  
To respond to this question that the physical world may become inaccessible to oneself if one 
becomes unconscious, however continues for those others that remain conscious, misses the 
point of the 100% correlation. Everyone is in the same boat and has the same personal 
experience regarding the physical world. What would happen if everyone simultaneously 
became unconscious? The world would go on, but what kind of a world would it be? What 
would the world look like in a world that only had plants as its living organisms? What could 
these plants say about the world? These are not the sort of questions that we want to have to 
address, as they undermine both our common sense notions of reality as well as a large body of 
scientific knowledge that we would prefer not to be challenged. 
It is important to differentiate between what is persistent and what is transitory in this process. 
The physical world may come and go in respect to one’s state of awareness, but the 
informational world continues in all respects regardless of one’s subjective state. When one’s 
lights are temporarily switched off, so to speak, the physical world may disappear, but the world 
is evolving in information space all the same. The laws of nature roll on irrespective of one’s 
particular state of consciousness. 
To begin our journey toward reconciling consciousness and the physical world, let’s start with 
the assumption that it is something to be like a dog, and a dog has a form of doggy consciousness. 
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We can substitute a chimpanzee if one prefers, or any animal for that matter which we are 
willing to license a Nagel-type subjective experience. Let us now ask the question: How does the 
dog deal with the hard problem of consciousness? Is the dog troubled by the irreconcilability of 
its phenomenological experience of the world and the physicality of the world? Has it ever 
passed through the mind of a dog the wonderment about how its soul could survive its physical 
being? Well, there has never been an account of any dog expressing such concerns, nor any 
chimpanzee for that matter. Beyond the seeming absurdity of this scenario lies the key to 
solving the dilemma; without language, there simply is no way to pose such questions, nor to 
have such thoughts. The world just presents itself as it does and there is neither reason nor 
means to interrogate that presentation.  
Language per se does not explain the nature of consciousness, but does define how 
consciousness came to be a problem. The hard problem of consciousness is in its rationalization, 
i.e. finding a solution within a logical framework. It is, in part, for this reason that science wants 
to force a physical solution onto the problem of consciousness, as physics shares the same 
logical structure as language, so they fit quite nicely together. If only consciousness could be 
described as physical states, then all would be fine. But so far physical explanations for 
consciousness have not succeeded, and never will, because it is consciousness that (to use a 
Bohmian terminology) unfolds the physical world.  
Let us now return to the matter of how our self-deception brings us to the point where we 
unquestionably label the physical world as a reality to which all else must conform. If one has a 
language big enough to pose the question, then this rational mind may well construct such a 
question about how the sensory world comes about. It is difficult to say what this threshold is, 
as in the normal course of events in life the answer is usually imposed upon us. Most of us are 
either offered or dictated a creation story at a fairly early age. It will be a story that satisfies the 
causation requirements of our mind. In some form it will attempt to explain how we got here. 
There is a strong tendency to carry the substance of these early teachings with us for the rest of 
our lives, nevertheless recognizing that there are many exceptions to this general rule. Again, 
for most, this will be classified as a faith in a creator deity, carrying with it a set of stories and 
rituals. 
The atheist-scientist, on the other hand, would think that he or she does not have a belief system 
as so much as a rationally objective picture of reality, and can back this up with an enormous 
volume of scientific data and well-constructed theories. The consensus scientific creatio ex nihilo 
story is The Big Bang. It has a few metaphoric holes, but it’s not a bad story when compared to 
most others. If one has accepted scientific objectivism from an early age, this writer being a 
prime example, then one acquires a near unshakable belief in the rationality of science that 
seems in stark contrast to that of religious mythologies. But when viewed within the framework 
of the linguistic construct, both religious and scientific beliefs are formed by the same process. 
And the truths of those belief systems simply conform to the axioms of each respective linguistic 
mind. How close a belief system conforms to some notion of an objective reality will depend on 
how well the system responds to the scrutiny of its axioms. And the recursive nature of 
language will always leave these sorts of questions about the veracity of beliefs unresolved. If 
the theorem-creating rules of two respective linguistic minds are different, then their respective 
belief systems will be like comparing apples and oranges.  
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As for physicalism, regardless of how one acquires a belief system which may be termed a world 
view, whether it be scientifically or religiously based, rest assured that a presupposition about 
the objective reality of the physical world will be a bedrock of that belief system. Although most 
religious systems have spiritual components to what comprises the totality of their respective 
realities, including aspects of transcendence beyond the material world, few would deny the 
material world entirely. It is recognized however that there have been copious varieties and 
numerous proponents of idealism in philosophical annals. Even without exposure to any of the 
traditional type belief systems, one is nonetheless likely to form a belief in the reality of the 
physical world by dint of common sense alone, because when you open your eyes, there it is; 
you can see it, you can hear it, you can feel it. Furthermore, just about everyone else in the 
world, including those with alternative world views, is likewise accepting the reality of the 
physical world, so there would be no compelling reason to doubt its existence. For the vast 
majority, irrespective of world view, belief in the reality of the physical world is acquired early 
in life, reinforced continually throughout life, both linguistically and phenomenologically, and 
rarely challenged. This is the perfect prescription for an entrenched belief system that will be 
nearly impossible to unhinge.  
Once again, a belief system is only as good as its axioms. We can summarily dismiss the 
commonsense notion of the reality of the physical world as it is wholly dependent on the yet to 
be understood phenomenon of consciousness. The axioms representing physicalism in such a 
belief system are a straightforward linguistic representation of sensory experiences, further 
supported by the aforementioned lack of a societal challenge to such beliefs. 
Belief systems categorized as religions, as well as other spiritual systems, are mostly based on 
personal experience and so-called revealed truths. There is not much that can be said about this 
that has not already been said by Richard Dawkins in his book The God Delusion (2006). Religion 
is a good indication of our yearning for causal explanations. As incorrect as religions may be, 
there is no point in using science to bash it up; it is just the mind trying to find a way to reconcile 
the logic of its language with the phenomena of its experiences. The potency of scientifically 
based arguments against religion is markedly reduced by the fact that the arguments are 
grounded in the presupposition of the reality of a physical world. Nonetheless, the physical 
world does represent a correspondence with testable hypotheses within the framework of the 
scientific method. Whatever answers are proposed to questions pertaining to the role of 
consciousness and what might be deemed some ultimate reality, they will have to explain why 
science produces the results that it does.  
It is the scientific assertion of an objectively real world which will take considerable effort in 
overcoming, for it is supported by a system of logic (mathematics) that beautifully describes its 
existence, reinforcing the belief that obtains from our sensory experiences. Everything in 
science holds together within its own contextual framework, whether the physical world is the 
definitive reality or not. It is actually quite unempirical to assume a physical ontology, for it 
closes the door to other possibilities on a basis of unproven assumptions. One cannot simply 
declare the physical world into existence and make it so. What is being challenged here is not 
physics, but rather the ontology of an incontrovertible physical reality and these two must be 
separated. Physicalism, as being the representative ontology of the broader scientific 
community, has gone unchallenged until quite recently, consigning these collective belief 
systems to borderline numinous speculation. 
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… 
A more detailed discussion regarding the principal concepts germane to the physical sciences 
will be left for later chapters. My purpose here is first to separate concepts of the science of 
physics from that of physicalism and further to release consciousness from its grip. There have 
been numerous theories and half-measure proposals about consciousness over a period of 
many centuries, yet nothing to date has really come close to answering the questions posed by 
the hard problem. I would like to conclude this discussion on physicalism with a few diverse 
thoughts on the subject before moving on to the solution of the problem. These are meant to be 
more of a commentary than an argument. 
 We should keep in mind the most successful physical theory in history, quantum 
mechanics, is a mathematical theory with a physical explanation that has eluded 
comprehension by its principal architects and supporters. In fact, the physical world as 
we understand it seems to break down to a fuzzy blur at quantum metrics. If the 
physical world falls away at its fundamental level of description, then what are we to 
make of its reality? 
 In a universe that yearns for economies and efficiencies at every pass, one has to wonder 
why it should be composed of so much stuff. If one could totally represent the world 
with information alone, why would one go to all the trouble of actually producing hard 
matter? It would be analogous to having to choose between either playing a DVD of a 
movie or gathering up all the actors and actresses that were in the movie and bringing 
them to every set to repeatedly play out their scripts every time we wanted to view the 
movie. It just seems to be more functional, if one has the information to do so, to have an 
interpretation of that information in a constructed or evolved format, a virtual world, so 
to speak.  
 Most of the physical stuff in the universe seems to be missing. As of this writing it is 
estimated that about 95% of the universe is composed of dark matter and dark energy, 
yet to be observed or described. These percentages are deduced by comparing the 
amount of matter-energy required to account for observed gravitation as well as the 
rate of expansion of the universe. Only 5% of the ordinary material that we are familiar 
with is of the kind that we find in our solar system and our bodies. I would suspect that 
this problem of missing material will be resolved in due course, but it does show that 
much ontological theory has been assumed while the full picture of the universe is still 
far from complete. 
 The holographic principle finds its origins in examining the thermodynamics of black 
holes. It has been expanded to beyond black hole thermodynamics to state that the 
entropy of a volume of ordinary space (not just black holes) is proportional to its surface 
area, spatial volume itself is illusory and the universe is really a hologram which is 
isomorphic to the information inscribed on the surface of its boundary. Put another way, 
it says that all the information of a 3-dimensional volume of space can be encoded on its 
2-dimensional surface. Although still a developing theory, it represents one of the more 
compelling arguments for linking information and physicalism, virtually equating the 
two, at least in a transformative way. 
And here are a few interesting quotations on the subject to bring this section to a close: 
 “Everything we call real is made of things that cannot be regarded as real.” ― Niels Bohr 
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 “It will remain remarkable, in whatever way our future concepts may develop, that the 
very study of the external world led to the scientific conclusion that the content of the 
consciousness is the ultimate universal reality.” ― Eugene P. Wigner 
 “Hence it is clear that the space of physics is not, in the last analysis, anything given in 
nature or independent of human thought. It is a function of our conceptual scheme [mind]. 
Space as conceived by Newton proved to be an illusion, although for practical purposes a 
very fruitful illusion.” ― Albert Einstein 
 “One has to find a possibility to avoid the continuum (together with space and time) 
altogether. But I have not the slightest idea what kind of elementary concepts could be 
used in such a theory.” ― Letter from Albert Einstein to David Bohm, October 28, 1954 
 “To meet the challenge before us our notions of cosmology and of the general nature of 
reality must have room in them to permit a consistent account of consciousness. Vice versa, 
our notions of consciousness must have room in them to understand what it means for its 
content to be reality as a whole. The two sets of notions together should then be such as to 
allow for an understanding as to how consciousness and reality are related.” ― David 
Bohm, from the introduction to Wholeness and the Implicate Order 
 “We have a closed circle of consistency here: the laws of physics produce complex systems, 
and these complex systems lead to consciousness, which then produces mathematics, which 
can then encode in a succinct and inspiring way the very underlying laws of physics that 
gave rise to it.” ― Roger Penrose, from The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws 
of the Universe 
 
The Origin of Consciousness 
Having rejected both dualist and monist theories of consciousness, what is left but for 
something completely different? As a re-entry point we will return to the examination of animal 
consciousness from earlier in the chapter.  
How can we tell if an animal has consciousness? To answer this question we first need to get 
past the language post by further elucidating upon the definition of consciousness; and for this 
purpose I will take Nagel’s description to be the initial definition. It would be fair to say that 
under this definition it should not be contentious that most, if not all mammals, have their own 
respective form of consciousness, i.e. dogs, cats, horses, cows, rats and bats all have a first-
person type of experience of the world, albeit different from ours and from each other. Once we 
place pre-linguistic humans into the frame, it becomes quite difficult to find criteria for when a 
particular species crosses from a predecessor class into a class that both I and Nagel would say 
is conscious. I cannot think of a single case of a mammal that goes about its business in a 
manner contrary to the Nagel criterion. They all seem to be aware of their world and behave in a 
manner consistent with their characteristics. That is to say, that I do not know of a mammal that 
behaves so robotically that I would doubt if it was truly having a subjective experience. Of 
course, it is the nature of consciousness that none of this can be proven; we can only surmise 
from appearances. And it would seem that resorting to solipsism is the only way out of making 
these sorts of judgments, whether it be for other species or other members of our own species.  
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We can continue back in time through the phylogenic tree as far as we like and the argument 
centering on the subjective experience of the organism will continue to hold. We will find that 
all living things have mechanisms for assessing their respective environments and methods for 
responding to some number of variations in conditions. Natural selection will of course dictate 
the robustness of these responses and breadth of environmental scope. It is rather arbitrary 
where the line is drawn between the haves and have-nots of consciousness. It is 
anthropocentrism alone and its attendant hubris that would find a line drawn too high and 
more specifically too far along the Homo sapiens branch.  
I have tried to steer the definition of consciousness along a path that suits the way I would like 
to drive the discussion, but realize that many would not see it in the same way. It is somewhat 
analogous to the dilemma of Joseph K in Franz Kafka’s novel The Trial. Everyone seems to be in 
agreement that the charges against Joseph K are serious and offer many avenues to resolve his 
case, but the charges against him are never specified by anyone. Despite not feeling that he has 
committed any crime, he is nonetheless forced to submit to these bizarre circumstances, for he 
is trapped within the system. If he steps out of the madness, he stands alone. Likewise with 
consciousness, nearly all the players seem to be in agreement that it is an emergent property, 
but cannot offer when it emerges in evolution or how it does so. It seems a bit of madness to 
persist along these lines, but to step out of this madness, like Joseph K, one stands alone. 
… 
I have stressed throughout this thesis that if we are to comprehend how the universe works it 
will require a specific structured approach that we are literally obliged to take if we are to use 
language to make our case (which of course we must). Up to this point in the discourse we have 
only two postulates: 
1. All that we know of the world is through our conscious experience.22  
2. Rational explanations of the world are subject to the constraints of the language in 
which they are expressed and the rules of its respective formal system of propositional 
logic. 
Perhaps there should be a third postulate that states that we can assume nothing else. All of this 
is not much to go on, especially when we consider that consciousness itself is yet to be clarified. 
So the main task at this point is to elaborate on the first postulate, and we only have the second 
postulate to work with to accomplish that task.  
Until there is a system to replace rationality there will not be another avenue to constructing a 
world which is both internally consistent and comprehensible. There simply is no choice but to 
work with whatever is permissible within language. Although the basis for this system is one of 
formal logic, it need not be formulated mathematically. In fact, many of the idiosyncrasies of the 
many varieties of logical systems only muddy the waters of an otherwise simple concept. We 
should not forget that we are talking about building a universe from the very modest enterprise 
                                                             
22 It has been previously noted in the discussion on language that some knowledge of the world is 
attained through non-conscious neural pathways, but this does not change the substance of the 
arguments, for it would only require a more expansive definition of consciousness to incorporate these 
inputs. 
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of the binary process, or how things go from one state to the next when there is only a selection 
to be made from two possibilities. The 20th century struggle in the field of mathematics to find 
what is provable or computable helps delimit how to go about such a process. So let’s begin! 
 
Computation Meets Consciousness 
What follows will be stated in the formal system of the propositional logic, i.e. the language, of 
the author. I recognize that I have integrated a number of beliefs into my language system, some 
of which I either cannot or choose not to support by evidence or argument and must be taken 
axiomatically. These are what I believe to be the relevant axioms of my language system: 
1. The axioms of first-order logic which include formal systems of propositional logic, 
arithmetic and set theory. 
2. Language is a formal system of propositional logic. 
3. Universal Computation (of the binary process). 
4. Finite Nature (i.e. the world is discrete, not continuous).  
The first of these axioms is generally accepted in mathematics. The second has been argued 
extensively in previous chapters. The other two will be discussed in the remaining sections of 
this book.  
… 
The world is made of bits and a recursive algorithm, most likely with attractor-like features, 
which determine how the configuration of these bits transforms from one state of affairs to the 
next after each successive execution of the algorithm. Both the bits and the algorithm exist in 
logical space. There is no need to fathom how something analogous to a computer program can 
run without something physical like a computer to run it on. I am calling it logical space to 
distinguish it from a space composed of physical material. I only have logic to play with, so I 
cannot posit something beyond the axioms of my system. It hardly matters what I call the 
platform for the operation of this program of our universe, for it is a kind of space that exists 
beyond the boundaries of our epistemic world of normal experience. I chose the name logical 
space, as it seemed the simplest description, but it is not meant to be understood as anything 
other than a space in which outcomes from binary operations can evolve into different 
configurations.  
It should be unambiguously understood that the algorithm that runs our universe effectively 
sits outside of the epistemic logical space of our consciousness, which should be seen as a 
subspace of the space created at the big bang. At these early stages in the realm of digital 
physics it is difficult to say how much in the greater scheme of things can be inferred about 
these particular laws of nature from within our subspace, but it might well be analogous to a 
monkey, having found the wreckage of an airplane in the jungle, managing to reverse engineer it 
to produce its very own flying machine. Although there are a growing number of physicists 
going down the pathway of a digital physics with a digital mechanics, the numbers are still 
rather paltry. Edward Fredkin and Stephen Wolfram are perhaps the most prominent advocates 
and have been prolific writers on digital physics. I have followed and agree with most of their 
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Figure 4: Cellular Automata. 2 Kinds of 
Neighborhoods. 
thinking on the subject, though we differ in a few minor respects. Suffice it to say that the only 
differences of substance that I seem to have with Fredkin, for instance, concern the importance 
of consciousness in digital physics and some details on how we get from the digital to the 
physical world, in effect, how they correspond. As there are not many of us in the digital 
philosophy parlor, there is a lot of scope for variation and gradation. At this juncture of the 
thesis I will limit the detail on the subject of digital physics to its applicability to consciousness 
and leave a more thorough discussion for a later chapter.  
As we can only gain access to the physical world through consciousness, it must be established 
how consciousness comes about to best utilize the knowledge gained from the application of the 
scientific method, which is couched in conscious observation. This is, in part, why we are 
effectively forced to take a digital philosophical approach to resolving how the world is put 
together; we have a discrete system (language), but lack a methodology for going from 
discreteness to continuity. Furthermore, consciousness must snugly fit between the digital 
world and the physical world for a consistent theory to succeed. The only arrangement that can 
account for all of language, mathematics, consciousness and physics is the one on offer here, i.e. 
within my axiomatized system. In my own particular case, once it became evident that 
Wittgenstein’s concept of language was correct, the rest, in due course, methodically fell into 
place. There seemed to be no alternative arrangement.  
… 
The essence of digital mechanics is that bits of information can programmatically build 
themselves into arrangements that can isomorphically be observed as physical-type structures 
like atoms and molecules. But it is more to the point a story about mathematics, and whether at 
the bottom of calculations that represent contemporary physics are discrete operations or 
continuous ones represented by differential calculus. So if quarks can build themselves into 
nucleons and we can add electrons and photons to make atoms, and aggregates of atoms can 
become molecules, and some complex molecules can form proteins, and so forth and so on, we 
can accept that the complex world that we see today came from more fundamental building 
blocks. This is the story of the cosmos. It is orthodox science. Complex things arose from simple 
things by a long and perhaps intricate process. 
There is not much argument about these 
generalities, but rather whether this description 
can be designated as a definitive physical reality 
or a virtual reality. Some, but not all, versions of 
digital physics would say that it’s a virtual 
reality. If this evolution of increasing complexity 
takes place by the execution of the laws of 
physics, exactly what do we mean by the laws of 
physics? How do entities like electrons and 
quarks know what to do next? Where do they get 
their instructions from? It should be quite 
evident that the instructions are written in the 
language of mathematics; but what kind of mathematics? Let’s see what happens if we go the 
way of a virtual reality. Remember, that everything in the world of bits can have a physical 
analogue, so if we are talking bits, we could just as well be talking about physical entities. 
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Figure 5: Cells change based on the 
states or adjacent cells. 
Arrangements of bits in logical space are analogous to arrangements of physical entities in 
spacetime. It may be easier to imagine what is happening in logical space if we assume this 
cosmological Universal Computation is happening on cellular automata, and for the sake of 
simplicity, cellular automata in a 2-dimentional lattice (see Figure 4).23 
It might be even easier to imagine an evolution of a state of affairs by picturing a game of chess 
instead, as the similarities are close enough for most illustrative purposes regarding 
consciousness. Whether we are talking about cellular automata or a game of chess, there are 
two principal stages to the process. The first is the assessment stage and the second is the action 
stage. In a cellular automation, the cell in question evaluates the state of each cell in its 
neighborhood, and based on the state of affairs either changes or stays in the same state. In a 2-
state system, such as a binary system of bits labeled 0 and 1, a cell starting out at 0 will either 
remain 0 or change to 1 as determined by a rule-following system encompassing the adjoining 
cells.  
For example, in what is called a cellular automation with a 
von Neumann neighborhood (see Figure 5), the state of 
cell C will evolve in a manner dependent on the respective 
states of cells N, E, S and W. 
This evolution takes place in time, so that each execution 
of the rules of action will move the cell to the next state. A 
representative time notation ‘t’ may appear like 
 t0,   t1,   t2,   t3,  . . . . . tn , 
reflecting the passage of time from one generation, or 
state of affairs, to the next. In a 2-state bitwise system the 
cell C may have a generational evolution like 
0,0,1,0,1,1,1,0,0, . . .n; of course, depending on the values of 
cells N, E, S and W, which themselves may be generationally changing based on conditions in 
their  respective neighborhoods. 
A notation more suitable to these types of 2-state systems might be as follows: 
 The assessment stage can be notated as Tc (Tc0, Tc1 . . . Tcn). I will hereafter call this the 
constate of the system. 
 The action stage can be notated as Ta (Ta0, Ta1 . . . Tan). 
This 2 step process characterizes the rhythm of the universe at its most rudimentary level; it has 
2 beats, one to assess the state of affairs, the other to run an algorithm to move to the next state 
of affairs.  
I propose that the constate, or assessment stage (Tc), is what Consciousness is. It is the 
recursive universal algorithm (UA), reloading itself with a new set of inputs based on the state of 
                                                             
23 See (Banks, 1971) for some of the seminal work in this area. 
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affairs that existed after the previous execution of the UA. It is effectively how things know what 
to do next. 
What things are conscious? The answer is: Everything!  
In fact, it is everything at every level of complexity. Every entity which can affect the decision 
process of the UA is conscious. It needs to be conscious in order to know what to do next. The 
kind of consciousness humans have is taking place at a very high level of complexity and 
requires its own special explanation. But first, I would like to show how complexity and 
consciousness grow together. The computational aspects of cellular automation fit well with 
this schema, but we will leave the world of cellular automata for the moment and utilize the 
following game of chess as a representative metaphor. 
The position from the game between IBM’s 
Deep Blue Computer and Garry Kasparov 
(Game 1, 1996) is shown in Figure 6. Deep 
Blue, playing White, is to move. We can see 
that Black can checkmate with Rook to h1. 
However, White wins the game with the Rook 
taking the Black pawn on h7 (Rxh7+). 
Kasparov resigned, because after Qg8+ and 
Nxf3, Black’s position is lost.24   
There may be some debate about what makes 
Kasparov tick, but we know that Deep Blue is 
running on a juiced-up version of a Turing 
machine. It only has bits to work with, yet 
somehow it is clever enough to beat the 
champ.  
As previously noted, chess is a type of formal 
system of logic. The board, the pieces and the 
players are for all intents and purposes the symbols of the system. The rules about how pieces 
move constitutes the formal grammar of the game as well as generating theorems, or legal 
moves. Any legal move in a game is an axiom, e.g. e4 is an axiom of the system on White’s first 
move in any game of chess. We can view a game of chess as a more complex form of cellular 
automata. In fact, there are many aspects of a chess game that are analogous to the universe as a 
whole.  
                                                             
24 The game moves were as follows: 
1. e4  c5  2. c3 d5 3. exd5  Qxd5  4. d4 Nf6  5. Nf3  Bg4  6. Be2 e6 7. h3  Bh5   8. O-O Nc6 9. Be3  cxd4 
10. cxd4 Bb4 11. a3 Ba5  12. Nc3  Qd6 13. Nb5 Qe7  14. Ne5 Bxe2  15. Qxe2  O-O 16. Rac1  Rac8 17. Bg5 
Bb6  18. Bxf6 gxf6 19. Nc4 Rfd8 20. Nxb6 axb6  21. Rfd1  f522. Qe3  Qf6  23. d5 Rxd5  24. Rxd5  exd5 
25. b3  Kh8 26. Qxb6 Rg8 27. Qc5 d4 28. Nd6  f4 29. Nxb7 Ne5 30. Qd5  f3  31. g3 Nd3  32. Rc7 Re8 
33. Nd6 Re1+  34. Kh2 Nxf2  35. Nxf7+ Kg7 36. Ng5+  Kh6 37. Rxh7+ 
 
Figure 6: Deep Blue (Computer) vs. Garry Kasparov 
challenge (Game 1, 1996) 
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To start, we can examine the conscious state of the White’s rook on c7. Yes, I said conscious 
state, because it needs to know what it can do next. This knowledge is within the system that 
excludes the players, so a piece cannot make an illegal move even if the player would like to do 
so; if it does, it wouldn’t be a chess game, but some other kind of game. There are several things 
the rook needs to know. It first must be self-aware, that is, it must know that it is a White Rook. 
It must know that its position in chess-space is on square c7. It must know that the only legal 
moves it can make are to squares in column c and row 7. Any instruction requesting a move to 
any other square could not be legally made, not being a theorem of the system. Irrespective of 
whether this game is being played in London or Bogota, being played with wood pieces, onyx 
pieces or in the virtual space of the internet, being played by a man, a woman, a computer or a 
chimpanzee, the scope of the rook’s consciousness remains the same. It is a long way down the 
complexity ladder from the consciousness of a human, a dog, a bat and so on, but it is 
functionally the same; it is an assessment of the state of affairs from the rook ’s perspective at 
time-generation Tc(w37) (being the state of affairs just before White’s 37th move). It is the 
subjective experience of a rook in the logical space of a particular chess game. Deep Blue 
instructs the rook to move to square g7. The rook checks its internal rule book, and finding that 
it would be a theorem, accordingly obliges. The algorithm being run on Deep Blue executes the 
move Rg7+ at Ta(w37). 
Deep Blue, being a complex entity in its own right, will instruct the rook to make the move Rg7+,  
introduces another level of complexity to the chess game system. An entity with a complex 
computational mechanism is integrated with a simpler entity, the rook, to form the 2-step 
process at T(w37). Although this is just a chess game, it is very much representative of how the 
universe operates as a whole. It may be hard to imagine how some pre-cellular ancestor to both 
mammals and bacteria, perhaps something like a virus, evolved into complex organisms like 
ourselves with more than 1013 cells, but of course, we know this is the case. The enormity of the 
numbers and the integration of entities operating at so many levels is nearly impenetrable. For 
what I am proposing in the context of consciousness is that human consciousness is an evolved 
state of simpler forms of consciousness, like rook-consciousness, which is a distant cousin of 
virus consciousness in a way analogous to a bacterium being a distant cousin of a human being.  
Assembling a universe from a computational model simplifies the architecture of complexity 
building for it can follow well-known concepts in computer programming, such as those of 
object-oriented programming (OOP). These concepts could well apply to demonstrate how the 
universe can build itself up from simple structures if the UA has a learning mechanism in place, 
such as natural selection, operational at the most fundamental levels of the world. It is both 
logical and intuitive to believe that if natural selection is the driving mechanism for evolution at 
the biological level, it should also be so at subordinate levels of complexity.  
Human consciousness is a far cry from the kind of consciousness represented in this 
computational model, but it is important to make the point that human consciousness derives 
from the same process as rook-consciousness in the chess example. Like a horse and an amoeba, 
they are very different creatures, but have a common ancestry; there are many things that are 
different about them, yet there are things that they share in common. Every logical entity that 
evolves both recursively and algorithmically will have a constate phase separating the execution 
stages of the algorithm so that the system evolves as follows: 
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This generalization of evolution in a logical space is not very different from the kind involving 
the evolution of complex biology. And one should think that to be the case, for biology is a 
generationally advanced subset of the UA, and as such, very much a part of the universal 
process. The sorts of questions that arise about this kind of system often pertain to just how this 
mechanism works, something not easily determined due to the number of entities and 
interrelationships involved in the process. As it relates to a Nagelian type of consciousness, the 
question is how does a configuration of constates, ostensibly designed to detect the state of 
affairs in something analogous to a von Neumann Neighborhood, evolve into what can be called 
a subjective experience. And a good question it is, indeed!  
Whether one favors a digital physics or a physics of a more conventional variety, we find that 
the universe has been evolving from simpler entities to more complex ones during the course of 
its history. The evidence also supports that we have the same laws of nature today that were 
around at the earliest moments of the universe. It would seem reasonable to assume that 
observables of the evolution of complex systems, such as what we witness in biology, are 
representative of the same laws of nature that were around when the world was a simpler 
place.  
 
Definition of Consciousness 
What we call consciousness is just one of the many complex arrangements generated by the 
algorithmic process that are the Laws of Nature, so that in any given case we get the process: 
Information → Laws of nature → Consciousness + Evolution  
As previously stated, serious debates on consciousness often get mired in trying to find a 
definition of common ground, especially if the parties have their own respective preferences on 
how the subject should be framed. So how would I chime in on the matter if posed the question: 
How would you determine if an entity has consciousness? My reply would be as follows: 
If an entity, however defined, can unambiguously transition from one state of affairs to the 
next by following a set of rules, including choosing from a set of probabilities for 
transitioning, then the entity is deemed to be conscious. 
… 
Before returning to the subject of how consciousness creates the physical world, we will take a 
look at how the world, as we consciously observe it, is one that well fits into the algorithmic 
format described above. 
•Tc(1) 
•Ta(1) 
Generation 
1 
•Tc(2) 
•Ta(2) 
Generatrion 
2 
•Tc(3) 
•Ta(3) 
Gemeration 
3 
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Building a Universe  
“The energy of the universe is constant. The entropy of the universe tends to a maximum.” 
 — Rudolph Clausius 
 
“The Fundamental Process of Physics is Computation Universal. This should be recognized 
as the First Law of Physics”!  — Edward Fredkin 
 
If you were looking for clues on what the universe is about, the laws of thermodynamics are not 
a bad place to start.25 There is near complete agreement on the scientific veracity of these laws. 
The first and second laws convey so much about how things evolve over time. To reprise a term 
used earlier in this book, it can be said that these laws are universally thematic in the sense that 
they are indicative of the purpose of the universe. Perhaps it is somewhat provocative to use a 
word like purpose in such a context. It reeks of teleology, not that this should be seen as a 
scientific obscenity, particularly if we set aside the anthropocentrism of theologies and the 
anthropic principle. From within the confinements of the box that we call our universe, nothing 
can be said about what lies outside the box, if anything at all. It behooves us to work with what 
we have inside the box and do the best we can to interpret the clues which we are given.  
I have long viewed the universe as a kind of factory going through a manufacturing process, 
perhaps without either the planning or appreciation for the products which are being produced. 
It starts out with a fixed amount of raw material, and then goes through a series of 
transformations and assemblies to produce things which have a low probability configuration 
(high information content). This happens at the expense of a considerable amount of waste 
(entropy). Perhaps all of the products made in this factory have a limited lifespan and will, in 
                                                             
25 Thermodynamics is a major branch of physics covering the evolution of physical systems, such as our 
universe or the weather, to give but two examples. There is also a close relationship, particularly 
mathematically, between thermodynamics and information theory.  
There are four laws of thermodynamics, the first and second being the most often cited: 
 Zeroth law of thermodynamics – If two thermodynamic systems are each in thermal equilibrium 
with a third, then they are in thermal equilibrium with each other. 
 First law of thermodynamics – Energy can neither be created nor destroyed. It can only change 
forms. In any process, the total energy of the universe remains the same. For a thermodynamic 
cycle the net heat supplied to the system equals the net work done by the system. 
 Second law of thermodynamics – The entropy of an isolated system not in equilibrium will tend 
to increase over time, approaching a maximum value at equilibrium. 
 Third law of thermodynamics – As temperature approaches absolute zero, the entropy of a 
system approaches a constant minimum. 
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turn, themselves become waste products. Is this not what energy, complexity and entropy are 
about? Can something be goal-oriented without necessarily being intentional? Many of the clues 
would say yes!  
In fact, entropy, information, complexity, uncertainty, predictability, unpredictability, order and 
disorder, are all the same thing given particular names to suit the peculiarities of the system 
being examined at the time. The same mathematics applies to all. The term information seems 
the most generic and therefore the most useful in a general discussion and can stand for any of 
the terms above and many others as well. For example, things that seem complex in the physical 
world are likely to have a high information content in logical space (or information space, if one 
prefers), which is self-evident if the physical world is an isomorphism of an arrangement in 
logical space.  
Let us imagine the universe as a kind of schema where the goal is to produce the most powerful 
computer possible within a set of constraints on both material and instruction (you may want to 
substitute bits and algorithm here and view it as a metaphor for an algorithmic dynamical 
system attractor). A creator-deity account can elucidate the kind of task that confronts such a 
project in that the product of the creation is so complex that it can seemingly only be 
accomplished by an omniscient being. But here I have imposed constraints restricting the 
project to produce the same results with simple and economical methodologies. I have set these 
impositions because it seems the best fit for the evidence of what the early universe was like 
and what the laws of thermodynamics inform us about the broad process of universe building. 
We find ourselves in a universe where the watch is more complex than the watchmaker. It is 
difficult to say what the schema of the universe is aiming to construct, for one cannot say how 
far along we are in this process. Do we have enough information at hand to tell whether the 
passage of some 14 billion years places us at the beginning, middle, or near the end of any such 
goal-oriented endeavor? With the amount of knowledge we have at present, it probably does 
not make much difference if we set the cosmological hypothetical to building the most powerful 
computer or baking the best tasting lasagna, for the process up to this point may well look the 
same in both cases; it may first require the production of an entity intelligent enough to be 
capable of producing either, perchance something like a human being. It is also difficult to say 
how applicable the concept of the anthropic principle might be, or whether the proceedings 
here on planet Earth are just a side show or by product of the main show that is playing out on 
another stage. In that complexity can take on so many forms, we need to contain our enthusiasm 
for a particular outcome and restrict ourselves to more generalized scenarios that might apply 
in a wider range of potentialities.  
The similarity between the measurements of information and thermodynamic entropy links the 
19th century work of Gibbs and Boltzmann with the 1948 work of Claude Shannon. 
Thermodynamic entropy and Shannon entropy are not necessarily equivalent as it depends on 
the context of the measurement. But one intuits that ultimately entropy and information stem 
from the same origin and only differ in the perspective of the measurement system.  
In a universe that has information at its core, complexity builds through various combinations 
of simple logical structures; and those structures in turn assimilate into ones which are yet 
more elaborate. Key features of OOP can illustrate universal complexity building, as it should, 
since there is not much difference between them. Objects in OOP, which are programmatic 
constructs, are very much comparable to the generically labeled physical entities of common 
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parlance. Complex objects are constructed from simpler ones. A chair made from wood, nails, 
glue and cloth takes on a whole new purpose completely different from its components once it 
is assembled, and goes about its existence in a form of superstructure of its componentry; semi-
autonomous, yet inextricably connected. A termite infestation of the wooden legs will take the 
chair down with it.  
It has been hypothesized here that from a human perspective the physical world comes about 
through the high-level mediation of the fundamental process of consciousness. At this juncture 
it should suffice to show that discrete computational processes can construct complex 
informational entities capable of isomorphic representations in a physical spacetime mediated 
by consciousness. There are numerous analogues of this kind of isomorphism in our everyday 
world, from the digital encoding on a DVD playing a movie to the DNA of a biological organism 
playing the part of an operating system for replicating and running that organism. The question 
is whether a digital physics can produce a consciousness that in turn can generate a physical 
representation of itself. This thesis is not the place to review the vast body of knowledge 
concerning computation, algorithmic information theory or computer programming. I have 
selected a few of the more pertinent concepts to elucidate the ideas presented herein. This 
includes the notion that anything that can be produced by a particular computer can be 
produced by any Universal Turing Machine (UTM), which establishes a ubiquity about 
computation itself (Computation Universality) and should, at the very least, be seen as 
something fundamental to how the universe operates (Fredkin, 2003). Again, if one can be 
convinced that physics is Computation Universal, there only remains to show the connection 
between computation and its physical isomorphism. This is no small task, but it should be clear 
enough that general computer programming concepts are sufficient to explain an algorithmic 
construction of the universe. It is not necessary to derive new concepts at the theoretical level, 
as ordinary physical world computer analogies are adequate.  
A search for the universal algorithm may well be a valuable exercise, but we must be realistic 
about the prospective achievement of such a goal. It should be understood that a computational 
physics can be produced by any number of diverse algorithms. There are many ways to write a 
program to produce a particular result, as there are many genotypes that can produce the same 
phenotype. It is only through the imposition of guidelines and constraints, such as certain kinds 
of efficiencies, that we may limit the number of possible algorithms. There are numerous 
algorithmic models of physical world type entities, many of which can be found in the field of 
cellular automation.  
Notwithstanding a personal familiarity with computer programming, I cannot help but be 
amazed by the complexity of some of the broadly available computer programs, e.g. the big 
name operating systems, computer aided design (CAD) programs and virtual reality animation. 
Many are a result of the collaboration of thousands of contributors. It would be far too great a 
task for a single mind. And yet these human constructions pall against the complexity of the 
universe, and are clearly, in fact, a small subset of the universe. A major criticism of 
computational models of the universe is the impossibility of actually doing the computation. But 
this should not be a reason for rejection of such approaches. I have stressed in this book the 
importance of understanding our cognitive limitations and finding methodologies to work 
within those limitations. 
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I have shown that within an axiomatic recursive linguistic framework that any set of 
non-contradictory propositions can produce truth, as truth is essentially a function of logic. The 
success of quantum mechanics as a scientific theory should be judged within this framework, as 
should all theories, whether they fall under the rubric of science or some other system that 
professes a particular epistemology. 
… 
In the unfolding of the complex universe it is easy to lose sight of an underlying simplicity in 
light of the menagerie of particles, superposition, multiverses, strings and the like, that 
mainstream science offers up as reality. There are only two main processes which need concern 
us regarding the evolution of the universe, (with my humble apologies to the strong and weak 
nuclear forces which certainly play important roles in the greater scheme of things). Gravity 
crushes simple atoms and spews them out as more elegant ones (and makes the sun shine to 
boot). This crunching and spewing may happen many times over in order to produce the 
heavier elements, which are most likely produced in supernovae. There are 98 naturally 
occurring varieties emanating from this process, which can easily be found, nicely sorted, in a 
periodic table of elements.26 Some of these are used to make chairs. The effect of gravity at the 
high densities found in stars is a brutal and crude process.  
The rest, which comes under the broad heading of Chemistry, is mediated by the electron. That’s 
it in a nutshell. Really! When it comes to chair-making, once you have your raw materials (atoms 
of various elements), it is thanks to the marvels of the electron to fathom together the wood, 
glue and carpenters to make it all happen. How did it ever become so clever?  
It would seem rather pointless to have yet another detailed discussion of quantum mechanics and the 
standard model of particle physics filled with the usual equations. Sometimes mathematics can be a 
distraction from examining the broader issues. The mathematics supporting quantum mechanics 
self-validates the concepts within its own self-referential system, but it does little to explain what is 
going on. What it can do it give us clues that help us make sense of the world. What follows is a 
review of the main features of mainstream physics and a theory of how it can fit quite well with 
computational models of the world. 
 
Quantum Weirdness   
“I like to think that the moon is there even if I am not looking at it.” — Albert Einstein 
 
It is worth recalling that although quantum mechanics refers to things in the physical world, we 
should not submit to labeling this as reality. Nor are we making reference to facts, but rather 
observations, something that is a product of the conscious experience. We are however learning 
                                                             
26 There are 118 elements listed in the periodic table including those artificially produced. There are also 
some opinions that as few as 90 elements occur naturally. 
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something about how the universe is constructed from these observations, without saying 
precisely what that universe is. If one insists on the ultimate objective reality of the physical 
world, then the quantum world will forever be weird. In a physical ontology, quantum physics 
will exhibit behaviors that are nonsensical within that ontology. This is due to inconsistencies 
between what the theory displays and the logic of language permits. It also fails on the essential 
notions of causality. It is part of normal parlance to say something is ontologically real without 
insisting on the requirement that it be observed. For example, if one were in New York City 
yesterday, but presently in London when asked the question ‘does New York City exist?’, it would 
seem factually correct to answer ‘yes’ without insisting on the requirement to revisit the city; 
and even if one were to hop on a plane and scoot over to New York to be certain, it would not 
necessarily verify with 100% certainty that it would have been true when the question was 
asked in London. This is yet another way of stating that our generally accepted notions of 
linguistic created reality do not require a personal conscious experience or observations to be a 
part of the picture.  
A consensus of the scientific community would have consciousness as an unstated or self-
evident part of the system that includes the generally accepted definition of physical reality. The 
presupposition of an ontic physical reality excludes any consideration of the workings of either 
language or consciousness; they just become part of the a priori construct of the physical world. 
So we find within orthodox science a disjunction in the three central themes put forth in this 
book – language, consciousness and the physical world – when referring to what is casually 
labeled physical reality, which, of course, includes quantum mechanical systems. Hence, this 
disjunction gives quantum mechanical systems the character of weirdness, since the linguistic 
description and the observational experience do not mesh. However, for an information based 
ontology (and I use this word reluctantly here), quantum weirdness is not weird at all.  
In the quotation above, Einstein expresses the discomfort we feel about a world that comes and 
goes in and out of existence by the mere incidence of our observation. Yet a dog would hardly be 
concerned about such matters; sometimes, ignorance is bliss. Language has a knack of distorting 
our notions of reality. The conceptual problem with the quantum world is in the 
conceptualizing, in that it is taking place within language, and if the concept formed doesn’t 
agree with observations (ostensibly what our other senses are telling us), then weirdness may 
ensue, which is another way of saying that we cannot make sense of that kind of world – the 
kind of world that science is telling us is reality. 
If the ontological insistence of a physical reality is removed from one’s set of logical-linguistic 
axioms, then our observations of the physical world can be taken for whatever it dishes out. We 
need not presuppose anything. In a world based on a digital physics unfolding in a logical space, 
the physical world need only comply isomorphically. The system producing that isomorphism 
can evolve computationally. 
Fields or waves should be understood as representations of the laws of nature; and particles can 
be seen to embody the state of affairs at a moment in time. This conforms to the algorithmic 
system hypothesized earlier wherein the universe evolves in a 2-step iterative recursive 
process. Every cell in a hypothetical cellular lattice takes stock of its environment in the first 
step, and then uses that information to computationally evolve to the next state of affairs based 
upon the rules (algorithm or laws of nature) for moving to the subsequent state. And this 
process is repeated a finite, albeit a very large number of times.  
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Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle elucidates this 2-step algorithmic process. The uncertainty is 
in the experimental or observational incompatibility of determining multiple states of affairs in 
a quantum system. The measurement of position entails the fixing of a particular state of affairs 
in time, while momentum (or the velocity vector) represents a computation between two 
position measurements. They cannot be measured in the same instant in time, because they do 
not occur in the same instant in time. In the (computational) time between the two 
measurements, the entities in question can be said to be in a superposition, effectively waiting 
for a measurement of the next state of affairs. This interpretation of superposition conforms to 
the epistemic viewpoint presented in this book, and is clearly not an ontological one. 
Superposition may be an ontological conundrum for quantum theoreticians, but fits quite well 
within an epistemic framework. We are not concerned about the objectivity of reality, but only a 
knowable reality. That which is unknowable is recognized as residing ‘outside the box’ and 
simply not accessible to those inside the box. We might well conjecture about what is going on 
outside the box, but the only certainty we can have is the certainty that any theory about such a 
place cannot be formally described, let alone proven. 
The most precise of present day timescale measuring is in yoctoseconds (10−24 seconds) scale 
units, which is around 20 orders of magnitudes larger than the putative Planck time scale for 
operations in an isomorphically-reversed logical space. This elucidates that there is an enormous 
amount of potential computation executing in the space of even the most nimble of quantum 
measurement systems. The world is evolving between these measurements probabilistically in 
accordance with the wave function, which represents the algorithm for the evolution of a 
system in the form of partial differential equations, a necessity due to the assumption of 
continuity in physical systems. If there are no interactions that require a modification to the 
evolution of a given quantum system, i.e. an absence of particle interactions, then a 
measurement of the state of affairs for the given system need not take place; this being the most 
efficient manner to evolve the system computationally. Thus, a null encounter produces a null 
response. So the system can stay in superposition for as long as there is no need to change the 
evolution of the local neighborhood for lack of interaction between neighboring entities. 
Imagine a photon travelling through empty space; if it has no interactions, it can just continue on 
its merry way. If it encounters another quantum particle, such as an electron, a constate 
measurement occurs in logical space, followed by a new evolution in the post interaction 
electron-photon system.  Such systems of photon absorption and emission are well studied in 
quantum mechanics. If measurements could in fact be made at Planck time intervals, then there 
would not be any superposition states, for there would be only a single computation between 
measured states and it would be the only computational possibility.27 Wave functions are only 
relevant when computations are made at intervals greater than Planck time. In the world of 
human measurement there are always greater than 1019 unmeasured universal algorithmic 
computations for any given entity (the difference between Planck scale and yoctoseconds scale), 
so the number of superposed quantum states is so large that it can only be realistically 
represented by a continuous wave function. 
                                                             
27 There are other hypotheses that could account for this as well, but I believe this is the best solution. 
Modalities could be built into the laws of nature, such that a probabilistic evolution which takes place 
between computations. But it seems more consistent to have a discrete replacement for continuous 
functions, rather than some mix of the two.  
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The main point is to see the system evolving computationally independent of a purported 
physical system. The evolution of the system in logical space is the fundamental one and is not 
just a mathematical representation of a physical system evolving in spacetime. This so-called 
collapsing of the wave function is a logical mapping process in a computational neighborhood 
(constate) and the origin of consciousness. Wave function decoherence is analogous to a 
constate. At quantum metrics, this process turns waves into particles only to become waves 
again in the next instant. Except for the colossal difference in complexity, this is fundamentally 
equivalent to human consciousness. There is so much transpiring at the level of the human 
mind, it is impossible to fully describe the system using tools available within the system, that 
being our universe. Consciousness can further be understood as information that a 
computational entity has about the state of affairs in its computational domain. This will be 
explored further in the next chapter.  
The Double-Slit Experiment Explained 
The 2-slit or double-slit experiment has been rightfully called the central mystery of quantum 
mechanics. In 1803 Thomas Young formulated the wave theory of light as a result of wave-like 
interference patterns detected when a light source was projected onto a screen after having 
passed through 2 slits in a card. The experiment has been successfully repeated innumerable 
times with many variations in design.  
When a source of quantum particles, such as photons or electrons, are sent through 2 slits cut in 
a barrier, a wave-like interference pattern is formed on a screen beyond the barrier (see Error! 
eference source not found., left). If a detector, or some other method of looking at what is 
going through the slits, is imposed on the experiment so that a measurement effectively takes 
place, that is, we actually detect which slit the object goes through, then a more typical particle 
pattern appears such as when bullets are fired through the slits (see Figure 7, right). 
This experiment is the archetype illustration of the wave-particle duality of quantum mechanics. 
In the classical (Newtonian) physical world there are waves and there are particles; something 
can be either one or the other, but not both. But in the quantum world every entity has 
characteristics of both waves and particles. Which feature is expressed depends on how the 
experiment is fashioned. Physicists are, for the most part, quite accepting of this being just the 
  
Figure 7: Light behaving like a wave (Left) and Light behaving like a particle (Right). 
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way things are, even if it does not quite sit well with our commonsense notions of how the 
world is supposed to work. The problem with this picture stems from the presupposition of a 
physical reality, so once such a reality is imposed on the situation it can only be scientifically 
described by the best available physical theory, which happens to be quantum mechanics. And if 
quantum mechanics describes a world that is somewhat puzzling, so be it; we are inculcated to 
accept that it is just the way reality is. 
An epistemological perspective does not require a material based reality and accordingly has no 
such problems with the findings of the double-slit experiment. Observation does in fact set off 
the collapse of the wave function to produce an isomorphic physical representation of a logical 
state of affairs (constate). Observation perfectly fits the theory. There is not much difference, in 
principle, between wave function collapse and what ensues during a game of chess. There are 
myriad possibilities for an upcoming move while the player is contemplating the move, but once 
the move is made, the resulting board position becomes the actual fixed state of affairs in 
respect to that game, a constate of the game of chess system. This process repeats until the end 
of the game, as with photons going through slits and measurements being made until the 
experiment comes to an end.  
… 
There are numerous aspects of quantum theory, and orthodox physics in general, that form a 
comfortable fit with computational models of the universe. The non-commutative mathematics 
of quantum measurement is consistent with a 2-state binary evolution in logical space. As it is 
with quantum mechanical systems, the order of operations in an iterative computational 
process changes the final outcome as the second iteration is dependent on the state of affairs 
after the first iteration.  
Two quantum particles can be thought of as being in an entangled state if they are part of the 
same computational neighborhood. Rules that might seem to causally apply in a 4-dimensional 
spacetime continuum do not necessarily apply in logical space with a representational 
isomorphic spacetime. Physical notions of separation and locality do not automatically hold in 
logical space. There is no clear and definitive solution to quantum entanglement, but it can be 
readily seen that paired entities created in a computational process can be so tagged such that 
they carry certain property identifiers that link their respective states regardless of their 
evolution in time and spatial separation in any isomorphic structure. Nevertheless, it would 
seem that there should be isomorphic equivalency between the speed of light in physical space 
and the rate of propagation of information in computational space, therefore something beyond 
this dynamic would seem to be in play. The usual or consensus explanation from a quantum 
mechanical standpoint is that 2 particles which come together or are created in such a paired 
state have a single composite superposition regardless of their separation in spacetime. 
Correspondingly, the objects of a paired entity in logical space should always remain connected 
even if they are propagated in opposite directions along a computational lattice at the maximum 
propagation rate of information. 
Although the most referenced computational model in this book is that of cellular automata, 
which are often represented in a lattice structure with a sense of locality, it should not be 
construed that this particular kind of model is being imposed upon the reader as the alternative 
for a material world type of reality. We are just at the beginning of exploring these relationships 
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and cellular automation happens to be a model that is off to a good start. However, having just 
located the rabbit hole, we need not race down it blindly.   
Logical and Physical Spaces 
I would not suggest that mainstream physics should shut down in favor of the pursuit of digital 
physics, but rather that there should be a recognition that progress is more likely to be made by 
entertaining computational approaches as foundational and physical theories as isomorphic.  
A fair criticism of digital physics is that it lacks scientifically testable hypotheses which can 
relate an algorithm to its purported physical isomorphism, or for that matter to any mainstream 
physical theory, although Edward Fredkin and Brian Whitworth have made a reasonable start.28 
There is a tangible contemporary pragmatism about academic physics that steers research in 
the direction of both fashion and funding. Even though computational science is gaining 
adherents, it still palls against the allure of high energy physics and M-theory. The previous 
chapter on consciousness listed quotations from a number of scientific luminaries supportive of 
computational approaches to physics, which is perhaps indicative of where the science is 
headed. 
One advantage of a computational methodology is how easily it fits a causal construct amenable 
to rational thought. Although the emotional security of a material world is surrendered in favor 
of an algorithmic one, it is easy to comprehend the step-wise approach it engenders, since it is 
metaphorically like building a house with bricks, wood, nails and concrete; and there is the 
further familiar comparison to the execution of a computer program. The material world is in 
fact not really surrendered at all, but simply put into a different slot in the order of things.  
This treatise has used the generalized term logical space germane to a non-specific 
computational framework, in some respects for lack of a better term. Physical theories already 
have related mathematical frameworks in n-dimensional Hilbert spaces, which themselves do 
not have any phenomenological reality in a physical world. Logical space can be construed as 
either dimensionless or multi-dimensional and conformal with nodal or lattice structures, such 
as cellular automation; there is no pretense that it is anything other than a mathematical 
construct. This is a very different starting point than one that presupposes the objectivity of the 
physical world. 
The nascent stages in the development of digital physics are perhaps best used in forming a 
philosophical ground that satisfies the requirement of human comprehension as well as the 
rigors inherent in mathematical formalism. However, there lacks an adequate descriptive 
                                                             
28 I recommend a four part series of essays by Whitworth under the general title The Virtual Reality 
Conjecture, as we share a similar perspective on the relationship between information and the physical 
world. Whitworth offers a descriptive narrative with instructive metaphors which should help elucidate a 
subject that can be difficult to come to terms with. He also provides a level of detail that affords arguably 
the most complete theory of how a digital mechanics world would operate. Although there are some 
differences between us in the theoretical construct of the physical world, there is far more in common 
than not. These essays, which seem destined to be part of a forthcoming book, along with the work of 
Fredkin, form an important foundation to the exploration of a new kind of physics.  
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vocabulary complementary for this schema. Writers in the field are often compelled to contort 
terminology used in conventional physics to fit a digital physics model to satisfy this deficiency. 
If an algorithmic unfolding of the universe is to become the new underpinning of physics, it 
should be descriptive enough to allow the physical world described by orthodox physics to be 
isomorphically represented within its theoretical construction; and this construction should 
have some explanatory incorporation of the entropic effects of the Holographic Principle as well 
as the mainstream physics of quantum mechanics and relativity.  
… 
Theories that suggest that the cosmos is a computer simulation being played out on the physical 
universe do not add up; there is simply too much entropy associated with changing bits in 
physical space. It would take 10 million photons to change a single bit. If the universe is to be 
computational it must either be a non-entropic or low-entropic reversible system or non-
physical, and possibly both. This is a good indication that in the current cosmological playhouse 
the main actors of information, waves and particles are not all dancing together on the same 
stage. There is a different relationship playing out from the one tied to a hypothesized objective 
physical reality. Let’s see where a system that starts with bits in logical space leads to. 
Using Planck scale units and the 2-stage process introduced in the previous chapter as the 
starting point for measuring computational processing would imply the following minimum bit 
energy levels: 
                                √
    
  
  .           
Based on a range of sources for the total energy and information content in the universe, this 
estimate for the energy of a bit seems much too small, as it would imply that the total 
information in the universe could be on the order of as much as 10146 bits as compared to more 
typical estimates of around 10121 bits (Funkhouser). I am not sure what to make of this 
discrepancy as it is quite easy to be off by very large margins when dealing with universal totals. 
Alternatively, the application of Planck units may not be suitable for measuring basic 
information content, as applying physical measurement systems to information systems is not 
manifest. The use of Planck time as the basic unit for a universal computational clock speed may 
be off by many orders of magnitude. Conformity with more generally hypothesized total 
information estimates would bring the single bit energy level up to around 10-52 J.  
 
Photons and Electrons 
Although the theoretic base computation level of a hypothesized universal algorithm is many 
orders of magnitude finer than the most rudimentary of quantum entities, it may be possible to 
map a simple computational model onto these entities, such as that of a physical quantum 
photon. The speed of light would be the one near certainty for a constant that would pertain to 
both logical space and physical spacetime.  If there is to be an isomorphism between logical 
space and physical spacetime, then a computational propagation speed (how fast computations 
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can be made across a hypothesized lattice) would need to have an isomorphic representation 
equivalent to the speed of the photon, in other words, the speed of light. The photon does not 
have many free variables, only energy, momentum (as a vector) and angular momentum (which 
is conveniently quantized at √  ). Since energy is conserved over time it would seem 
reasonable that there should be a simple formula relating bits to energy, perhaps as simple as 
one bit equals one unit of energy in a new basic scale, which would make energy conservation 
equivalent to bit conservation in computational models. In the case of photons, momentum is 
merely energy and an orientation vector that tells us where the photon is going in relation to the 
rest of the world. So a photon can be seen as the composite carrier of a variable amount of 
usable information from one part of information space to another part, its vibrational frequency 
representing the amount of available information in the energy packet. A process such as 
photosynthesis can be seen as the physical representation of using this informational raw 
material to build complexity into a system, such as a plant in this instance. Similarly, massive 
particles are simply carriers of more elaborate structural building blocks and instructions on 
how they are to be put together; it is the stuff that things like molecules are made of, 
consequently leading to the formation of myriad complex arrangements. We can see analogies 
with DNA, RNA and amino acids as corresponding building blocks with instructions at much 
higher levels of complexity.  
Having proposed the photon as the physical representation of the fundamental carrier of 
information across logical space, we can now turn our attention to the electron: the particle 
responsible for life and just about everything that happens on planet Earth. The mass-energy of 
an electron is 0.511 MeV (8.2×10−14 J or 9.109 ×10−21 kg). The energy associated with the 
momentum of an electron bound in an atom is rather small by comparison and is mediated by 
the emission and absorption of photons. Whatever the case may be, an electron has 
considerable energy-information content, something around 1040 bits. Most of this is locked up 
in the electron’s mass. One can pose the same questions about the information content of 
particles that have been asked about a particle’s mass: Why do particles have the masses that 
they do? We have not come close to finding an answer to this and most other ‘why’ questions in 
physics, for that matter. 
Aside from the electron’s locked-up energy there are several features that it can play with to 
perform its critical tasks. Most of the important work done by electrons takes place at distances 
of several angstroms (Loewenstein, 1999). As for the scale of things in the universe, this is at 
least within the scope of human comprehension, as it is roughly 50,000 times smaller than the 
width of a human hair and not much finer than the thickness of a cell membrane (see Figure 8).  
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Figure 8: A cell membrane. 
All up, the electron has the following key features: 
1. A mass of 0.511 MeV. 
2. An electric charge of −1.602×10-19 coulomb (shown by convention as negative).  
3. An intrinsic angular momentum, or spin, of ½. Electrons are part of a class of particles 
called fermions which have half-integer spins.  
4. An intrinsic magnetic moment along its spin axis approximately equal to 9.274 ×10−24 
joules per tesla. 
There are also 4 quantum integers that describe the size and shape of electron orbitals and 
momentum characteristics: 
1. Principal quantum number associated with the primary shell or energy level. 
2. Azimuthal quantum number associated with angular momentum or subshell. 
3. Magnetic quantum number associated with subshell orientation. 
4. Spin projection quantized as either up or down. 
It is more important to take stock in the somewhat limited information content of an electron 
than understand the significance of these quantities and units in their own right. The fact is that 
the electron has eight characteristics to sort out all of its transactional behavior in the wide 
variety of conditions required to manage our biosphere in all its intricacies.  
Most of the heavy lifting of life is wrapped up in this rather small set of characterizing numbers. 
Electrons bind themselves to protons to build atoms through their electric charge, form various 
types of chemical bonds in the assembly of molecules of enormous variety, calculate 
interactions based on van der Waals forces, absorb and emit photons of quantized energy levels, 
and form bonds with other electrons on the basis of spin orientation. Electrons are like little 
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Figure 9: Lego Man 
http://www.behance.net/Gallery/Yellow/192175 
 
Lego bricks that can bind together to form an incredible number of complex arrangements (see 
Figure 9). 
The obvious question to ask is: How does the 
electron know what to do under the wide 
variety of environmental conditions it 
confronts during its very long lifespan? The 
equally obvious, if not unsatisfying answer 
is: From the laws of nature! But where are 
these laws of nature?  And where does the 
electron go to look them up? Analogous to 
the manner in which a computer stores both 
the program and data which the program 
manipulates, so does the electron store its 
operating instructions within itself. This I 
would suggest is what constitutes the 0.511 
MeV of locked up energy (or information) 
that an electron carries around wherever it 
goes, or at least until it gets blown away in 
some cataclysmic event to release this 
energy back into the environment in the 
form of photons, e.g. gamma ray creation in 
electron-positron annihilation (Called the 
Dirac process:          . The Breit–Wheeler process,        , although conceptually 
simple, being the inverse process of the Dirac process, has been by far one of the most difficult 
to be verified experimentally (Kleinert, Ruffini, & Xue, 2008) (see Figure 10). Images produced 
in a bubble chamber show this process when gamma rays of sufficient energy are passed either 
near or are collided into an atomic nucleus. This is suggestive of the possibility that the 
instructions for the production of the leptons are encoded in the quarks of the nucleus, or 
perhaps with the electrons associated with the nucleus involved in the process.29 When high 
energy gamma rays encounter nucleic matter, the electron and positron program instructions 
are copied, in a way that might be likened to mitosis, to become the newly created particles. 
Some of the momentum from the gamma rays is absorbed into the atomic nucleus to power this 
conversion process. Of course, this is quite speculative at this time, but it conforms to a 
computational process theory and presents some interesting analogies to known processes in 
computer programming, stored-program Turing machines and biological processes. 
                                                             
29 Alternatively, there is the possibility that the Higgs boson could be the hypothetical carrier of such 
instructions in conformity with the acquisition of mass via the Higgs mechanism. There seems to be 
enough mass in the Higgs to carry the entire algorithm for running the universe. In fact, at an estimate of 
125 GeV, the Higgs boson would have an overabundance of information even if only a small fraction of 
this energy were translated to the universal algorithm. Using Landauer’s energy to change one bit of 
information gives the Higgs enough energy to manipulate around 1013 bits of information, which would 
be a rather large program by any standard.  
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Figure 10: The Breit–Wheeler process, 𝟐𝜸 𝒆 𝒆 . Bubble Chamber image and illustration. 
It’s a long way from photons, electrons and quarks to human beings, but if one is starting only 
with bits, the building process would seem to require a step-wise method along with a very 
large number of transactions. Key quantum determinants, such as charge and spin are already 
quantized in physical theory and can easily be modularized by simple bit configurations. A 
particle, such as an electron, can have as part of its own modular construction a sub-module 
component that relates to the negative electric charge as well as the necessary n-dimensional 
vector components required to give it the linear and angular momentum properties that a 
particular electron happens to carry. All of these properties can be seen as being the 
information the electron requires to know what to do when encountering another entity in 
space. Every entity in the universe, whether we perceive it in physical space or logical space, 
needs to know what to do next; it needs to have within its own being, its own self, the means of 
deciding what it will do and where it will be in the next instant of time.  
 
Spacetime 
The other major physical theory that a computational model should address is the geometry of 
spacetime, which includes both gravity and the relativistic effects related to inertial frames of 
reference. To conform to relativity theory, a constant speed of light implies that there is a 
related constant rate of computation in logical space; a computer analogy would equate to the 
clock speed of the computer’s processor. And as there is a maximum to the velocity of light, 
there is as well a limit to the transfer rate of information across the entirety of the system. The 
cellular lattice structure and the idea of computational neighborhoods are helpful to imagine 
how these limits apply in computational terms.   
How could a digital physics account for the redshift of light in respect to inertial frames of 
reference moving apart from each other? An observer in one of the frames would detect a 
slowing of the clock speed, or computation rate, in the other frame. There would also be a noted 
reduction of energy, represented by a frequency decrease in EMR (the redshift), as well as the 
amount of information communicated between the two frames. This would correspond to 
time-computation dilation in accordance with Einstein’s theory of special relativity. In the same 
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way that ordinary concepts of time are used in differential calculus to compute rates of change, 
computational time corresponds to the rate of change for informational configurations or the 
rate of information flow through an information lattice or logical space. 
We can further posit a computational description of relativistic time dilation in a gravitational 
field. A physical description would maintain that the energy density in a particular region of 
space would be manifested in the geometry of that space. Time dilation in a gravitational field 
would correspond to a computational dilation due to the information density in the related 
logical space. The denser the computational neighborhood, the more computations will be 
required, although the processor speed, or its capacity to execute the program, remains 
constant (equivalent to the speed of light constraint). To balance things out, the clock speed 
appears to slow down in the local region of logical space in order to accommodate the 
computations that are required in any given algorithmic iteration, so that all the computations 
that are required to be made in the algorithmic action stage (TA) are in fact executed.  Local 
computations seem to be progressing as normal when compared to similarly dense 
computational spaces in a given neighborhood, as would be the case in a physical general 
relativistic description. This computational description fits well with the idea of entropic 
gravity, which itself is related to information content (Verlinde, 2011). This picture brings into 
equivalence the mass-energy density of a 3-dimensional spatial volume, the 2-dimensional 
surface entropic density described by the holographic principle and the information density of 
logical space.30 The importance of the holographic principle is that it brings together a wide 
range of concepts involving both information and physical entities. Broadly speaking, it 
describes how the information content of any n-dimensional entity is inscribed on its enclosing 
(n – 1)-dimensional surface. 
The holographic principle grew from theories of black hole thermodynamics developed by 
physicists Jacob Bekenstein and Stephen Hawking, which has come to be known as the 
Bekenstein-Hawking entropy. Their work centered on what transpires when black holes grow 
by the accretion of material into the black hole from beyond its event horizon. The insight was 
that the information content of all that falls into the black hole is manifest in surface fluctuations 
of the event horizon. They discovered that the entropy of a black hole is proportional to the area 
of its event horizon, the surface from within which even light cannot escape. More precisely, a 
black hole with an event horizon spanning ‘A’ Planck areas has A/4 units of entropy; the Planck 
area, approximately 10−66 square centimeters, is the fundamental quantum unit of area 
determined by the strength of gravity, the speed of light and the size of quanta. If measured as 
information, it is as if the entropy were written on the event horizon, with each bit (each digital 
1 or 0) corresponding to four Planck areas (see Figure 11). It is worth noting the similarities to 
the lattice constructed from a simple 4-neighbor von Neumann neighborhood discussed earlier 
(see Figure 4). 
                                                             
30 The holographic principle was first proposed by Gerard 't Hooft in 1993 and has had a number of 
prominent contributors to its development, including Raphael Bousso and Leonard Susskind. In one of its 
central assertions, the holographic principle states that any 3-dimensional volume of space can be 
described by the information contained on the 2-dimensional surface of the volume.  
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Figure 11: Black Hole Entropy (© Scientific American) 
So what we find here from a historical perspective is an examination of the thermodynamics of 
extreme gravitational entities leading to concepts relating to the information content of matter.  
Furthermore, we have a physics usually described by differential calculus morphing, in a sense, 
into a Planck scale digital description. The holographic principle is yet one more piece of 
evidence supporting ideas relating to the melding of information and matter.  
Moreover, the holographic principle resolves the black hole information paradox within the 
framework of string theory (and M-theory). Whether any of the various versions of string 
theory and its 10-dimentional framework or its 11-dimensional spacetime successor suggested 
by Edward Witten in 1995 dubbed M-theory, succeeds in merging gravity into a unified physical 
theory is yet to be seen. What is most striking about the theoretical basis of these models, along 
with mainstream quantum mechanics, is how the physicality of the world melts into a 
mathematical landscape to the extent that the usual notions of substance dissolve to mere 
metaphors for a catalogue of differential equations. In the end, these physical metaphors serve 
little purpose except for satisfying the limitations of human conceptualization. One might revisit 
earlier sections in this manuscript concerning the human necessity for making sense of the 
world through causal relationships. 
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Probabilistic Determinism and the Arrow of Time 
The laws of physics are theoretically time reversible, i.e. the clock of the universe can be run 
equally well backward as forward. This is completely compatible with an information 
theoretical universe, particularly if a time-reversible logical operator is in force.31 If we say that 
the mathematics of the laws of physics allow for the universe to evolve both forward and 
backward in time, then we are likewise saying the universe is logically reversible as well. Yet the 
physical experience of the universe has time exclusively flowing in one direction, which we 
happen to call forward, and as such has been labeled the arrow of time. A game of chess can 
likewise be viewed running in reverse (something easy to do on a computer by using the undo 
or backward keys), but only follows the rules of the game when run forward and becomes 
nonsensical evolving in reverse, very much the same as the universe would.  
If a computational model had a random operator introduced, then time-reversibility could be 
preserved even in a non-deterministic universe. This might explain why the laws of quantum 
physics seem time reversible yet not wholly deterministic, to the extent of the predictability of 
the evolution of a quantum system. If continuum mathematics is used to describe the system, 
such as in the Wave Function, we have a predictive model which is reversible, yet not fully 
determinate in a classical sense. But if a discrete process is assumed, there is the possibility of 
evolving a non-time reversible non-deterministic system if random operators are in place. This 
conforms both to observations of randomness in the universe as well as the arrow of time 
suggested by the second law of thermodynamics.  With a computational model there is no 
evident necessity for a multiverse or a many worlds interpretation of the universe. Although 
there is no exclusion for any particular number of algorithms evolving simultaneously in some 
sort of relationship, there does not seem to be any reason to go down this path. Wave-particle 
duality may pose some troubling interpretational difficulties in quantum mechanics, but not so 
with a computational model which integrates the role of consciousness in the process. I do not 
see this issue as critical, since a variety of models can fit observations and mathematics alike; 
the point is made merely to show the compatibility of discrete processes with a variety of 
interpretations of the observed universe. 
The big question becomes increasingly clear with each descriptive narrative: How do all of these 
seemingly related phenomena fit together? We have waves, particles, strings, branes, energy, 
information, dimensions, time, computation, logic, mathematics, randomness, determinism, 
continuity, discreteness, complexity, entropy, and so on. If we just focus on gravitational 
systems, in the broadest of terms, we find that nature wants to draw mass-energy onto itself. 
The concept of entropic gravity makes sense as it conforms to the second law of 
                                                             
31 Conservative and reversible logic was developed by Edward Fredkin and Tommaso Toffoli, both of whom 
have invented logic gates used in computing that bear their respective names (Fredkin & Toffoli, 1982). 
Time reversible logic systems use a 3-bit system to preserve information flow so that it can be run in 
reverse without information loss. It also is quite handy as it coincides with the mathematics of both 
classical and quantum physics.  
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thermodynamics, something we loathe to ignore. It is incontrovertible that nature in its myriad 
forms tends to evolve to more probabilistic states of affairs. Yet this coming together of the stuff 
of nature, under the right conditions, leads to local complexities, i.e. states of affairs with lower 
probabilities, while the universe as a whole continues its inexorable path toward blandness and 
thermal mortality.   
My emphasis on epistemology is with good cause and is particularly relevant in the 
philosophical conceptualizing and building of a universe that makes sense on all accounts, in 
that the theory holds together at all levels of examination, with an appreciation that the 
examination is being done by a human being with certain acknowledged attributes. It gives full 
recognition to the fact that biology is every bit a part of nature as quantum mechanics. There is 
no point in theorizing about an objective reality when it is impossible to succeed in such an 
endeavor. Before adopting a principle which can be accepted with certainty, we should set some 
benchmark whereby if the accepted principle were incorrect our entire understanding of the 
world would be in shambles and we would be forced to go back to basics and start afresh. For 
example, concepts which derive from the laws of thermodynamics fall into the category of the 
indispensible, for it is difficult to know how we could proceed if these laws somehow turned out 
not to be true after centuries of rigorous experimentation without an exception. What options 
would we have except to start from scratch?  
One might be inclined to think that the reality of a physical universe independent of 
consciousness would also fall into this category. A theory of consciousness, such as the one 
proposed in this book, is just the sort of challenge that could undermine the entire orthodoxy of 
mainstream physical theories; or at the very least, we should feel compelled to rethink the 
meaning of physicality. Aside from the arguments presented herein, the laws of 
thermodynamics, and particularly the second law concerning entropy, oblige us to 
conceptualize the universe as a dynamic process with direction. Information theory and all of its 
attendant implications are central to this perspective. Whether the reference is to formal 
systems or entropic gravity, we are still in the same family. We are simply talking about 
different relations of the same generic principle. The universe is falling. It is falling in a sense 
that it is heading to a more probabilistic state of affairs, and the laws of nature are what is 
keeping it from going straight down in a kind of free-fall. The question is: How does it do it? 
I would not go so far as to say that descriptions showing correspondence between a virtual 
reality of algorithmic origins and a phenomenological physical reality constitutes a scientific 
theory per se, mainly due to the lack of experimental evidence, but when taken along with the 
rest of what has been presented in this treatise, it forms a strong argument for a foundational 
digital physics. The concepts presented by information theory and thermodynamics should 
become the bedrock of the cosmogony of the future. The trickiest part of the puzzle is finding 
the proper place for consciousness, so we shall revisit this subject in the next chapter. 
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Reality 
“Consciousness cannot be accounted for in physical terms. For consciousness is absolutely 
fundamental. It cannot be accounted for in terms of anything else.” ― Erwin Schrödinger 
 
Everything would be so simple if we could only open our eyes and say with certainty: “This is 
Reality!” And although this is seemingly the case, it is a perspective which is quite contrived and 
heavily skewed with historically religious and mystical predispositions. It would place man yet 
again at the center of the universe with some exceptional access to that which is universally and 
objectively true and to that which is not. The extraordinary access that humans actually do have 
is to that of the phenomenon of language, which in turn provides access to logical truths, and 
furthermore are not necessarily truths about the universe, for if they were, we might just as well 
learn all there is to know about the world from a game of chess.   
Language is about belief, meaning and truth. It is pointless to talk about these things outside the 
context of language. Language is a dominant part of the human conscious experience and it 
happens to be the part we use to do things like analysis, science and philosophy. As such, it is 
used in the analysis, science and philosophy of consciousness, an ever-present recursion that 
always muddies the water. 
We need to constantly remind ourselves that we are forever subjugated to the entrapment of 
language. Caution in its use is always required, for it is a tool that can be likened to a chain saw; 
it can be of great use, it can fell trees many times its size, but in the wrong hands can cause a 
great deal of damage. And I hasten to add that there have been more massacres due to language 
than chain saws, despite there not being any film attesting to this account (see Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12: 1974 Film ‘The Texas Chain Saw Massacre’ 
This note of caution is emphasized because language is a part of the conscious 
phenomenological experience, and we will be required to use it to explain that very 
phenomenological experience that is causative to its existence. There is no way out of this 
circularity, for we have no other tool to work with.  
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It is perhaps due to the historical evolution of the philosophy of language that we have seen a 
decline in the standing of Wittgenstein’s early work on the logic of language which made 
Wittgenstein a central figure of the Vienna Circle.32 Much of this is due to Wittgenstein himself, 
who went down the path of what became the philosophy of Ordinary Language. This in turn was 
taken up by a number of philosophers at the time, including Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976), and 
remained a major school of philosophy until 1970. Although an important principle in the 
philosophy of language, it did not seem to warrant a school of philosophy in its own right, and it 
was not so many years before it went into decline. Earlier in this book I summed up my account 
of these matters in the sentence: The meaning of a word is determined by social agreement or 
declaration. An examination of the use of language in ordinary social circumstances should 
make this clear. The later Wittgenstein (PI and PG) blends a convoluted introspection on the 
boundaries of rule-following systems, semantics and grammar that challenges one to find 
cohesion in the totality of his work. Nonetheless, there is much to be gleaned from both the 
early and later Wittgenstein. 
There is a second development which contributed to the waning of the Wittgenstein of the 
Tractatus which evolved in the field of linguistics. The revolution in the field of generative 
grammars initiated by (Chomsky, 1957) would seem to have incorporated the formalism of 
Wittgenstein’s early work, but for some reason Wittgenstein is cut off without a mention. In fact, 
Wittgenstein does not even appear in the bibliography of Chomsky’s landmark paper Syntactic 
Structures.  How bizarre it is that the two giants of linguistic formalism are totally disconnected. 
The formalist pathway is muddled by this peculiar history, which is why I have set out to 
synthesize the major ideas of linguistic formalism without getting too mired in the historic 
aspects, which is something best left to historians. 
… 
It is critical to clearly differentiate the various challenges encompassing the subject of 
consciousness.  There is first the problem of plainly describing what it is, for it seems to mean 
different things to different people. One must be clear and not get lost in the morass of 
definitions, nuances and interpretations. Additionally, there is the matter of distinguishing what 
constitute the various types of reasoning, including the kind of reasoning associated with formal 
systems, such as language and mathematics, as well as inductive and stochastic types of 
reasoning. These latter forms are syntheses of lower level binary processes that are not directly 
accessible to the entity involved in a decision process, that is to say that they are not accessible 
at the uppermost level of the decision process and are often labeled as instinctive, particularly 
in the case of animals. We can easily become confused because our common terminology does 
not clearly distinguish among these variants. For example, what do we mean by the term 
                                                             
32 The Vienna Circle was a group of scientifically trained philosophers and philosophically interested 
scientists who met under the nominal leadership of Moritz Schlick for often weekly discussions of 
problems in the philosophy of science during academic terms from 1924 to 1936.  Their radically anti-
metaphysical stance was supported by an empiricist criterion of meaning and a broadly logicist 
conception of mathematics. They denied that any principle or claim was synthetically a priori. Moreover, 
they sought to account for the presuppositions of scientific theories by regimenting such theories within a 
logical framework so that the important role played by conventions, either in the form of definitions or of 
other analytical framework principles, became evident.  
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thinking? As far as humans are concerned, thinking would most certainly be included as a 
conscious activity. Do dogs and cats think, or are they doing something else when they decide 
what to do next? And what shall we call that type of decision making? If we limit the term 
thinking to something that humans do, but other animals do not, are we limiting the term to 
logical forms of rational analysis and decision processes? Then what is to be said about human 
beings before they had true language? Are we to conclude that these humans were incapable of 
thought? 
The previous discussion on consciousness established how the subject was to be approached. 
Consciousness was defined as a fundamental part of the Planck scale system-state 
measurement, which I termed the constate, thus taking the definition of the word consciousness 
away from that of social agreement to one defined by declaration in conformity with my own 
designation for the meaning of a word. Hence, we start with a definition which is at the very 
least rhetorically tautological and can easily be adjudged logically so as well. The case for my 
rationale for this belief regarding consciousness has already been argued; if one is to agree or 
disagree with this, either accepting or denying its truthfulness as the case may be, that choice 
will be made within the formalism of one’s own respective system of propositional logic. If one 
is to contend that consciousness is something else, then they are reading from a different hymn 
book (working with a different set of axioms), and there can never be agreement about the 
matter. These preliminaries are necessary to avert a derailment by the mischievous proclivities 
of language. 
This position on consciousness was developed by moving progressively backward in time from 
the present to more primitive and less complex states of entity decision processes in order to 
finally get to the bit-wise Planck scale occurrence of a constate, although I make no claim that 
evolution works in such a progressive and ordered manner. The entire universe is thereby 
conscious at every level of entity, regardless of size or complexity. It is now the task to work 
forward in time to build from this rudimentary state to one that can account for human 
language and consciousness and in turn our phenomenological experience of the physical world.  
 
Top Down and Bottom Up 
In a world which is fundamentally algorithmic and information-based, both top down and 
bottom up perspectives are completely valid and compatible, and furthermore, not mutually 
exclusive. In a computer program the stream of bits leading to the opening and closing of logic 
gates can be viewed as the bottom up cause for what appears on the computer monitor, and 
every one of these bits can be shown to be part of a process which is causal to something 
happening at a higher level, such as an image appearing on a computer monitor. Likewise, the 
click of a button of the computer’s mouse can be seen as the top down initiation that sets off a 
part of the program that will cause a stream of bits to open and close logic gates that 
dynamically cause a change of state of the computer monitor. The human operator of the 
computer can be seen as making a decision based on information received from the output on 
the computer monitor and enacting that decision by clicking the mouse button on a particular 
choice displayed on the monitor, thus setting off another stream of bits that will in turn change 
the display output on the monitor once again, in a continuous loop of decision and process. But 
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then one can separately examine the portion of the process involving the human operator’s 
decision process in its own right, momentarily exit the computer part of the loop, and enter the 
multi-level world of biological complexity of the human computer operator, itself involving 
countless decisions, before returning to the mouse click event. One can also view this from a 
perspective somewhere in the middle of the process, that being a procedure call nested within a 
computer program; this will yield a view of information entering (arguments), program 
execution (processing), and a causal output (return value). Processes both above and below a 
particular procedure are all part of the totality of the system. In a complex program, even the 
programmer may find it difficult to trace the entire process from top to bottom; debugging 
programs are usually needed to assist in this process. One should note that although the 
assertion is being made that consciousness is universally pervasive, it is also localized, and not 
to be confused with popular notions of cosmic consciousness. I do not believe that the arguments 
presented herein either add or detract from the ideas presented elsewhere about the 
interconnectedness of the universe as a whole. 
The programmer, who can be seen as the top down cause of the program, sits outside of the 
program and cannot be inferred from within the program. The program and the programmer 
together form a causal meta-system, which itself cannot infer what may be outside of it, in a 
meta-meta-system (Hofstadter, 1979). The concept of nesting is familiar to computer 
programmers and involves the layering of recursively interdependent processes. But we don’t 
have to look far to see myriad examples of nesting, looping and feedback in our everyday lives. 
We need only explore the complexity of our body’s metabolic processes as an example (Figure 
13).  
 
Figure 13: Metabolism overview. 
The carbohydrate metabolic cycle is unconscious from the level of the organism, yet not that far 
down from the top level. We are in fact quite conscious of when we are in need of some 
carbohydrate metabolism when we have feelings of hunger or weakness, and we realize it’s time 
to get some sugar into the machine. We can also drop down a level or two to observe some of 
the metabolic process from the semi-autonomous perspective of a muscle cell (see Figure 14). 
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Figure 14: Metabolism of a muscle cell. (From Stephanie Seneff) 
Many of the illustrations and diagrams representing biological processes resemble system flow 
charts often associated with information processing. Complex entities, in general, require 
environmental feedback and the ability to respond to ‘what if’ situations, whether it is how a car 
responds to depressing the accelerator pedal or how the body reacts if one’s blood temperature 
registers at 40 degrees Celsius. 
When it comes to the operation of complex organisms, like human beings, it is far from evident 
where the decisions are being made. They seem to be coming from everywhere at once with 
interdependencies and feedback loops not easily unraveled. Some sections of the process may 
become well-described, yet it is always possible to extend the scope of the process under 
examination so that it will encompass something that is either not well understood or reaches a 
level of complexity such that it overwhelms comprehension. There are simply too many 
transactions occurring all at once to properly describe the system as a whole. Whether one 
wishes to call them conscious or not, everywhere one looks, decisions are being made on the 
basis of local states of affairs, at every level, from top to bottom. In respect to living organisms, 
most decisions are being made below the top level of perception just to sustain the orderly 
functioning of the organism, with tasks such as temperature control and metabolism to give but 
two examples. I have chosen to call these decisions conscious, because they meet the criteria of 
assessing the relation between the entity’s own state of affairs and its environment. It is 
irrelevant whether the decision maker in the process is attributed with awareness, self-
awareness, intentional states or whatever; we need not get entrapped by the language. If an 
entity has the information or knowledge to make a binary decision on the basis of a rule-
following system, it is for all intents and purposes conscious, regardless of the level of operation 
under scrutiny. There is a whole world of activity that took hundreds of millions of years to 
evolve that goes about its business, whether it is processing information, communicating, 
testing, probing, replicating, executing, which are most often filled with cybernetic loops, all 
taking place from the molecular level up, as well as down, falling just below the top level state of 
consciousness of the organism (Loewenstein, 1999). It goes on while we sleep and it goes on 
when awake, yet so much is unbeknownst to our conscious mind (to which I refer to as the top 
level of consciousness in keeping with the more common parlance). I know less about what it 
feels like to be a muscle cell in my own body than what if feels like to be a bat. At least the bat 
has a brain. But suffice to say that the muscle cell knows what it feels like to be itself in 
whatever way it is capable of doing so. It is not for me in my inimitable anthropocentric 
appraisal to pass judgment on such feelings.  
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The concept of emergence, particularly in reference to complexity, can be seen as a playing out 
of a rule-following system. If we use computer chess as an example, with each successive 
reference to the board position (state of affairs or constate), the computer plays a move that 
puts the state of affairs in a more complex state than that prior to the move. This can be 
measured as the amount of information required to evolve the system to the position in 
question in the particular manner that was taken to get there (being the particular moves made 
to arrive at that position). Although this example may meet the criteria of evolving to a less 
probable state of affairs, it is a far cry from the apparent improbable evolution of our universe 
to its current cosmological constate. So the question remains if there is sufficient evidence to 
support a theory that can account for human consciousness as it is generally defined (in its 
broadest sense). That is to say, do the definitions and mechanisms of consciousness elucidated 
herein fit the evidence for the observable universe? 
… 
There are many theories of consciousness floating about in what is a rather speculative 
theoretical space, all searching for the right combination of items to include and exclude from its 
definition and operating manual. It is worth taking a look at some of the current thinking on the 
subject. An interesting offering comes from the Noble Prize winning neuroscientist Gerald 
Edelman. I have chosen the work of (Edelman 2004, 2006) to use as an example due to his long 
and distinguished career in both physiology and neuroscience, as well as his commentary on 
most of the important issues on the subject.  
Edelman rejects outright the analogy of the brain as a computer. His main argument is that the 
brain operates more like a pattern recognition machine than a logic-based Turing Machine. The 
central theme of his thesis is labeled Neural Darwinism, a value selection system that guides and 
reinforces neuronal pathways toward favored beneficial structures. I quite like this idea of 
Edelman’s, as might be expected from someone strongly supporting the generic extension of 
Darwinian concepts, although I do not see a conflict with the computer metaphor. In fact, they 
should be quite compatible, as coordinated binary neuronal firings form the brain-state patterns 
that Edelman believes central to brain operation. But this is actually secondary to the key issue, 
which is that Edelman, like so many others, is focused on one layer of operation, virtually 
ignoring everything that leads up to the process of neuronal operations and pattern formation. 
An analysis at such high levels of complexity ignores that most of the computation has been 
packed down the chain of command. The stuff that more clearly has the appearance of 
operations in logical space is transpiring before a neuron ever gets to decide to fire or not to fire.  
Edelman goes on to explain how timing mechanisms and the process of re-entry, a kind of 
feedback loop, pull everything together to give the feeling of a stream of consciousness. The 
theory offers quite a compelling explanation of how brain function produces the experience of 
phenomenological consciousness; but again, like most of those looking for the neural correlates 
of consciousness, he is focusing on operations near the highest levels of execution, leaving the 
underpinnings to the side, unquestioned and unresolved. So if we do find, with certitude, the 
neural correlates of consciousness, will it answer the hard problem? Not likely!  
Then there is always the sticky issue of whom or what has consciousness. Edelman postulates 
that there are two levels of consciousness: primary consciousness is a pre-linguistic form of 
perceptual consciousness that we share with other mammals, in recognition that we have 
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substantially the same brain physiology as our phylogenetic cousins, and higher-order 
consciousness, reserved for the privileged few, one to be exact, that somehow managed the 
acquisition of language. This is of course true for the most part; it is just presented in a 
somewhat misleading way. If the only 2 mammals on the planet were bats and cats, one could 
say that bats had primary consciousness, but in addition to this primary consciousness, cats had 
a higher-order consciousness called vision. The pseudo-creationist rapture toward language is 
something to behold, especially amongst those self-proclaimed atheists. But this is a pitfall that 
one faces when taking a starting position on consciousness from the human perspective. The 
point has been made that language is what sets humans apart from the rest, but we need not be 
awestruck by the fact and walk away in utter amazement. (Griffin & Speck, 2004) are almost 
apologetic in their defense of attributing consciousness to animals, although their paper is 
ostensibly presented as strongly supporting this case. Rather than wondering if the 
consciousness bar is set too high or too low, the bar should simply be thrown away.  
Another thing that I believe Edelman gets right is the characterization of mammalian 
consciousness as epiphenomenal, as he bluntly states: Consciousness is a property of neural 
processes and cannot itself act causally in the world. The approach that I have taken in this book 
cannot adequately determine if human consciousness is causally significant, primarily because I 
have defined consciousness as both fundamental and pervasive. To make such statements 
concerning human consciousness would require a redefining of the term consciousness as it has 
been used herein, as I have tried to be careful to differentiate between the constate of 
consciousness and human, animal and other varieties that fall under the ambit of the term in its 
general usage. 
… 
It has been repeated here often enough that we should realize that we cannot rely on our own 
experiential consciousness to conjure a theory of consciousness, for it failing on the grounds of 
being self-referential and tautological, effectively proving nothing. It is this sort of argument 
that has been used in support of the concept of intentionality. The problem with theories of 
consciousness that focus on attention and intentionality are that they presuppose existents 
more inexplicable than the ones they are claiming to resolve. In these cases the assumption is 
the axiomatic existence of the self and the will, such as in the phrase: I turned my attention to the 
vase on the table and willed myself to pick it up. Nor can we defer to physical theories for 
assistance, as these are dependent upon phenomenological consciousness for their empirical 
construction. In fact, by the very nature of language, there can never be a foolproof construction 
of a theory of consciousness. It can only be argued from within the logical construct of a formal 
system to make a particular case; and that case can only be judged by the weight of evidence, 
including its explanatory and logical consistency and completeness.  
This explanation begins with the attribution of consciousness to a binary-state dynamic in a 
cellular or lattice structure, noting that this structure should be understood as logical rather 
than physical. This must be a fundamental property of the universe at every level of 
measurement, because every scientific measurement ever made has shown that the measured 
entity evolves in time from one state to another due to a causal relation between itself and its 
environment, notwithstanding the indeterminacies of quantum mechanics, which have already 
been addressed herein. There can be no argument, regardless of whatever reasoned theory is 
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applied, disputing that the universe is in a state of flux and its overall state is never the same 
from one instant to the next, however the word instant may be defined. 
 
Free Will 
Free will and the illusion of free will is for all intents and purposes the same thing. It is mostly 
about how one frames the argument. Like so many topics in philosophical debate, arguments 
are dismantled by means of language and a failure to deeply examine the presuppositions 
supporting a particular philosophical position or belief. The topic of free will seems a bit outside 
the scope of this book, except for its close connection with consciousness, rationality and 
language.  
If, as is the usual case, free will is solely attributed to humans to the exclusion of other 
organisms, then it must be seen that it is language that bestows free will upon us. As such, it is 
language that must be central to any rigorous analysis of free will, and we would have to query 
what it is about language that conveys this ability to reign over one’s decisions. The mere 
examination of the two words, free and will, proffers so much of the problems associated with 
the subject. What do we mean by the will? It is as if there is some entity that can be directed by 
the actor by the act of willing. Exactly what the process is and what actors must do to produce a 
causative effect has been a subject of much debate and clouded in confusion.  
A consensus of opinion points to a definition of the will as being something incorporated within 
an agent that can direct itself in a particular causative action. I think it is safe to call this agent 
the self; and its agency is its intention and capacity for self-direction. When the agent is limited 
to humans the process is said to be mediated by rational thought, effectively language. If this 
rational thought process is not pre-determined, then we can say that the agency is free, in that 
the agent is a causative actor and thus has free will. Sometimes this is framed as having the 
capacity of choice, or the ability to do otherwise. In most cases, non-humans are not allotted this 
ability to do otherwise, as if they have no choice but to do exactly as they do in some 
predetermined way, without quite defining what agency is causative in respect to these 
organisms; yet humans, thanks to rationality, are said to be engendered with this ability.  
The notion that the ability to do otherwise differentiates human and non-human behavior 
pervades both theological and secular perspectives. We tend not to blame sharks for attacking 
people; they are just being sharks and cannot be expected to do otherwise. Such is life in the 
animal kingdom. But humans can contemplate the options available and make decisions that 
can be judged by some standard of behavior. As has been discussed at great length, this rational 
process is language. It is hard to see how anything other than language being the defining factor, 
lest we venture into the magisteria of the theologians. Therefore, humans have a rule-following 
system that can churn out decisions worthy of being adjudged on some scale of normative 
behavior. And this is in fact what we do. So we live our lives with the presumption of free will, at 
least from the standpoint of responsibility, whether legal or moral.  
This point deserves closer scrutiny, for it would seem by these arguments that language is the 
sole factor in whether the world unfolds deterministically or not. But one might ask what it is 
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about language that grants choices in life that is denied to all else in the universe. It is more that 
those supporting the case for free will have placed their focus on the apparent decision making 
ability of the individual without questioning or examining the processes that lead up to the 
behavior. It is not dissimilar to concluding that moths are spontaneously generated from old 
cloth. As has been discussed in an earlier chapter, a belief system, for which any position 
concerning free will encompasses, has no limit to the variety of its self-referential truths. The 
arguments supporting free will are just such a system. The framers have defined the limits of 
the argument to suit the conclusion. If one broadens the boundaries, we find no particular 
reason for surmising that humans are any more in control of their will than any other animal. 
The only real difference is that humans use rational thought to supplement decision making 
mechanism that we had prior to the acquisition of language. The will of humans can be said to 
be free to the extent that the determinations of their respective systems of propositional logic 
can be said to be free; and this would take quite an extensive examination, as the terminus of 
this journey would draw us back to the fundamental laws of nature.  
There have been many comprehensive arguments supporting the case that free will is just an 
illusion. Some of these theories focus on support for an epiphenomenal consciousness (Wegner, 
2002). There is also a body of experimental evidence to suggest that decisions are made 
unconsciously, but will set in motion actions that we feel are being made consciously 
(Honderich, 2005; Libet, 1999, 2003; Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008). I find these 
arguments compelling if not totally convincing. The evidence is quite substantial that 
phenomenological consciousness alone is not sufficient to be a sole causative agent, as would be 
the case for support of free will, and it remains an open question what the function of 
phenomenological consciousness might be.  
My own definition of the constate as a fundamental constituent of the laws of nature readily 
deals with the questions concerning how the world evolves in time. The matter of free will 
never emerges in such a theory. It is just an unnecessary play on words that may adequately 
describe a feeling of how things are, but not in fact how things are. It is for this reason that it is 
irrelevant whether we call free will a reality or an illusion. It is just definitional and it only 
matters where you look for the answers. It is also worth pointing out that the actuality of 
constates does not address the question of the purpose of the conscious experience. In fact, 
there is nothing that can adequately address such matters, for purpose must be something 
found outside our own particular laws of nature, i.e. external to our own reality.  
The main concerns about the nature of free will revolve around issues of morality and legal 
responsibility, as societies need to deal with non-normative or injurious behavior.  Society is 
concerned with retribution, punishment, reform, safety and mental competence, as well as how 
to deal with these matters in meeting the needs of its members and in respect to the society’s 
power structure. There is an unfounded fear that if we deem that humans are not free agents, 
then they cannot be held responsible for their actions. As we would put down a rabid dog for 
reasons that it is a danger to our well-being, we similarly deal with deleterious human behavior. 
We do not blame the dog for contracting rabies and thus behaving dangerously, but nonetheless 
must address the matter of what is best for the society. It would be healthier for society to 
assume that humans do not have free will and simply deal with matters of anti-social behavior 
on their merits. If some anti-social behavior can be rectified by rehabilitation, then this should 
be the path to take; the rehabilitation process may well include some form of incarceration. 
Each case should be judged on its merits. Without venturing any further down this path, I make 
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the point that the methods utilized in addressing social needs should not be contingent upon the 
question of free agency. The attribution of free will and moral responsibility is a convenience for 
sidestepping the nature of the complex interactions in any given society. It is usually easier for a 
society to eliminate the problem, as if we would exterminate a rabid dog, than scrutinize the 
complexities that produce both acceptable and inappropriate behavior. 
 
General Theory of Evolution 
The term evolution has usually referred to the adaptive changes of living organisms over the 
course of time. But the boundary between life and non-life is not so clear. The first catalogued 
organisms, bacteria of various phyla, are thought to have a common ancestor, but that ancestor 
has yet to be discovered. Bacteria are quite complex entities in their own right, being composed 
of around a trillion atoms; the genome of E. coli (sequenced in 1997) has about 3000 genes and 
4 million base pairs, although some studies show results exceeding 4000 genes (Koonin, 2000). 
Whatever the number, it would certainly be informative to know how those atoms ordered 
themselves into such complex relationships. What instructions were they following to get 
themselves into such an organized state?  
It is perhaps due to the historical particulars regarding the emergence of the theory of evolution 
that it began its journey separated from the world of physics and never quite conjoined with it.  
Science became ever more compartmentalized, such that we presently find ourselves without a 
general theory of evolution. There is a troubling gap between theories concerning the evolution 
of the universe and those covering the evolution of living organisms, as if somehow the laws of 
physics gave birth to a new set of laws applicable just for living things, in a sort of son of physics. 
Not only should there not be, but there cannot be a discontinuity in the laws of nature cropping 
up 10 billion years after the big bang. It is fine to cultivate a deep understanding of the evolution 
of life in accord with Darwinian processes, but it should be understood that these processes are 
higher level formulations of more fundamental ones.  
The application of natural selection should be broadened to encompass all natural processes in 
the universe, not just for living organisms. It is more a matter of which forces of nature are 
applicable to a particular circumstance. In the prebiotic universe the primary force selecting the 
evolutionary path for a given entity was gravity. The gravity driven star factory is well and truly 
running at full tilt to this very day, churning out atoms of more complex varieties than the ones 
that found their way into the factory. When these construction materials migrate to cooler and 
more amenable environments for complex entity formation, such as planet Earth, then 
electromagnetism can take charge in the next phase of emergence. Both organic and inorganic 
molecules rely on EM for their composition. Differentiations are related to the materials in use 
and level of complexity, not the fundamental processes involved. The fact that we cannot find 
agreement on how to actually define life reveals the arbitrariness of the term. There is tangibly 
nothing magical in the emergence of life, and if we were there to observe it we would probably 
barely notice anything special happening. It would be some innocuous chemical transition that 
took place which persisted over a long period of time. Not that much unlike the emergence of 
language, it would take a self-proclaimed expert to pass judgment on the event of life’s 
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emergence, and other experts would disagree. In fact, it would simply come down to whose 
definition prevails, but the laws of physics would not be altered by the wrangle of authorities.  
The prevailing scientific paradigm proclaims that the laws of nature are isotropic, continuous 
over time with the value of physical constants remaining unchanged and energy being 
conserved. There have been ongoing challenges to these beliefs, but for the most part this 
paradigm has held up well under scrutiny. Even if some of the factors thought to be constant 
over time are found to have evolved, it would seem likely that their evolution would have been 
prescribed by the initial laws of physics. It is hard to see a place for outside intervention 
changing the laws of nature after the earliest moments of the big bang, a time before which the 
physics is less understood. Yet notions of special circumstances of sorts seem to be acceptable 
when attributed to definitions of life, language and consciousness. There seems to be an allusion 
to outside intervention, or change of circumstances, when addressing how these things came 
into existence, which appears to be a divergence from generally accepted scientific principles 
and orthodoxy. Lee Smolin, along with other noted physicists, has argued to the contrary, 
although Smolin does not support magical interventions (Smolin, 2013). His argument is closer 
to a Darwinian form of evolution akin to the cosmological natural selection (CNS) theory.33 CNS 
and the modifications over the years leading to Smolin’s book is quite speculative and perhaps 
somewhat remote from the current cosmological orthodoxy, but is nonetheless interesting in 
the application of natural selection to universe building. We can add this to Edelman’s neural 
Darwinism and see a gradual generalization of Darwinian concepts. 34  Although I find 
considerable disagreement with Smolin’s reasoning on a number of issues, including finding 
that he has fallen into a few linguistic traps regarding the use of terms like real and realism, it is 
generally good for science to have new and controversial ideas floating around for 
consideration. If the entities within the universe evolve as well as the laws directing their 
evolution, then we are forced to reach beyond our universe for that which controls the evolution 
of both. It doesn’t mean that such hypotheses are incorrect, but rather we would be looking at 
an inaccessible domain for answers to how and why things are the way they are in our own local 
(accessible) universe. At this point it is fitting to invoke a Smolin favorite in Leibniz’s principle of 
sufficient reason and perhaps a bit of Ockham’s razor as well, and stick to the more orthodox 
view that entities evolve in accordance with fixed universal laws, without regard to what may 
have transpired outside the creation of what is measureable in our own universe. This should 
clarify the scope of Darwinian processes that are addressed herein, as well as some of the 
speculations excluded.  
Although my generalized model of consciousness is that it is both fundamental and intrinsic, its 
manifestations will vary with each respective entity in question, for everything must be 
conscious, since a lack of consciousness would mean that the entity would not have the 
information required to know what to do next. In this sense, consciousness evolves along with 
the entity, so that anything that can engage in an independent decision process is conscious and 
                                                             
33 Smolin's hypothesis of cosmological natural selection, also called the fecund universes theory, suggests 
that a process analogous to biological natural selection applies at the grandest of scales. Smolin published 
the idea in 1992 and summarized it in a book called The Life of the Cosmos. 
34 Formally called TNGS – Theory of Neuronal Group Selection (Edelman, 1993). 
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may well have, and in fact is almost certain to have, both subsets and supersets of conscious 
entities in a cascade of nested conscious entities.  
… 
Is This Thing Conscious?  
Perhaps this question is central to settling on a veritable definition of consciousness. Can a case 
be made that protozoa are conscious?   
Shall we restrict the term conscious to only those 
animals with language, ostensibly humans? If one 
day we find clear-cut evidence that dolphins have 
language, then shall we add them to the 
consciousness club as well? And would this mean, 
that if dolphins had language 100,000 years ago 
and humans did not, that dolphins would have 
developed consciousness before humans?  
Shall we deem that all humans, with or without 
language, to be conscious? So now we would have 
some criteria other than language to fit the 
classification. Would these criteria include clear 
evidence of self and self-awareness? 
A self-awareness attribute would open the flood gates to include a menagerie of other 
organisms far beyond our household pets. But where would the line be drawn? Could we 
include small rodents, but exclude frogs? And on what basis? Both seem to be well aware of 
their respective environments. They search or hunt for food, they attempt to escape danger; 
they use vocalizations and appear that they experience pain. 
Without being overtly arbitrary, it is difficult to know where to draw the line with dog, cats, 
mice and frogs. It would seem that any definition would necessarily be anthropocentric. Nearly 
every definition starts with human characteristics and lops off traits that one feels can be 
omitted while still retaining enough of a human-like experience to be called conscious. 
Is it sufficient for consciousness to emerge if an organism has a brain? For it would be difficult 
to assess what criteria would be necessary to differentiate brains with and without 
consciousness. What could we say is the factor to divide those brained animals with 
consciousness from those without consciousness? Size? Number of neurons? The brain of the C. 
elegans nematode worm has just 302 neurons, but in spite of this, it is able to carry out the same 
requisite functions as the nervous systems of higher organisms. The nematode may be small, 
but seems to relate to its environment just as well as larger brained animals relate to theirs. 
How many neurons does it take to have a conscious experience? 
The reason these questions are so difficult to answer is the same reason that the hard problem 
of consciousness is so difficult to answer; in fact, they are really the same question. The answer 
to the question can only be known by the organism having the first person experience.  
Figure 15: Paramecium 
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So, is a paramecium conscious and what kind of consciousness would it be if it is? Well, who 
knows? It’s a matter of definition, falling within the rubric of the language of another species — 
the one doing the judging. The paramecium says it’s a no brainer. It’s doing just fine going about 
its business just the way it is. How humans characterize its intellect and life experience is of no 
concern. It simply does what it has to do to play out the possibilities made available by its 
genetic program.  
… 
The conceptualization of both consciousness and evolution should be generalized so they form 
an integral and fundamental part of how the laws of nature are perceived. By limiting the scope 
of either, we leave ourselves with gaping holes in the explication of how things evolved from the 
big bang to the present. In the case of consciousness, we would not only need to explain the 
phenomenon of consciousness in humans, but also how it arose from non-conscious entities. 
Evolution is somewhat simpler. We need only to push back the clock and become more inclusive 
in the way we think about the laws of nature, while blotting out the entrenched demarcations 
separating life from non-life. Wittgenstein may have overstated his case for language being able 
to account for all the problems of philosophy, but he was not far off the mark. Sometimes 
terminology alone can cloud our viewpoint. When the laws of nature are considered from an 
information-centric perspective, the world unfolds from a simple inception to the one of current 
complexity. The pieces all fit together quite nicely, without the gaping explicatory voids we find 
from other theories, even if the arguments may not seem all that convincing to those with 
entrenched presuppositions about how the world is presumptively put together.  
The laws of nature must be a rule-following system. This should be evident by the fact they are 
written in the language of mathematics and they are consistently predictive and postdictive. To 
understand the world from the context of the laws of nature, it should be obvious to turn to the 
fundamentals of mathematics as a foundation. Hence, the binary process and axiomatic systems 
are the keys. Consciousness must also fit into this schema, not the other way round. It is just one 
aspect of the process whereby entities decide what to do next, which is analogous to the playing 
out the laws of nature. What we typically call perceptual consciousness (as opposed to the more 
generic constates) may very well be epiphenomenal, and may not have any significant causal 
role to play in high level decision processing. The oddity of blindsight is one of the pointers 
toward such epiphenomenalism (Butler, 2003; de Gelder, 2010). In the end, consciousness 
becomes a term that needs revision and those in the field should find a common ground on the 
terminology used to cover this central theme of our perception of the world.  
The lack of significant progress in formulating a theory of consciousness is due to a wide variety 
of factors, many of which have been discussed herein. To best sum it up, it has been putting 
consciousness outside of nature that has been at the heart of the problem. The term 
Naturalizing Consciousness (Edelman, 2003) can be a bit misleading due to the equating of 
natural with physical, to the exclusion of information-based theories, as if they were not natural. 
There has been too much focus on human consciousness as opposed to more generalized 
conceptualizations, as well as the persistent intrusion of the mind-body problem into the 
debate. The hard problem of consciousness and physicalism are like two trains speeding toward 
each other on the same track. It is truly hopeless to find a solution in this capacity; nor will the 
discounting of consciousness as an entity in the world make it go away. Some of the proposed 
solutions for human consciousness would not explain how other organisms interact with their 
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environments. The individual and collective decisions of termites are just as much a part of the 
natural world as the individual and collective decisions of humans. Whatever we are to make of 
the decision level processes of termites would have to likewise apply to humanity.  
One can metaphorically represent the phenomenological consciousness of a person by the flow 
of images on a television screen. When the television is off, not powered up, not turned on, 
effectively not in a conscious state, the perception of the world is non-existent. But the world is 
still there to be perceived. The EMR responsible for the picture that could emerge on the screen, 
that is, a possibility of a state of affairs, is waiting to be expressed. When the television is 
switched on, the only thing that changes is that the picture on the screen goes from a potential 
state to a realized state. Effectively, not all that much changes. The turning on of 
phenomenological consciousness is like the flick of a switch, so to speak, that unfolds the 
physical isomorphism that we perceive as the experiential world, effectively bringing the world 
to life. Correspondingly, one can say that to flick the switch brings the television to life as well. If 
there so happens to be a second television in the same room, it would have no idea whether the 
first was on or off; television two could not say what it was like to be television one. It is not as if 
the conscious experience creates the world, but only a kind of perception of the world — a 
perception that we call the physical world. As such, there is not really any substantive difference 
between human consciousness and the physical world as it is actually experienced by humans, 
and clearly it is very much a subjective reality.  
The solution of the hard problem of consciousness is solved by the vanishing of the problem. 
The hard problem is produced within a system of propositional logic which does not have 
within its construct any means to access the information required to produce a satisfactory 
answer. To the pre-linguistic human being, Homo sapiens, the world simply presents itself as it 
does and there are no baffling questions asked as to how that comes about. The linguistic Homo 
deceptus, however, does have a formal system for posing such a question. Unfortunately, we 
must resign ourselves to the realization that the answer resides outside this system and 
phenomenological aspects of consciousness cannot be resolved within the language system. The 
hard problem of consciousness does not really exist. It is a bit of a misnomer which should be 
restated as the hard problem of language. 
Perhaps most significantly, it should be appreciated that language is as much a part of the 
evolutionary process as everything else. It is competing with other influences on our behavior to 
affect a selectively beneficial outcome for itself via its hosts. As such, language can be regarded 
as a kind of parasite, infecting its host for the benefit its own propagation. Language is a vector 
of delusion. In Homo deceptus it has managed to subsume much of the behavioral influences that 
have served other species well enough to survive and be our contemporaries. There is no 
predestination to the outcome of this ongoing process. In fact, there is every possibility that 
language will cause the extinction of its principal host species by dint of self-deception.  
By one means or another we are probably in the final generations of our species. Language will 
succeed in producing one of two outcomes within the next century or so. The first is extinction 
by killing its host by any of the numerous means that it has furnished to humanity over the 
years, most likely through catastrophic war or environmental collapse. The other, which I 
consider more likely, is through the cooptation of natural selection itself, from a balanced 
process of many influences to a controlled process. Homo deceptus will have effectively 
mastered the process of evolution so that it supplants what was formerly done by a more 
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interdependent aggregate of natural forces. The laws of physics will remain the same, but 
nature will have gone through a phase change.  
For all we know, something similar has already taken place somewhere else in the universe, or 
perhaps in a great many places. And in some future phase of evolution there will be a process of 
naturally selecting the fittest of formal systems of logic, in which our successor species may be a 
participant. There seems a certain inevitability about the emergence of language, as it is so 
closely tied to the very essence of the laws of nature. There is no moralizing about this. It is just 
whatever path the master program has within itself to unfold, something perhaps to be 
understood by future generations. It is what it is.  
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Homo Deceptus - Final Thoughts  
“Nature is the source of all true knowledge. She has her own logic, her own laws; she has no 
effect without cause nor invention without necessity.” — Leonardo da Vinci 
 
The aim of this book in the broadest sense was to rethink the relationship between logic and the 
physical world, or if one prefers, the relationship between mathematics and physics. This in 
itself is not such a novel idea. The difficult part in dealing with such weighty issues is how to 
construct a framework that sets out the order and boundaries in which these matters can be 
properly addressed, while limiting the leakage into a world of linguistic nonsense. From the 
human perspective, the world is not about what exists but rather about what can be said. 
After such a prolonged period of success, it would be hard to argue that science is in crisis. But 
from deep within its bowels, all is not well, and many sense that there are troubling signs ahead. 
The uncanny relationship between mathematics and physics has been a major area of such 
concerns (Rosinger, 2007; Tegmark, 2008; Wigner, 1995). There is a deep philosophical 
question here that needs resolution if we are to attain a more foundational understanding of the 
universe. A resolution to the missing mass problem and quantum gravity may well be found 
within the current scientific paradigm, but is it likely to shed light on the more fundamental 
questions of reality? We have been in this particular paradigm for around a hundred years. It 
may be reaching the point of exhaustion, at least in its ability to answer the philosophical 
questions it has raised. 
Science wants to be the most reliable system for the production of knowledge about the world. 
It also wants to liberally use the word reality to differentiate itself from other systems 
purporting to describe the world. Most scientists would like to use words like truth and real to 
distinguish the kind of knowledge they produce from that professed by religions. Is there 
something that science is lacking that it has failed to become the unchallenged account of how 
the world operates? Or is it just that science lacks the political clout to wrest control from 
competing philosophies. It really shouldn’t matter what the majority of the world thinks; 
nonetheless, science would like to provide a compelling narrative that would be hard to reject. If 
science can convince itself it is on the right track, the rest should fall into line. But it needs to 
deal with some of the thornier problems that persist within its ranks. 
For science to successfully move forward on these matters it is imperative to go through a 
rigorous redefining of what it is. At least informally, this is already happening. But the general 
disdain toward digital physics within scientific orthodoxy is but one example that there is still a 
long way to go. As reassuring as having testable hypotheses underpinning science might be, it is 
also limiting its reach into theoretical models which are not, at least at present, testable. It does 
not mean that these models are incorrect. Nor should it mean that such models cannot be 
substantiated through other evidence-based methodologies. The formal refining of science that I 
am suggesting would open science to other philosophical frameworks which meet the general 
principles of the scientific endeavor. 
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This framework for a new kind of science can be summarized as follows: 
1. Science can be reformulated into an ordered structured framework which at the very 
least acknowledges the significance of issues that it has yet to seriously consider as part 
of scientific orthodoxy. 
2. Science purports to assert scientific truths, but should refrain from calling these 
assertions reality. 
3. Scientific truths are theorems derived from formal systems of logic falling within the 
scientific belief system, such being defined by its axioms. This body of knowledge is 
derived from language and mathematics, which should be at the top of the list of the 
axioms of science.  
4. Science should abandon the pretense of conferring objective knowledge and replace it 
with a formalized axiomatic system of what it purports to be, including its boundaries 
and limitations. 
5. As science incorporates observation and observables as a part of its system, it should 
categorically confront the nature of consciousness and its role in scientific observation. 
The plausibility of scientific truth is dependent on it, and what can be said to be 
scientific truth must be attenuated to the extent of any lack of incorporation of a theory 
of consciousness into the wider body of science.  
6. The concepts of information theory, computation and digital physics should be 
welcomed into the main body of scientific theory. 
7. The concept of evolution should be broadened so that it reaches beyond the definition of 
life and incorporates all that is within our universe. Evolution should be seen as a 
characteristic of the laws of nature.  
Science has always been good at dealing with its paradigm shifts, so there should not be much 
fretting about why it seems to be taking so long. When you read about the history of these major 
transitions in thought, they appear to happen rather quickly, but when one is living through 
them, they seem to take forever.  
Whether it is by common sense, religious belief or scientific theory, we want to understand how 
the past became the present and if it is possible to predict the future from what we know of both 
the past and the present. In this light we might say that the central issue for science is 
determining how things know what to do next, which in keeping with the tenor of this text can 
be restated: How do things decide what to do next? It doesn’t matter what things we are talking 
about; it can be people or it can be electrons. Additionally, we not only want to understand how 
people decide what to do next and how electrons decide what to do next, but also how the 
electrons that reside in the bodies of people decide what to do next, all in sync with the higher 
level decisions made by the individual containing those electrons. 
Complex organisms run internal programs cultivating sub-modules which enable modifications 
and variations to the program so that behavior is learned from environmental interactions. 
Learning is a high level feedback loop supported by some incalculable number of lower level 
nested feedback loops in a two-directional coordinated dance perhaps drilling all the way down 
to Planck scale dimensions. 
There is a great predilection to think of ourselves as something more than just some kind of 
computing machine. We see a computer as a bunch of electronics in a box, and we want to be 
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more than that. These predispositions will either drive us toward or away from a particular 
theory that purports to describe the universe and our place in it. It is difficult to ask someone to 
be open-minded when the mind is a substantially closed system with small vents to the outside 
world, filtering what comes in and what goes out. It is likewise difficult to ask one to be 
objective when such a thing is an impossibility. Yet there is a way around these seemingly 
insurmountable problems. For me, it was Wittgenstein that opened the door to a pathway to 
thinking about the world while dealing with such perplexities. 
… 
What can we say about the world without speaking nonsense? How can we convert truth into 
reality without falling afoul by the very mechanisms that produce the truths that we wish to 
assert as reality? How much of what we think we know about the world can be incorporated 
into a broad and consistent theory so that there are no contradictions within such a theory? 
In order to answer these questions, some of the certitude we would have liked to attribute to 
nature had to be abandoned. In its place boundaries were established limiting the certitude but 
expanding upon what can be said within that context. As with the uncertainty principle, the less 
certain we are about something the more can be said about it, and conversely, the more certain 
we are about something the less can be said about it. Both postures have been taken in this book 
at various times to suit the situation at hand. But my preference has been to aim for certitude 
when possible and to structure the arguments in that vein. In keeping with the spirit of 
Wittgenstein, we may limit what can be said about the world, but that which can be said, can be 
said clearly. 
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Glossary 
Angstrom One ten-billionth of a meter. Symbol: Å 
 
Anthropic Principle In astrophysics and cosmology, the anthropic principle is the 
philosophical consideration that observations of the physical 
Universe must be compatible with the conscious life that observes it. 
 
Blindsight Blindsight is the ability of people who are cortically blind due to 
lesions in their striate cortex, also known as the primary visual 
cortex, to respond to visual stimuli that they do not consciously see. 
The majority of studies on blindsight are conducted on patients who 
are blind on only one side of their visual field. Following the 
destruction of the striate cortex, patients are asked to detect, localize, 
and discriminate amongst visual stimuli that are presented to their 
blind side often in a forced-response or guessing situation, even 
though they cannot actually see the stimulus. Research shows a 
surprising amount of accuracy in the guesses of blind patients. 
Blindsight challenges the common belief that perceptions must enter 
phenomenological consciousness to affect our behavior. This 
phenomenon shows our behavior can be guided by sensory 
information of which we are consciously unaware.  
 
Attractor An attractor is a set towards which a variable, moving according to 
the dictates of a dynamical system, evolves over time. That is, points 
that get close enough to the attractor remain close even if slightly 
disturbed. In finite-dimensional systems, the evolving variable may 
be represented algebraically as an n-dimensional vector. The 
attractor is a region in n-dimensional space. In physical systems, the 
n dimensions may be, for example, two or three positional 
coordinates for each of one or more physical entities. If the evolving 
variable is two- or three-dimensional, the attractor of the dynamic 
process can be represented geometrically in two or three 
dimensions. An attractor can be a point, a finite set of points, a curve, 
a manifold, or even a complicated set with a fractal structure known 
as a strange attractor. If the variable is a scalar, the attractor is a 
subset of the real number line. Describing the attractors of chaotic 
dynamical systems has been one of the achievements of chaos 
theory. A trajectory of the dynamical system in the attractor does not 
have to satisfy any special constraints except for remaining on the 
attractor, backward and forward in time. The trajectory may be 
periodic or chaotic. If a set of points is periodic or chaotic, but the 
flow in the neighborhood is away from the set, the set is not an 
attractor, but instead is called a repeller (or repellor). 
 
Cellular Automata 
 
 
Cellular automata (CA) are discrete, abstract computational 
systems that have proved useful both as general models of complexity 
and as more specific representations of non-linear dynamics in a 
variety of scientific fields. Firstly, CA are (typically) spatially and 
temporally discrete: they are composed of a finite or denumerable set 
of homogeneous, simple units, atoms or cells. At each time unit, the 
Homo deceptus by Bruce Bokor 112 
cells instantiate one of a finite set of states. They evolve in parallel at 
discrete time steps, following state update functions or dynamical 
transition rules: the update of a cell state obtains by taking into 
account the states of cells in its local neighborhood (there are, 
therefore, no actions at a distance). Secondly, CA are abstract, as they 
can be specified in purely mathematical terms and implemented in 
physical structures. Thirdly, CA are computational systems: they can 
compute functions and solve algorithmic problems. Despite 
functioning in a different way from traditional, Turing-machine-like 
devices, CA with suitable rules can emulate a universal Turing 
machine, and therefore compute, given Turing's Thesis, anything 
computable.  
 
Computation Space See Logical Space 
 
Constate System state assessment. Symbol: Tc. A term used in this book to 
represent a state in logical space associated with consciousness. 
 
Deductive Reasoning 
 
Deductive reasoning, or deduction, starts with a general case and 
deduces specific instances. Deduction starts with an assumed 
hypothesis or theory. Deduction is used by scientists who take a 
general scientific law and apply it to a certain case, as they assume 
that the law is true. Deduction can also be used to test an induction 
by applying it elsewhere, although in this case the initial theory is 
assumed to be true only temporarily. 
Deductive reasoning assumes that the basic law from which you are 
arguing is applicable in all cases. This can let you take a rule and 
apply it perhaps where it was not really meant to be applied. 
Scientists will prove a general law for a particular case and then do 
many deductive experiments to demonstrate that the law holds true 
in many different circumstances. In set theory, a deduction is a 
subset of the rule that is taken as the start point. If the rule is true 
and deduction is a true subset (not a conjunction) then the deduction 
is almost certainly true. Using deductive reasoning usually is a 
credible and 'safe' form of reasoning, but is based on the assumed 
truth of the rule or law on which it is founded. Deductive conclusions 
can be valid or invalid. Valid arguments obey the initial rule. For 
validity, the truth or falsehood of the initial rule is not considered. 
Thus valid conclusions need not be true, and invalid conclusions may 
not be false. 
 
Formal System A formal system is broadly defined as any well-defined system of 
abstract thought based on the model of mathematics. 
Euclid's Elements is often held to be the first formal system. 
The entailment of the system by its logical foundation is what 
distinguishes a formal system from others which may have some 
basis in an abstract model.  
 
Each formal system has a formal language, which is composed by 
primitive symbols. These symbols act on certain rules of formation 
and are developed by inference from a set of axioms. The system thus 
consists of any number of formulas built up through finite 
combinations of the primitive symbols—combinations that are 
formed from the axioms in accordance with the stated rules. 
Homo deceptus by Bruce Bokor 113 
 
Formal systems in mathematics consist of the following elements: 
 
1. A finite set of symbols (i.e. the alphabet), that can be used for 
constructing formulas (i.e. finite strings of symbols). 
2. A grammar, which tells how well-formed formulas 
(abbreviated wff) are constructed out of the symbols in an 
alphabet. It is usually required that there be a decision 
procedure for deciding whether a formula is well formed or 
not. 
3. A set of axioms or axiom schemata: each axiom must be a wff. 
4. A set of inference rules 
 
Fredkin Gate 
 
The Fredkin gate (also CSWAP gate) is a computational circuit 
suitable for reversible computing, invented by Edward Fredkin. It is 
universal, which means that any logical or arithmetic operation can 
be constructed entirely of Fredkin gates. The Fredkin gate is a 
three-bit gate that swaps the last two bits if the first bit is 1. 
 
Hilbert space The mathematical concept of a Hilbert space, named after the 
German mathematician David Hilbert, generalizes the notion of 
Euclidean space. It extends the methods of vector algebra and 
calculus from the two-dimensional Euclidean plane and 
three-dimensional space to spaces with any finite or infinite number 
of dimensions. A Hilbert space is an abstract vector space possessing 
the structure of an inner product that allows length and angle to be 
measured. Furthermore, Hilbert spaces must be complete, a property 
that stipulates the existence of enough limits in the space to allow the 
techniques of calculus to be used. 
 
Inductive Reasoning 
 
Inductive reasoning, or induction, is reasoning from a specific case or 
cases and deriving a general rule. It draws inferences from 
observations in order to make generalizations. 
 
Information Space See Logical Space 
 
Isomorphism An Isomorphism is an information preserving transformation. An 
isomorphic relationship between two entities can be said to exist if 
one entity can be mapped onto the other so that for each part of the 
first entity there is a corresponding part in the second. If a certain 
dynamic in the physical world can be described by a mathematical 
formula then we can say, at least for this case, that an isomorphic 
relationship exists between that dynamical system and the formula. 
We can generalize this by saying that there is an isomorphic 
relationship between mathematics and the physical world, 
recognizing that both mathematics and the physical world are rather 
large concepts and this generalization would require a great deal of 
specification. 
 
Language: A Formal 
Symbolic System 
Language as used in this book is a formal system of signs governed 
by grammatical rules of combination to communicate meaning. This 
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 definition stresses the fact that human languages can be described as 
closed structural systems consisting of rules that relate particular 
signs to particular meanings. This structuralist view of language was 
first introduced by Ferdinand de Saussure, and his structuralism 
remains foundational for most approaches to language today. Some 
proponents of this view of language have advocated a formal 
approach to studying the structures of language, privileging the 
formulation of underlying abstract rules that can be understood to 
generate observable linguistic structures. The main proponent of 
such a theory is Noam Chomsky, who defines language as a particular 
set of sentences that can be generated from a particular set of rules. 
This definition of language is commonly used in formal logic, and in 
formal theories of grammar and in applied computational linguistics. 
In the philosophy of language these views are associated with 
philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, early Wittgenstein, Alfred 
Tarski and Gottlob Frege. 
 
Logical Space; 
Information Space; 
Computational Space 
All three terms are used interchangeably throughout this book and 
are representations of abstract non-physical binary spaces. They can 
be considered nuances of the same concept. The preference for one 
term over another mostly depends on the context.  
 
A logical space is a generalized binary process space used for symbol 
manipulation, and particularly the evaluations of propositions or 
similar logical constructs. More generally, it is the space in which 
objects and states of affairs exist. This is the most general kind of 
space there is, so everything that exists and everything that could 
exist exists in logical space. The term originates in Boltzmann's 
generalized thermodynamics, which treats the independent 
properties of a physical system as defining separate coordinates in a 
multidimensional system the points of which constitute the 
‘ensemble of possible states’. The Tractatus does not define the term 
‘logical space’, but clearly it refers to the ensemble of logical 
possibilities. Logical space stands to ‘reality’, the existence and non-
existence of states of affairs (TLP 2.05), as the potential to the actual. 
The term conveys the idea that logical possibilities form a ‘logical 
scaffolding’ (TLP 3.42), a systematic manifold akin to a coordinate 
system. The world is the ‘facts in logical space’ (TLP 1.13), since the 
contingent existence of states of affairs is embedded in an a priori 
order of possibilities. There are several dimensions to the analogy 
between space and the ensemble of logical possibilities.  A ‘place’ in 
logical space is determined by a ‘proposition’ (TLP 3.4–3.42), which 
here means an elementary proposition. It is a possible state of affairs, 
which corresponds to the two ‘truth-possibilities’ of an elementary 
proposition – being true or being false (TLP 4.3ff.).  
 
Information space is used primarily to indicate the storage of binary 
information or bits. Computational space is most often used for 
transformations in a binary process, such as the execution of an 
algorithm or computer program. 
 
Maxwell's Demon 
 
A hypothetical being imagined as controlling a hole in a partition 
dividing a gas-filled container into two parts, and allowing only 
fast-moving molecules to pass in one direction, and slow-moving 
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molecules in the other. This would result in one side of the container 
becoming warmer and the other colder, in violation of the second law 
of thermodynamics. 
 
Planck Time 
 
Planck time (tp) is the time it would take a photon travelling at the 
speed of light to cross a distance equal to the Planck length. This is 
the ‘quantum of time’, the smallest measurement of time that has any 
meaning, and is equal to approximately 10-43 seconds. 
 
 
  
Predicate Logic Sometimes called first-order logic or first-order predicate logic, it is a 
fundamental system of mathematical logic. 
 
Propositional Logic A subset of predicate logic that does not use quantified variables.  
 
Quantum 
Entanglement 
Quantum entanglement is a product of quantum superposition. It is a 
physical phenomenon that occurs when pairs of particles are 
generated or interact in ways such that the quantum state of each 
member must subsequently be described relative to the other. 
 
Tautology   A proposition that is true regardless of what is and what is not the 
case. As such, tautologies lack sense (but are not nonsense) and say 
nothing. Wittgenstein asserts that the propositions of logic are 
tautologies, thus underscoring the idea that the propositions of logic 
cannot say anything about the world. 
 
Turing Machine (TM) A Turing machine is a hypothetical device that manipulates symbols 
on a strip of tape according to a table of rules. Despite its simplicity, a 
Turing machine can be adapted to simulate the logic of any computer 
algorithm. 
 
Universal Turing 
Machine (UTM) 
In computer science, a universal Turing machine is a Turing machine 
that can simulate an arbitrary Turing machine on arbitrary input. 
The universal machine essentially achieves this by reading both the 
description of the machine to be simulated as well as the input 
thereof from its own tape. 
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